Historic Trial Transcripts
Linda Kasabian: Day ten Testimony, August 7, 1970
LINDA KASABIAN,
the witness on the stand at the time of the adjournment, resumed the stand and testified further as follows:
CROSS-EXAMINATION (Resumed)
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Now, Mrs. Kasabian, when you saw the tall man being injured, did you start crying?
A. I don’t think so.
Q. You didn’t cry then, did you, Mrs. Kasabian?
A. No.
Q. When you saw the lady stretched out on the grass, were you crying then?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, that assumes a fact not in evidence, she never testified she saw the woman sprawled out. She said she saw Sadie chasing the woman with an upraised knife.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. SHINN: Your Honor, that is a misstatement of fact.
MR. STOVITZ: That’s right. He didn’t mean Sadie, he meant Katie.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Yes, I meant Katie, I apologize.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. KANAREK: Q. Now, this knife—may I approach the witness, your Honor?
THE COURT: You may.
MR. KANAREK: This knife, Mrs. Kasabian, was your knife; right?
A. Yes.
MR. STOVITZ: Counsel, will you identify it by exhibit number, please?
MR. KANAREK: Yes. Exhibit 39.
MR. STOVITZ: Thank you, Counsel.
MR. KANAREK: Q. Now, Mrs. Kasabian, when you heard noises from this residence, Mrs. Kasabian, were you in a state of shock?
A. Yes. Still.
Q. You were in a state of shock when you heard the noises from the residence?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you recognize the noises from the residence?
A. They were screams.
Q. I mean, did you recognize whose voices were screaming?
A. It just sounded like voices. I couldn’t tell.
Q. Now, these people that were in the house were your friends; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Mr. Watson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Miss Atkins; they were your friends, right?
A. Yes.
Q. And directing your attention to those screams, you didn’t know who was screaming, did you?
A. I didn’t know for positive but I had a feeling that they weren’t the ones screaming.
Q. You what?
A. I had a feeling that they weren’t the ones screaming.
Q. You had a feeling? Were you in a state of shock?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you think that they were not the ones screaming?
A. Yes.
Q. You thought they weren’t?
A. Yes.
Q. But your shock wasn’t such that it kept you from thinking that the people screaming were not your friends?
MR. STOVITZ: Objected to as argumentative, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Would you repeat your question?
THE COURT: Read the question.
(The question was read by the reporter.)
THE WITNESS: I don’t understand your question.
MR. KANAREK: Q. Well, as you heard the screams, did you think that the people screaming were your friends?
A. No.
Q. You definitely thought they were not your friends?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that right?
A. I had a feeling that it wasn’t them.
Q. In other words, you were willing to take a chance that it wasn’t them?
MR. STOVITZ: Objected to as argumentative, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Keep your voice up, please.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Now, when you heard the screams, Mrs. Kasabian, did you take that knife and go into the house in order to protect your friends?
A. No. I didn’t have the knife.
Q. Well, you were in a state of shock at that point; is that right?
A. Yes.
MR. STOVITZ: Objected to, your Honor, as being asked and answered.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. How do you know for sure whether you did take the knife and go in or not if you were in a state of shock?
MR. STOVITZ: I object to the question in that form, your Honor, as argumentative.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Well, having in mind this state of shock that you have spoken of, Mrs. Kasabian, was that state of shock such that you couldn’t think?
A. I could think.
Q. Pardon?
A. I could think.
Q. Well, then, would you describe in what way other than just uttering the word “shock,” s-h-o-c-k, other than just stating that word, in what way were your faculties affected by the shock that you stated you had?
MR. STOVITZ: Your Honor, this was asked and answered and thoroughly covered in yesterday’s transcript. I refer to Volume 43, morning session.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Now, Mrs. Kasabian, when you heard the screaming, was your state of shock such that you didn’t care about what was happening to anyone in that house?
A. Of course I did.
Q. You did care?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you tell us, how did you—what did you do after you felt this emotion of care?
A. I started to run towards the house to make it stop.
Q. You started to run towards the house to make it stop?
A. Yes.
Q. Right?
A. Yes.
Q. You had that knife on you as you ran towards the house, is that right, Mrs.—
A. No, I did not.
Q. May I finish?
A. No, I did not.
Q. You didn’t?
A. No.
Q. That was your knife; right, Mrs. Kasabian?
A. Are you talking about this knife (indicating)?
Q. That’s right.
A. Yes.
Q. You had that knife for a long time before you came to Spahn Ranch; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you carried that knife on you for protection; right?
A. No.
Q. You carried it to cut potatoes—to cut—
A. It was a kitchen knife.
Q. A kitchen knife?
A. Yes.
Q. But you carried it on you wherever you went?
A. Yes, sometimes.
Q. And so you ran towards the house?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, Mrs. Kasabian, I am going to—
Are you perfectly composed today, Mrs. Kasabian?
A. At the moment, yes.
Q. Pardon?
A. Yes, at the moment.
Q. At the moment.
Now, I will show you this picture—
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I would like to have this marked as a defense exhibit.
THE COURT: Don’t hold it up to the jury, Mr. Kanarek.
MR. KANAREK: I am trying not to.
MR. BUGLIOSI: It is a Grand Jury exhibit. The People request it be a People’s exhibit.
MR. KANAREK: I ask that that statement be stricken. I would like to approach the bench.
THE COURT: It will be marked as People’s 88 for identification.
MR. KANAREK: May I approach the witness, your Honor.
Q. Now, I show you a picture of a lady, and I ask you, Mrs. Kasabian, to look at that picture?
A. I looked at it.
Q. Would you take the picture, please.
THE COURT: She does not have to take it. She can see.
Let me see the photograph.
MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: Did you see the photograph, Mrs. Kasabian?
THE WITNESS: Yes, I did.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Now, Mrs. Kasabian, in connection with the lady that you say you saw, you say you saw at the house.
Does that appear to be the lady?
A. In the white gown.
Q. Pardon?
A. The white gown, I did not see her face. I just saw her white gown and long hair.
Q. I see, and in preparation for your coming to court has anyone shown you or attempted to speak with you concerning the identity of this lady in the white gown?
A. I don’t understand.
Q. Well, you have spoken with Mr. Bugliosi and Mr. Stovitz and police officers concerning this case, haven’t you?
A. Yes.
Q. Has anyone, has anyone in connection with this case shown you this picture before?
A. No.
Q. Has anyone shown you a picture of this white gown before?
A. No.
MR. STOVITZ: May counsel be requested to, if he is through questioning her about this picture, that the picture be lowered, your Honor. It seems to be causing some distress to the witness.
MR. KANAREK: I don’t know whether it is or not.
THE COURT: I don’t care for any comment, Mr. Kanarek.
Let’s go back behind counsel table and resume your examination.
MR. KANAREK: Very well, your Honor.
(Mr. Kanarek returns to the counsel table.)
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Now, Mrs. Kasabian, in connection with the interrogations that you have undergone, you have spoken to Mr. Bugliosi and Mr. Stovitz and various Los Angeles police officers and District Attorney’s representatives over an extended period of time, maybe some eight months or so, right?
A. For as long as I have been in jail, yes.
Q. And during that time, Mrs. Kasabian, has anyone shown you the picture of anyone who passed away?
A. No.
Q. Not once, have they?
A. No.
Q. And so, directing your attention to your conversations with Mr. Bugliosi and Mr. Stovitz, they have in their conversations with you shown you from time to time certain exhibits that you have seen in this courtroom, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, when you ran towards the house, Mrs. Kasabian, what was in your mind; what were you running towards the house for?
A. To make it stop.
Q. To make it stop?
A. Yes.
Q. You wanted all of this not to occur?
A. Yes.
Q. Right? And what was your state of mind; what were you thinking as you ran towards the house?
A. Just to make it stop. I wanted to make it stop. I don’t know.
Q. Well, at some time you stopped running, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you started walking?
A. I just stopped short.
Q. You stopped short?
A. Yes.
Q. And what was in your mind and what were you thinking when you stopped short?
A. I saw somebody come out of the door.
Q. And you saw this person coming out of the door, and what occurred when this person came out of the door?
A. He stood at a post for a minute and then he fell in the bushes.
Q. Pardon?
A. He stood at a post for a minute and then he fell in the bushes.
Q. I see. Then when you saw this person fall what was going through your mind?
A. I just knew for sure what was happening at that point and I was just so sorry, I just said, “Oh, God, I’m sorry, I think I said to myself, “Please make it stop.”
I was praying to God.
Q. You prayed to God then?
A. Yes.
Q. I see, and how long did you pray to God?
A. I don’t know, everything just stood still.
Q. I see. Were you in a state of shock?
A. Yes.
Q. I see. And you prayed to God for what period of time?
A. I don’t know.
Q. Well, can you give us an estimate?
A. It was probably just for a few seconds, but it seemed like forever.
Q. I see, and when this person—when this person fell to the ground did you do anything with regard to the physical body of the person that fell to the ground?
A. No.
Q. You just prayed?
A. I just stood there, I couldn’t do anything.
Q. You could not do anything?
A. Yes.
Q. What was keeping you from doing anything?
A. I don’t know, I just couldn’t do anything. I just stood there.
Q. Well, you’re telling us, Mrs. Kasabian, that when you heard the noises coming from the house you were thinking that your friends were in danger, right?
A. No, I did not think it was them.
Q. You felt that somebody else was in danger?
A. Yes.
Q. And why did you think that somebody else was in danger and your friends were not?
A. I just felt that they were killing these people because they killed that guy in the car.
Q. You were thinking in terms of they were killing these people because—
How was that, because they killed the guy in the car?
A. Yes.
Q. And by “they,” you meant who?
A. Well, it was Tex who killed the guy in the car.
Q. You just said they were killing these people the way they killed the guy in the car.
A. I made a mistake, I am sorry.
Q. What way did you make a mistake?
A. By using the word “they.”
Q. I see. And what did you mean to say instead of they?
A. That Tex killed the man at the car.
Q. Well, after Tex had killed the man at the car you had been to the back of the house, right?
MR. STOVITZ: Objected to as asked and answered, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: And your intent after you knew that the man in the car had been killed was to enter that house and steal?
MR. STOVITZ: Objected to—
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Is that correct?
MR. STOVITZ: Objected to, your Honor, as being asked and answered.
MR. KANAREK: Not so, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: You wanted to steal after you knew that the man in the car had died, right?
A. I guess so. I don’t know what I thought then.
Q. You don’t know?
A. I don’t know. I just did what Tex told me to do.
Q. I see. In other words, you were not operating under your own thinking. You were operating under Tex’s thinking.
A. I guess so.
Q. You guess so. Would you think for a moment?
A. I just know I did what he told me to do, and that is to go in the back of the house.
Q. And when you went in the back of the house it was not because you were walking of your own free will, you were walking under Tex’s will, is that it?
A. I don’t understand you.
Q. You don’t understand the question?
A. No.
Q. Did you go to the back of the house, Mrs. Kasabian, to steal because you wanted to steal?
A. Well, that is why I thought we went there.
Q. And that is why you went to the back of the house, right?
A. I guess so.
Q. All right, now, would you tell us, Mrs. Kasabian why you prayed to God over the gentleman who came out of the door and did not pray to God when the gentleman was shot by, you say, Tex?
A. It just did not seem real. I don’t know, I don’t know, it just did not seem real at that point until I saw this man.
Q. I see. The first killing did not seem real to you?
A. Yes.
Q. But the second killing did.
(Pause.)
MR. STOVITZ: Are you waiting for an answer?
MR. KANAREK: Yes, may we have an answer?
THE WITNESS: What was your question?
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: The first killing, Mrs. Kasabian, did not seem real to you, but the second one did, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, when you saw this lady in the white, what you call the white gown, did that seem real to you?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you see that lady in the white gown before you saw the man who you say fell over?
A. No.
Q. You saw the man who fell over first?
A. Yes.
Q. Then you saw the lady in the white gown?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you hear any screams coming from the house after you saw the lady in the white gown and after you saw the man who you say fell?
A. I don’t know. I turned and ranned away.
Q. Pardon?
A. I turned and ranned away—ran away.
Q. Well, when did you hear the screams—I will withdraw that.
May I ask you: When you turned and ran away, why did you run away?
A. There was nothing to do and I didn’t want to kill anybody, and I just ran.
That was the only thing I could do.
Q. You didn’t want to kill anybody?
A. Yes.
Q. Well, you say you didn’t have a knife?
A. Yes.
Q. Well, how would you have killed anyone?
A. I don’t know. Maybe if Tex or somebody told me. I didn’t know what was going to happen, and the best thing I could do was turn and run away.
Q. If Tex or someone told you? That went through your mind? If Tex or someone told you to do something, you would have done it, and then you would have killed somebody, and that is why you ran away?
A. No.
MR. STOVITZ: Just a moment. I object to the question as a characterization of her testimony and not her testimony at all. It is improper cross-examination.
THE COURT: Overruled.
Did you answer it?
THE WITNESS: I said no.
I don’t know what his question was.
MR. KANAREK: May the question be read, your Honor?
THE COURT: Read the question and the answer.
(The record was read by the reporter.)
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Then that isn’t the reason you ran away? What is the reason, Mrs. Kasabian?
A. There was just nothing I could do. I don’t know, I just turned and ran away.
Q. I see.
You had no reason for running away?
A. I think I have given you a reason. Maybe it is not a reason to you. I just did the only thing I could do.
Q. Then you have told us all of your reasons as to why you ran away?
MR. STOVITZ: That is objected to, your Honor, as argumentative.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Now, in running away, Mrs. Kasabian, you had to scramble over a fence; right?
A. Yes.
Q. When you ran away, Mrs. Kasabian, did you run away because you didn’t want to get caught in a place where someone had gotten killed? Is that the reason you climbed over the fence and scrambled away?
A. I don’t think so.
Q. You don’t think so but you might have?
A. I don’t remember that going through my head.
Q. Well, what was going through your head as you scrambled over the fence? What was your reason for scrambling over the fence?
A. I can’t remember thinking of anything until I got to the bottom of the hill.
Q. When you got to the bottom of the hill, Mrs. Kasabian—let me ask you—from the time you got over the fence until you got to the bottom of the hill, what was going through your mind?
A. I don’t know.
Q. Were you in a state of shock?
A. I just remember running. I don’t remember what I was thinking.
Q. Were you in a state of shock?
A. Yes.
Q. And so you don’t remember what occurred or what was in your mind; right?
A. I don’t know what I was thinking about. I don’t even think I was thinking.
Q. And your state of shock—you were also in a state of shook before you climbed over the fence; right?
A. Yes.
Q. So, your intent was to go into the house, run right into the house, at a time while you say you were in a state of shock, is that correct?
MR. STOVITZ: That is objected to, your Honor, as being argumentative, having been asked and answered, and also unclear as to what point counsel is talking about.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Well, Mrs. Kasabian, I am now asking you; At the time that you state that you ran toward the house with the thought that you were going into the house, at that time—at that time—were you in a state of shock?
A. Yes, I guess so.
Q. And so, being in a state of shock, you don’t know whether you went into the house or not; is that correct?
A. I know I didn’t go into that house.
Q. You know you didn’t?
A. Yes.
Q. Or is it a fair statement to say that you wish you didn’t?
MR. STOVITZ: That is objected to as argumentative, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may I approach the witness in connection with a photograph?
MR. STOVITZ: May the photograph be marked here, your Honor, as people’s next in order if it is a photograph that was furnished by the People?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, we would ask for it to be a defense exhibit. I think 89 is the number, but I ask for it to be a defense exhibit, your Honor.
THE COURT: It will be People’s 89 for identification.
MR. KANAREK: Q. Mrs. Kasabian, I show you this picture.
A. Oh, God.
MR. BUGLIOSI: She has already looked at it, your Honor. Is there any necessity for him to continue flashing it in front of her face?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, it seems like I am the one that is always the villain.
THE COURT: Just a moment.
Mrs. Kasabian, did you see the photograph?
THE WITNESS: Yes, I did.
THE COURT: Did you see it well enough to identify the person in the photograph?
THE WITNESS: He was the man that I saw at the door.
THE COURT: All right.
You may return.
MR. KANAREK: Thank you, your Honor.
MR. STOVITZ: So the record is clear, she is talking about Exhibit 89 for identification, Counsel?
MR. KANAREK: I guess so, your Honor.
Q. Mrs. Kasabian, why are you crying right now?
A. Because I can’t believe it. It is just—
I don’t know.
Q. You can’t believe what, Mrs. Kasabian?
A. That they could do that.
Q. That they could do that?
A. Yes.
Q. I see.
Not that you could do that, but that they could do that?
A. I know I didn’t do that.
Q. You were in a state of shock, weren’t you?
A. That’s right.
Q. Then how do you know it?
A. Because I know it.
I do not have that kind of thing in me to do such an animalistic thing.
Q. And you are basing it upon the fact that you don’t have it in you to do that kind of an animalistic thing?
A. Right.
Q. Is that why you are saying you didn’t do it; right?
A. I just know I didn’t do it, Mr. Kanarek.
Q. And your thinking, as you sit there on the witness stand, Mrs. Kasabian, is that they did it; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. I see.
Now, when you got to the bottom of the hill, Mrs. Kasabian, had you regained yourself from this state of shock?
A. Yes. I laid down on the ground for a few seconds.
Q. I see.
And after regaining yourself from a state of shock, you waited there for the people that you came there with?
A. Not when I was on the ground, no.
Q. Pardon?
A. Not when I was on the ground.
Q. What were you doing when you were on the ground?
A. I was thinking, trying to get my thoughts together.
Q. I see.
What were you thinking about?
A. My first thought was to go to the police and get help.
Q. I see.
Mrs. Kasabian, the day before you were arrested in New Hampshire, the day before you were arrested in New Hampshire, Mrs. Kasabian, what did you do?
A. The day before I was arrested?
Q. Right.
MR. BUGLIOSI: It is too broad a question, your Honor. I object on that ground.
THE COURT: I think you should pinpoint it a little more definitely, Mr. Kanarek. Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor.
Q. You tell us now, Mrs. Kasabian, that you were thinking about what to do and thinking about getting the police and helping as you could to do something in connection with this situation.
Between that instant and the day before you were arrested was how many days, Mrs. Kasabian?
A. I don’t know.
Q. Was it several months?
A. Yes.
Q. And the day before you were arrested you weren’t making any plans whatsoever to contact the police, were you?
A. Plans had gone through my head.
Q. Pardon?
A. Plans had gone through my head.
Q. But the reason that you didn’t contact the police is because you didn’t want to go to prison or the gas chamber; is that right?
A. No, that wasn’t my reason.
Q. Then what was your reason?
A. I was pregnant, I had my baby with me; I was just afraid.
Q. You were afraid?
A. I didn’t know who to go to or how to do it or anything.
Q. You didn’t know who to go to or how to do it?
A. Yes.
Q. But when you found out that the police wanted you and you knew that the jig was up, so to speak, you knew exactly what to do, didn’t you?
MR. STOVITZ: That is objected to as argumentative, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. When you found out that the police, Mrs. Kasabian, knew all about you and that there wasn’t any chance any more for you to hide what you had done, then you knew what to do; right?
A. I went to my mother and asked her what to do.
Q. After you knew that your mother knew that the police in New Hampshire were looking for you; right?
A. Yes.
Q. But the day before your mother knew, you were going along living your life without contacting the police or without doing anything about this matter or these matters at all?
A. Yes.
Q. Correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So, it is a fair statement that you were interested in No. One, Linda Kasabian?
A. No. I was more interested in my children.
Q. You were more interested in your children?
A. Yes.
Q. I see.
Then, what was the difference, Mrs. Kasabian, as far as your children were concerned, between the day before, when your mother and as far as you knew, the police, had no knowledge of you, and the day after, when the police and your mother had knowledge of you?
MR. STOVITZ: Objected to.
I am sorry, Counsel. I thought you had finished. You lowered your voice.
THE COURT: Had you finished the question?
MR. KANAREK: No.
MR. STOVITZ: I am sorry for the interruption.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. My question, Mrs. Kasabian, you say you were interested in the welfare of your children. Will you please tell us how the welfare of your children involved a difference in what you did the day before?
A. I don’t understand what you are saying.
Q. May I finish the question?
A. But you lost me in the beginning of your question.
Q. In other words, you had no interest in yourself; you had no interest in your physical welfare, the inconvenience, the misery of being in a jail cell, the possibility of going to the gas chamber.
You were not interested in that all these months: you were interested only in the welfare of your children, is that correct?
MR. STOVITZ: Objected to as argumentative, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled, you may answer.
THE WITNESS: I don’t know.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Your answer to that question is, “I don’t know.”
A. Yes.
Q. Is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. When you came back to Los Angeles, Mrs. Kasabian, to get your daughter, you knew that you were involved in seven killings, is that correct?
A. Yes, I guess so.
Q. And therefore, knowing that, knowing that—did you arrange for the welfare of your child, Tanya, so that she would not be involved emotionally or otherwise with the possible future arrest of you in connection with these matters?
A. Yes. I made a few phone calls for money to go back East, but I did not get any money and I hitchhiked to Florida.
And I rested for a while and then my father gave me money and I went to my mother’s house.
Q. Well, did it ever occur to you to work for money?
A. Yes, I did work.
Q. Pardon?
A. I did work.
Q. Did you work? Where did you work?
A. I babysat.
Q. You babysat?
A. Yes.
Q. And you babysat while you were in Florida?
A. Yes.
Q. And you babysat for spending money because your father and Judy Emmer were taking care of you, right?
A. Yeah, they gave me a place to stay and food to eat.
Q. Yes, but I’m talking about going out and getting a job and working, you did not do anything like that, did you?
A. No.
Q. Did you?
A. No.
Q. Now, when you got to the bottom of the hill, when you got to the bottom of the hill you say that all of these things were going through your mind about going to the police and all of that, right?
A. Yes.
Q. But the reason you did not go to the police was because you did not want to be arrested, is that right?
A. No, that was not my thought.
Q. Your own personal well-being had nothing to do with it?
A. No.
Q. You were thinking only of Tanya when you did not go to the police at the bottom of the hill?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Only Tanya?
A. Yes.
Q. Right?
A. Yes.
Q. And throughout these proceedings, until you got arrested you were thinking only of Tanya and the unborn child, is that right?
MR. STOVITZ: That is objected to, your Honor. That is a characterization of her testimony.
As to what time, Counsel?
He keeps jumping from one period of time to another. It is quite ambiguous as to what period of time he is talking about now.
THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer.
THE WITNESS: I thought that if I came forward that they would just say that I was crazy and that I was making it up, like they are trying to do now, and I just did not know what to do.
Yes, I guess I did think about myself.
THE COURT: We will take our recess now, Mr. Kanarek.
Ladies and gentlemen, do not converse with anyone nor form or express an opinion regarding the case until it is finally submitted to you
The Court will recess for 15 minutes.
(Recess.)
THE COURT: All parties, counsel and jurors are present.
You may proceed, Mr. Kanarek.
MR. KANAREK: Thank you, your Honor.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Now, Mrs. Kasabian, is there some reason, Mrs. Kasabian, that you have refused to speak with me concerning this case?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you tell us, Mrs. Kasabian, why is it you have refused to speak with me concerning this case?
A. Because I don’t trust you.
Q. You don’t trust me?
A. Yes.
Q. You think I am dishonest?
A. Yes.
Q. I see.
Now, do you see Mr. Fitzgerald there?
A. Yes.
Q. You have refused to speak with him also; right?
A. Right.
Q. You think he is dishonest?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And we have Mr. Shinn here. Do you think he is dishonest?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. I see.
And we have Mr. Hughes here. Do you think he is dishonest?
MR. STOVITZ: That assumes a fact not in evidence that Mr. Hughes requested to speak to this witness.
MR. HUGHES: I requested to speak to the witness, your Honor.
MR. KANAREK: I will lay the foundation.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Do you think Mr. Hughes is dishonest?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, Mrs. Kasabian, do you remember Mr. Reiner?
A. No.
Q. You don’t remember Mr. Reiner?
A. No.
Q. Now, Mrs. Kasabian, when you were at the various communes that you have spoken of, Mrs. Kasabian, did you have a state of mind concerning our form of government that you enunciated?
A. Yes.
Q. And this was at about the time of these events of the two days, the two nights, that you have spoken of?
A. I felt those things about the Government for a long time.
Q. Would you tell us your thinking, would you tell us what your thinking was concerning the government?
MR. BUGLIOSI: It’s irrelevant, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: May we approach the bench?
(The following proceedings were had at the bench out of the presence of the jury:)
MR. KANAREK: Mr. Bugliosi has interjected this issue. He has said that Mr. Manson, without belaboring it, Mr. Manson had certain ideas in connection with the revolution and various matters such as that.
It would be a denial of equal protection of the law under the 14th Amendment, and a denial of due process for me not to go into that, especially in view of Mr. Bugliosi’s position as to Mr. Manson, as part of our defense it is our position that this girl viciously entered into the killing of these people because she hated them because they were pigs, because they were people that she had a definite distaste for over and above, your Honor—
THE COURT: No one has precluded you from inquiring into that.
MR. KANAREK: I am laying a foundational question as to what was her state of mind at this time, what her attitude was towards our established form of government.
Mr. Bugliosi opened up this issue, your Honor, and his witness, it is my belief, has been in that house and participated in the killings.
THE COURT: Philosophical views in general, unless they can be related to this case, have no relevance.
That is the reason I sustained the objection.
I have no objection to your going into her state of mind in the various events surrounding this alleged crime.
You asked the question about “What do you think about our government,” or something like that.
MR. KANAREK: I will try to frame a proper question your Honor.
THE COURT: If you allege some connection which would lead from one place to another, there is a chain of relevancy, you may inquire.
MR. KANAREK: Very well, your Honor, I will try to do that.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. KANAREK: Thank you.
(The following proceedings were had in open court in the presence and hearing of the jury:)
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Now, Mrs. Kasabian, on these two nights that you have spoken of, these two nights were nights that involved conversation between you and the people in the automobile wherein you used the word “piggy”?
A. Where I used the word, piggy?
Q. Did you use the word, piggy, while you were in the automobile between the Spahn Ranch and the Tate residence?
A. No.
Q. You did not. You never used the word that night?
A. No.
Q. Did you use the word “pig,” that night?
A. No.
Q. Did anyone in the car use the word, pig, or piggy?
A. No, not that I recall.
Q. And directing your attention to your state of mind, to your state of mind, when you were at the Tate residence, what was your thinking concerning the people that lived at the Tate residence prior to the time that you entered the premises?
A. I don’t know.
Q. You don’t know.
When you went to the premises did you go there only for the purposes of stealing, Mrs. Kasabian?
A. Yes.
Q. No other purpose, right?
A. No.
Q. And the people that were with you, Mrs. Kasabian, entered the premises only for the purposes of stealing; is that correct?
MR. STOVITZ: The objection is that that calls for a conclusion of this witness as to what someone else’s purpose was, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Well, did you have a discussion? Did you have a discussion as you drove along in the automobile? Did you have a discussion which involved the purpose of going to the Tate residence?
A. The purpose?
Q. Yes.
A. No.
Q. No discussion was made by anybody?
A. There was a discussion but not as to the purpose, why we were going.
Q. The discussion had nothing to do with the purpose of going to the Tate residence; right?
A. No.
Q. Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And so, as far as you knew and were concerned, everyone in that car was going there only for the purpose of stealing?
MR. BUGLIOSI: I object, your Honor. It calls for a conclusion as to what other people were going there for.
MR. KANAREK: Talking about what she knew of her own knowledge.
MR. BUGLIOSI: She couldn’t know what they were thinking of unless they told her. She testified they did not tell her.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Excuse me just a moment, your Honor.
(Pause.)
Q. Now, Mrs. Kasabian, on the second night, when you were driving along on that night, there was a discussion concerning Mr. True; is that right?
MR. STOVITZ: As she was driving along or after she parked, counsel?
I object to the question as ambiguous.
MR. KANAREK: I think it is clear. I said as they were driving along.
THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer.
THE WITNESS: No.
MR. KANAREK: Q. Pardon?
A. No.
Q. You had no discussion concerning Mr. True as you were driving along?
A. No.
Q. I see.
While you were driving, on the second night, Mrs. Kasabian, did you utter any words from the time you say you left the ranch until you got to the home of Mr. True? Did any words come out of your mouth?
A. Before we got there?
Q. Yes.
A. No.
Q. You just sat there and said nothing, not one word in the entire time you were driving?
A. I may have said words, I don’t remember. I was mostly tired.
Q. You were exhausted?
A. Yes.
Q. Right?
A. Yes.
Q. You were just plain exhausted?
A. Yes.
Q. So you don’t recall what was said; right?
A. Not everything that was said, no.
Q. Well, were you sort of dozing off as you drove along?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall what was said in the automobile as you were driving along?
MR. STOVITZ: Your Honor, I will object to that as being ambiguous.
Before they got to Harold True’s house or after they got to Harold True’s house? What time? There was a large period of time there, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
You may answer.
THE WITNESS: There were a few conversations.
I don’t know what you are asking about.
MR. KANAREK: May the question be read, your Honor?
THE COURT: Read the question.
(The question was read by the reporter.)
THE WITNESS: Yes, I recall some things.
MR. KANAREK: Q. You recall some things?
A. Yes.
Q. And some things you don’t recall?
A. Sometimes I was sleeping.
Q. You were sleeping?
A. Yes.
Q. Because you were exhausted?
A. Yes.
Q. And about what percentage of time would you say, Mrs. Kasabian, you were sleeping?
A. I don’t know.
Q. Between the time you left the Spahn Ranch and the time you got to the vicinity of Harold True’s?
A. I don’t know.
I dozed off a few times when Charlie was driving.
Q. Would you tell us what percentage of the time?
A. I don’t know.
Q. Like, was it five per cent? 80 per cent? 90 per cent?
A. I don’t know. I didn’t sleep very long.
Q. Pardon?
A. I didn’t sleep very long. I dozed off a few times.
Q. You did not sleep very much of the time?
A. Yes.
Q. And while you were driving along did you smoke anything, Mrs. Kasabian?
A. Cigarettes.
Q. You smoked cigarettes while you were driving along?
A. Yes.
Q. And those cigarettes, did you have a package of cigarettes?
A. There was a pack of cigarettes in the car for all of us.
Q. What did you bring with you, Mrs. Kasabian, on that second night?
Would you tell us what you brought with you when you went—when you were driving, after having left the Spahn Ranch?
A. I had a few candy bars and a bag of peanuts.
Q. And what else?
A. I had some leather thong that Charlie gave me and that is all.
Q. Now, this leather thong that Charlie gave you—that you say that Charlie gave you?
A. Yes.
Q. That leather thong, somehow or other, you lost it, right?
A. I don’t know. I may not have lost it. It might still be in my pocket.
Q. Well, but between that day and this day you lost it, right?
A. I don’t know where it is.
Q. You don’t know where it is?
A. Yes.
Q. You prefer those words to that you lost it?
MR. STOVITZ: That is objected to as argumentative, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Well, when you left the Spahn Ranch, Mrs. Kasabian, you had this item that you are speaking of, the thongs?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you now have the thongs?
A. No.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may I have that exhibit?
THE COURT: What number, Counsel?
THE CLERK: 75 most likely, your Honor.
MR. KANAREK: May I approach the witness, your Honor?
THE COURT: You may.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. I show you, Mrs. Kasabian, an item which is marked No. 75 for identification.
Would you pick that up, please?
A. For what reason? I can see it.
Q. Well, you would rather not pick it up?
A. Well, it doesn’t matter.
Q. Well, would you please pick it up? Thank you. Now, would you look at it?
A. Yes.
Q. Does that appear to be the thong or thongs that you had?
A. Yeah, it looks like them.
Q. It looks like the thong that you had that night, right?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Thank you.
Q. Now, Mrs. Kasabian, when you arrived at the house, Harold True—in the area of the house next door to Harold True, by whatever means you arrived there, were you more tired when you got there than when you had left the Spahn Ranch?
A. I don’t know.
Q. Well, are the events of that night a little hazy to you, Mrs. Kasabian?
A. Well, the parts when I was dozing off, I don’t know what was said or where we were.
Q. Pardon?
A. The parts when I was dosing off, I don’t know what was said.
Q. I see. And, as you testify now, are the events that occurred on the second night a little bit hazy?
A. Not the parts that I heard, no.
Q. The parts that you heard—there’s no haze about those?
A. No.
Q. And there is no question in your mind that you lost a thong or thongs that night, is that correct?
MR. STOVITZ: That is objected to, your Honor, the characterization of the testimony.
She said she did not know what happened to them. She didn’t say she lost them.
It has been asked and answered.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: I just remember Charlie giving them to me and I don’t know—I don’t remember him asking them from me. If he did so they probably were still in my pants the whole night.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. All right.
A. They were probably in my pants the whole night but I did not check to see.
Q. You never checked to see them after that night?
A. No.
Q. After that night you haven’t seen them since?
A. Right.
Q. Correct?
A. Right.
Q. So there is no haze about that in your mind, I mean, you know for sure that what you have just said is true?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, Mrs. Kasabian, on how many instances, Mrs. Kasabian, did you have sexual relations with Mr. Watson?
A. Mr. Watson?
Q. Yes.
A. Two or three times.
Q. Two or three times?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, could it have been more than that?
A. Not that I can remember.
Q. You mean it might possibly be more than that?
A. It could be, yes, but I remember just specific instances, and possibly a third.
Q. One of them was the first night that you came?
A. Yes.
Q. Right?
A. Yes.
Q. Is it a fair statement that while you were at the Spahn Ranch you had sexual relations with many people?
A. Yes.
Q. With many men?
A. With the men at the ranch, yes.
Q. All of the men at the ranch; right?
A. Not all of the men, no.
Q. Well, will you tell us those with whom you had sexual relations?
A. Charlie, Tex, Bruce, a guy named Chuck, Bobbie. That is all.
THE COURT: What was the last name?
(The record was read by the reporter.)
THE WITNESS: And Clem.
MR. KANAREK: Anyone else?
A. No, not that I can remember.
Q. And it is a fair statement, is it, that you enjoyed sexual relations?
MR. BUGLIOSI: This is immaterial, object.
MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor, it is material. I can represent to the Court—
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Does your Honor wish me to enunciate why I believe it is material?
THE COURT: No, sir. Let’s proceed.
MR. KANAREK: Pardon?
THE COURT: Ask your next question.
MR. KANAREK: Q. Mrs. Kasabian, is it a fair statement that while you were at the ranch, and referring to the people that you have spoken of, you had sexual relations with these men from time to time during the time you were there?
A. Yes.
Q. And is it a fair statement that your sexual relations with these people covered the entire time, that is, practically each and every day you had sexual relations with someone or other?
A. No.
Q. Now, on how many days didn’t you have sexual relations?
A. I don’t know. I didn’t count them.
Q. Well, would it be a fair statement to say that you had sexual relations more than, let us say, 50 per cent of the time you were there?
MR. STOVITZ: You mean, taking the hours, or the days, Counsel?
MR. KANAREK: I don’t know.
Is the question unclear to you?
MR. STOVITZ: It is unclear to me. I object to it as being ambiguous, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Is it a fair statement, taking the total days involved, Mrs. Kasabian, that you were at the ranch, that you had sexual relations more than 50 per cent of those days?
A. No.
Q. Less than 50 per cent?
A. Yes.
Q. I see.
About what percentage? Taking up the total number of days that you were there, what percentage of those days did you engage in sexual activity?
A. I am not sure about percentages. I don’t know how to relate it in percentages.
Q. You don’t know what percentage means?
A. Yes, I do, but I don’t know how to relate it to you.
Q. Well, you were at the ranch for what period of time?
A. A little bit more than a month.
Q. Well, how many weeks?
A. I don’t know how many weeks.
Q. You don’t know how many weeks you were there?
A. Right.
Q. Can you give us an estimate as to how many weeks?
A. Probably five or six.
Q. Five or six?
A. Yes.
Q. Let us say that it was five weeks. Seven days in a week.
There would be 35 days.
Would you tell us on how many of those 35 days did you engage in sexual relations?
MR. STOVITZ: Your Honor, I object to the question.
The witness said five or six weeks, and counsel now chooses arbitrarily to take five weeks. It is a characterization of her testimony.
MR. KANAREK: I will be glad—all right, I will please Mr. Stovitz and—
MR. STOVITZ: Don’t please me, please the Court, Counsel.
THE COURT: Rephrase the question.
MR. KANAREK: All right.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Mrs. Kasabian, we will take six times seven, which is 42.
Of the 42 days that you were there, let us say you were there 42 days, on how many days did you have sexual relations?
A. Can I say it in terms of how many times I made love?
Q. That is what I am asking, right.
MR. BUGLIOSI: His question was number of days. Now she is answering, your Honor, in the number of times she made love. It could be more than once a particular day. So, I think the question and anticipated answer is just ambiguous.
THE COURT: Let’s find out what the answer is.
Mr. Kanarek added that that is what he was asking her in response to her question to him.
Are you able to answer that, Mrs. Kasabian?
THE WITNESS: How many times I made love?
THE COURT: That is the last question.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
Eleven times.
MR. KANAREK: I see.
Q. And that took place, you made love 11 times, and that took place on how many days?
A. Just throughout the time that I was there. I don’t know what day.
Q. But it is 11?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, of that 11, how many times did you make love to Mr. Manson?
A. Four times.
Q. Four times?
A. Yes.
Q. And of that, how many times did you make love to Mr. Watson?
A. I counted three.
Q. That makes four left over.
A. Yes.
Q. Did you ever make love on more than one day—pardon me—on a given day, more than once?
A. Not that I can recall.
Q. Not that you can recall?
A. Right.
Q. So that these 11 days were spread over—these 11 times were spread over 11 different days?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, directing your attention to your feelings for Tex.
Is it a fair statement that you felt that you were in love with Tex?
A. I was in love with everybody.
Q. Well, may we ask it this way: Were you especially in love with Tex?
A. No.
Q. You weren’t more in love with Tex than anyone else?
A. No.
Q. You loved everybody equally?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that right?
A. Sure.
Q. And this included the girls? You loved the girls and the boys equally well; is that a fair statement?
A. Well, I didn’t make love to the girls, so it was a different form of love, a different level of love that I had for the guys compared to the girls.
Q. I see.
But you loved all the guys the same?
A. Yes.
Q. And you didn’t love Tex any more than you loved Bobby?
A. No.
Q. Right?
A. No.
Q. And so, when you were there at the Tate residence, you were up there—or were you up there because you loved Tex?
A. I was up there because Charlie told me to come.
Q. Because Charlie told you to come, that is why you were there?
A. Yes.
Q. When Charlie told you to go up there, your mind was completely clear; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. You weren’t under the influence of any drug?
A. No.
Q. You weren’t under the influence of anything; right?
A. I was under the influence of Charlie.
Q. You were under the influence of Charlie?
A. Yes.
Q. When you were up there and all this killing was taking place at the Tate residence, you were under the influence of Tex, you did what Tex told you to do; right?
A. Yes.
Q. If I had been up there, you would have been under my influence; is that right?
MR. BUGLIOSI: This is argumentative and ridiculous.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. What I am saying, Mrs. Kasabian, your statement that you were under the influence of Charlie and that you were under the influence of Tex is a crutch in your mind; is that correct, Mrs. Kasabian?
MR. BUGLIOSI: That is argumentative, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Looking into your mind, Mrs. Kasabian, and recognizing the horrible things that occurred at the Tate residence, in your mind, is it a fair statement that you wish to have an excuse for what you did that night?
A. An excuse?
Q. Yes.
A. No.
Q. You are not looking for any reason why you yourself were not responsible for your own actions?
A. I have admitted what I did and I am taking responsibility for what I did.
Q. You have admitted what you did?
A. Yes.
Q. I see.
Now, what did you do that you have admitted?
A. I ran away, I went around the house, I threw clothing out, I threw guns and knives out. All those things I admitted to you.
And I admitted not killing people because I didn’t kill them.
Q. Go on.
A. All the other things that I have admitted to you.
Q. But in your mind, you haven’t admitted to anything wherein you did anything really wrong though; right?
MR. STOVITZ: That is objected to as argumentative, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: You have admitted to things, Mrs. Kasabian, or you have tailored your thinking to admit to things that really don’t matter, have you not?
MR. STOVITZ: Argumentative.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: How have you chosen these things that you have admitted to, Mrs. Kasabian?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Argumentative, your Honor.
MR. KANAREK: I have asked her how she chose them, your Honor.
THE COURT: I think the form of the question is objectionable, Mr. Kanarek.
Sustained.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Well, you have now told us everything you have admitted to?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, in connection with the second night, Mrs. Kasabian, would you tell us what you have admitted to?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, what he is asking for is the relation of her testimony all over again.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. BUGLIOSI: It is an incredibly broad question.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Now, Mrs. Kasabian, are you, Mrs. Kasabian, in your mind—in your mind—do you feel that these people that passed away at the Tate residence, passed away because of what you did?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, this calls actually for a legal conclusion.
MR. KANAREK: Not at all, your Honor. I am asking her for her subjective intent, her state of mind.
MR. BUGLIOSI: It is much too broad a question.
She may have some philosophical concept, your Honor, that because she was with these people that night she is responsible.
It is irrelevant what her philosophical state of mind is.
MR. KANAREK: I am not discussing her philosophical state of mind, I am asking her for her criminal responsibility, whether or not she feels that what she did—
THE COURT: I will sustain the objection to the question, Mr. Kanarek.
You may pursue the subject further but you will have to ask another question.
MR. KANAREK: Very well, your Honor.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Mrs. Kasabian, as you sit there on the witness stand right now, do you feel that you were at fault in connection with the passing away of the five people at the Tate residence?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Calls for a legal conclusion, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Mrs. Kasabian, when you were at the Tate residence you knew everything that you were doing, right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you were there doing what you did freely and voluntarily on your own part, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, as a result of this, these two nights and all of this, you are contributing information to someone, a writer, whereby you are going to get money, is that correct?
MR. BUGLIOSI: That is argumentative.
THE WITNESS: Would you repeat that?
THE COURT: Read the question.
(Whereupon, the reporter reads the pending question as follows:
“Q. Now, as a result of this, these two nights and all of this, you are contributing information to someone, a writer, whereby you are going to get money, is that correct?”)
THE WITNESS: No, it doesn’t concern the Tate case at all.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: It doesn’t?
Q. And in what way does it not—I will withdraw that.
You say—would you tell us what it does concern then?
A. Me, myself.
Q. Pardon?
A. Myself.
Q. You, yourself?
A. Yes.
Q. And someone is paying—is going to pay a large sum of money concerning you and yourself, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Is your state of mind, your thinking such that the reason someone is going to pay you that money has no relationship to what happened at the Tate residence?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Calls for a conclusion, your Honor, as to what someone else is thinking.
THE COURT: Read the question, please.
(Whereupon, the reporter reads the pending question as follows:
“Q. Is your state of mind, your thinking such that the reason someone is going to pay you that money has no relationship to what happened at the Tate residence?”)
THE COURT: Sustained. Just a moment, Mr. Kanarek.
(Pause.)
THE COURT: You may proceed, Mr. Kanarek.
MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Well, has anyone prior to the time that you were arrested, Mrs. Kasabian, ever offered you any large sum of money for your life’s story?
A. No.
Q. And is it true that this interest in you has taken place since you have been in custody in connection with the very matters before this court right new?
MR. STOVITZ: That is objected to, your Honor, when he said “very matters,” the witness answered it had something to do with her prior life before she got involved here.
THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer.
THE WITNESS: Would you read the question.
THE COURT: Read the question.
(Whereupon the reporter reads the pending question as follows:
“Q. And is it true that this interest in you has taken place since you have been in custody in connection with the very matters before this court right now?”)
THE WITNESS: Yes, I guess so.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. And your state of mind is such that as a result of these writings you will receive some money?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And is it a fair statement that your state of mind is such that the only way you can enjoy that money, those dollars, is to leave custody and walk out of this courtroom?
A. I don’t care about the money. I am doing it to pay my attorneys.
Q. I see. And you have no desire for the money whatsoever?
A. It doesn’t matter if it is there or not. I have never usually had money.
Q. What is that?
A. It doesn’t matter if I have money or not.
Q. It doesn’t matter whether you have money or not?
A. Yes.
Q. I see, and you were not going to get any of this money at all?
A. I am sure I will get some.
Q. And you know you will get some, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, did you know, Mrs. Kasabian, when you left, when you left the Tate residence that you, Tex, Sadie and Patricia Krenwinkel were going to go on a creepy-crawl mission?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, this calls for a conclusion. She testified to what she thought; she cannot testify to what they were thinking.
MR. KANAREK: That is not so, your Honor.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Unless they told her.
THE COURT: What isn’t so?
MR. KANAREK: Mr. Bugliosi answered his own objection.
If there was discussion, then of course she had reason to believe that as a result of this discussion, that everybody knew where the car was destined.
THE COURT: Read the question, please.
(Whereupon the reporter reads the pending question as follows:
“Q. Now, did you know, Mrs. Kasabian, when you left, when you left the Tate residence that you, Tex, Sadie and Patricia Krenwinkel were going to go on a creepy-crawl mission?”)
MR. STOVITZ: I think the question was “When you left for the Tate residence.”
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, is he asking me to second guess the reporter.
MR. STOVITZ: No, no, but the reporter sometimes—
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. You may answer.
THE WITNESS: Did I know if we were going to a creepy-crawly mission when we came from the Tate residence? I didn’t get the question.
THE COURT: You don’t understand it?
THE WITNESS: No.
MR. KANAREK: May the question be read?
THE COURT: Read the question once more.
(Whereupon the reporter reads the pending question once again as follows:
“Q. Now, did you know, Mrs. Kasabian, when you left, when you left the Tate residence that you, Tex, Sadie and Patricia Krenwinkel were going to go on a creepy-crawl mission?”)
THE WITNESS: No.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. You did not know that?
A. No.
Q. So that when you were driving along you were driving along having left the Spahn Ranch, all the guns and the knives were in the car, you had no knowledge that you were going on a creepy-crawl mission.
MR. BUGLIOSI: I object, he is assuming a fact not in evidence.
MR. STOVITZ: This is another example of how counsel asks one question one time—
THE COURT: Just make your objection.
MR. STOVITZ: I make the objection that the question is unclear, your Honor.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
Q. Now, Mrs. Kasabian, at some point—at some point—in that trip, did you become aware that it was going to be a creepy crawl mission?
A. I thought within my own mind that it was, yes.
Q. Well, you say, Mrs. Kasabian, that you weren’t on any drug that night?
A. Right.
Q. And you were on friendly terms with Mr. Watson, Susan Atkins and Patricia Krenwinkel?
A. Right.
Q. Was there any lack of ability on your part to talk?
A. No.
Q. Was there any lack of ability on the part of these other people to talk?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Objection. It calls for a conclusion.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Did you hear the other people talk, use the English language, in the car?
A. Driving to the Tate residence?
Q. Yes.
A. Tex talked.
Q. Tex talked?
A. Yes.
Q. You talked; right?
A. I don’t remember talking.
Q. You uttered no words at all?
A. Well, I must have but I don’t remember, I don’t know.
Q. You don’t know whether you did or not?
A. Right.
Q. And so you assumed that you were going on a creepy crawl mission at some point? You assumed that to be the case; right?
A. Yes.
Q. You didn’t know it when you started off?
A. I didn’t know it for a fact. I just thought it.
Q. You just thought it?
A. Yes.
Q. Well, when did it become in your mind a fact?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, that assumes a fact not in evidence.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Q. Well, at any time did it become a fact in your mind that you were going to be on a creepy crawl mission that night?
A. I don’t understand.
Q. You don’t understand that question?
A. No.
Q. Well, when you started out, your state of mind was such that you weren’t thinking that you were going on a creepy crawl mission?
A. I’m sorry, but I can’t understand you now.
Q. You don’t understand that question?
A. No.
Q. Well, when you left the Spahn Ranch, Mrs. Kasabian, was your state of mind such that you thought you were going on a creepy crawl mission?
A. I thought it, yes.
Q. You thought it?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, then, looking into your mind, at some point did you come to realize, instead of you just thinking that it was going to happen, that it was going to happen for sure?
A. No.
Q. You never figured out it was going to happen for sure?
A. No.
THE COURT: It is 12:00 o’clock, Mr. Kanarek.
Ladies and gentlemen, do not converse with anyone nor form or express any opinion regarding the case until it is finally submitted to you.
The court will recess until 2:00 p.m.
(Linda Kasabian resumes the stand.)
CROSS EXAMINATION (Continued)
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Mrs. Kasabian, did you see the tall man that you hitchhiked with in New Mexico in this courtroom this morning?
A. I wasn’t sure that it was him until on my lunch hour. I questioned if it was him, and I found out it was.
Q. Whom did you question?
A. My attorney.
Q. And what did your attorney tell you?
MR. BUGLIOSI: This calls for hearsay.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, this goes to state of mind.
MR. BUGLIOSI: What the attorney told her is certainly hearsay.
MR. KANAREK: It is not hearsay.
MR. FLEISCHMAN: Privileged.
MR. KANAREK: And it is not privileged either, your Honor, in the context of these proceedings.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Did you have a conversation with your attorney concerning this person that you saw or think you saw this morning in this courtroom that was in New Mexico with you?
MR. STOVITZ: I object to the question, your Honor, as being ambiguous.
She said she saw a person here in the courtroom. She says she thinks it is the same person. The way the question is asked, it is ambiguous.
MR. HUGHES: The answer is in.
MR. GOLDMAN: We also object on the ground of privilege.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: May we approach the bench, your Honor?
THE COURT: It is not necessary, Mr. Kanarek. We have gone over this.
Let’s proceed.
MR. KANAREK: Not in this connection, your Honor. However, I will proceed.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Mrs. Kasabian, the man that you saw in this courtroom, would you tell us about where he was sitting?
A. I believe it was chair No. 77, or the one in the front of it. I can’t really see.
Q. The one in front of 77?
A. Yes.
Q. 77, from where you are, is in which row?
A. I guess it is the second row. It is hard to tell.
Q. He was sitting in about No. 77; is that right?
A. He was in the first row, so I believe it was that seat.
Q. Now, as you were testifying, you knew that there was an order excluding witnesses from the courtroom; is that correct?
MR. BUGLIOSI: This is argumentative, your Honor. It also calls for a legal conclusion.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Q. Did you know that there was an order excluding witnesses from the court?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Same objection.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Q. Was there any sign of recognition made by you to this person in the courtroom?
A. No.
Q. There was no communication by any movement of the face or any portion of the body as far as anything that you have observed?
A. Well, I looked at him and I said to myself, “I think I know you,” but I couldn’t quite place his face.
Q. I see.
Did he make any kind of a motion to you?
A. No.
Q. And did you tell your attorney about this during the noon hour?
MR. GOLDMAN: Objection, your Honor.
MR. STOVITZ: It calls for hearsay, your Honor.
THE COURT: I didn’t hear the question. Read the question.
(The question was read by the reporter.)
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Q. Did you have a conversation with Mr. Fleischman during the noon hour?
MR. GOLDMAN: Objection on privilege, your Honor.
MR. KANAREK: The fact of conversation, your Honor, is not privileged.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Then what is the relevance?
I object on the ground that it is irrelevant, then, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Q. Was that Mr. Fleischman?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you have a conversation with Mr. Goldman during the noon hour?
A. Yes.
Q. During the noon hour, did you speak to Mr. Bugliosi?
A. No.
Q. Or Mr. Stovitz?
A. No.
Q. Did you speak to any law enforcement officers during the noon hour?
MR. STOVITZ: Other than the transportation officers, Counsel?
I am objecting to the question as ambiguous, your Honor. There are transportation officers that are law enforcement officers, and I believe that she speaks to them.
THE COURT: She may say so if she did.
MR. KANAREK: Presumably she will be questioned on redirect.
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. You may answer.
THE WITNESS: Yes, I have spoken to the transportation officers, the officers that are with me all day.
MR. KANAREK: You spoke to them during the noon hour?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, you say that money has never meant anything to you; is that right, Mrs. Kasabian?
A. I always usually managed without it somehow.
Q. You never have been concerned too much about having money or not?
A. No.
Q. Is that right?
A. Right.
Q. And you can get along without it?
A. Yes.
Q. Right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you don’t go out of your way to get money?
A. No.
Q. Is that right?
A. Right.
Q. Then would you tell us, Mrs. Kasabian, why, on the day prior to the date you were arrested, you made application for welfare in Milford, New Hampshire?
MR. STOVITZ: Objected to, your Honor, as immaterial and irrelevant, and assuming a fact not in evidence.
THE COURT: Just one moment, Mr. Stovitz.
Read the question, please.
(Whereupon, the question was read by the reporter.)
THE COURT: What was the objection?
MR. STOVITZ: Immaterial and irrelevant, and assumes a fact not in evidence, your Honor.
THE COURT: On the latter ground, the objection will be sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Q. Mrs. Kasabian, did you, on the day before you were arrested, the day before you knew that anyone was seeking you in the State of New Hampshire or anywhere in connection with this case, did you seek welfare? Did you go out and try to get some welfare?
A. I don’t know if it was the day before, but I did go out looking for welfare, yes.
Q. You wanted the welfare because you wanted the money that the welfare brought you?
A. Yes.
Q. Correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, Mrs. Kasabian, would you tell me why it is that you don’t trust Mr. Fitzgerald to talk to you?
A. I spoke to him yesterday, and just the way he spoke, the things that he said made me distrust him.
Q. I see.
What did he say that made you distrust him?
MR. STOVITZ: That is objected to as calling for hearsay.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor, it is not offered for the truth of anything asserted. It is offered for the effect on her state of mind.
THE COURT: It is also irrelevant.
MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor, I think—very well.
May I have just a moment, your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
(Mr. Kanarek and Mr. Fitzgerald confer.)
MR. KANAREK: Q. Did you say, Mrs. Kasabian, that Mr. Fitzgerald is the evilest one of all, that he was a devil?
A. No, I did not.
Q. You didn’t make that statement?
A. No.
Q. Then would you tell us, Mrs. Kasabian, what was your conversation with Mr. Fitzgerald?
MR. STOVITZ: That is objected to as outside the scope of direct examination, and being immaterial and irrelevant.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, it is offered on the issue of bias and prejudice, your Honor, in that one of the grounds for impeachment is to show—
THE COURT: I don’t have to hear the argument, Mr. Kanarek. I am familiar with it.
The objection is sustained.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Well, then, Mrs. Kasabian, would you tell us why it is that you don’t trust Mr. Shinn?
A. I was just told by my attorneys not to speak to any of them.
MR. KANAREK: I see.
Q. Now, that is the real reason, isn’t it, Mrs. Kasabian?
A. Yes.
Q. Your lawyers told you not to talk to anybody?
A. Yes.
Q. Right?
A. Yes.
Q. Except them, or the prosecution; is that right?
A. Well, he told me not to talk to you because you can’t be trusted.
Q. I can’t be trusted; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Mr. Hughes can’t be trusted?
A. Right.
Q. But Mr. Bugliosi can be trusted; right?
A. I guess so.
Q. That is what your lawyer told you; right?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Then, your Honor, I would like to approach the bench to make a motion.
THE COURT: Very well.
(Whereupon all counsel approach the bench and the following proceedings occur at the bench outside of the hearing of the hearing of the jury:)
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, this is clearly a suppression of evidence within the contemplation of the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment, both under California and Federal law.
You cannot deprive a person in a capital case, or in any case, of the power to speak with a witness, especially in the context of these proceedings.
THE COURT: Neither can you force a witness to testify or to talk to anyone if she doesn’t want to.
MR. KANAREK: But, your Honor, we have put in here—we have state action here by way of this immunity.
THE COURT: State action?
MR. KANAREK: State action, because of negotiations—
THE COURT: We don’t have to go through all that again.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, then I make a motion that all of this witness’ testimony—a motion to strike all the testimony of this particular witness; or in the alternative, your Honor, I make a motion that we be allowed to take her deposition out of the presence of the jurors.
MR. STOVITZ: What do you think you have been doing for nine days?
MR. FITZGERALD: Well, I think the point is this: The only constitutionally permissible procedure would be for this witness to take the witness stand, be asked questions, and then to assert her privilege against self-incrimination, whereupon the prosecution would offer her immunity, and she would, testify.
With the situation we have here now, she has a dual status, that of a witness and that of a defendant.
Now, your Honor may be sustaining objections because your Honor is concerned not only about the attorney-client privilege but concerned about certain incriminatory statements she may have made to her counsel, and I think that is the thrust of Mr. Kanarek’s objection.
If her status was clear—
THE COURT: That isn’t the reason that I sustained the objection. I sustained the objection where the privilege has been asserted because of the privilege.
She has already made incriminatory statements from the witness stand. I don’t see how she can incriminate herself any more than she has. That isn’t the reason I sustained the objection.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, all witnesses, whether a defendant or not, are entitled to have a lawyer present them. The purpose of having a lawyer is to give legal advice.
Her lawyer apparently has advised her not to talk to these people. I find no suppression of evidence or anything in that.
THE COURT: That is perfectly true. But there is also something to what Mr. Kanarek and Mr. Fitzgerald said with respect to Mrs. Kasabian, who has a rather anomalous position in the case by virtue of her being a defendant and also the chief prosecution witness, or apparently the chief prosecution witness, at least so far, with a promise, apparently, if not of immunity, at least a recommendation for immunity; and in all probability, whether the Court would grant her immunity or not, she would have it as a matter of law if you ever tried to use her testimony in this case against her.
That is a thought off the top of my head.
MR. STOVITZ: This case, People vs. Schwartz, holds that we cannot prosecute her.
THE COURT: I strongly doubt anyone could ever use those statements against her.
MR. BUGLIOSI: No matter what hat she is wearing, your Honor, whether as a defendant or a witness who is not a defendant, no matter what hat, she is entitled to a lawyer, and the lawyer can give her advice, and it is perfectly proper advice irrespective of what hat she is wearing, or if she is wearing two hats I think the same rule applies. She is a witness.
MR. STOVITZ: And when counsel say they did not have an opportunity to question her, yes, they did not have an opportunity to go up and say to Linda “When is the last time you had a normal menstrual period.”
But they had full discovery; they have eight or nine handwritten notes; they even went back and investigated that she had an application for welfare in New Hampshire.
They have got, even, secret Social Service reports. Those Social Service reports are secret and cannot be subpoenaed without an order of the court. They got those.
They had full discovery from the very beginning of this case.
Mrs. Chapman won’t talk to the defendants’ attorneys and she won’t even talk to us unless she feels right.
THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek, while I understand what you a saying, I am at a loss to understand, for example, the necessity for a deposition.
If the witness is not willing to tell the truth under oath from the witness stand, what makes you think you are going to get anything out of her when she is not testifying under oath?
MR. KANAREK: If I may attempt to explain to the Court what my position is.
THE COURT: If she lies on the witness stand she jeopardizes her immunity.
MR. KANAREK: No, your Honor, the point is, the thrust of People vs. Walter and other cases is that her state of mind, when she is granted immunity, is that it is firm in her mind that she has the immunity, and not being granted the immunity poisons her testimony because she knows she is beholden to the prosecution.
It is her state of mind that is significant. Whenever you get to a close question, let’s say, how she should answer it, she is going to answer in a way that is going to be favorable to the prosecution.
People vs. Walter sets it out so beautifully.
In fact, in People vs. Walter there was a conspiracy and it is remarkably analogous to this case and therefore it is incumbent, in so many words, in the Walter case, the prosecution must grant the immunity at the earliest possible time so that her testimony is not colored by the thought of reward.
And that is exactly what she is doing here. Furthermore, if I may finish it, we have a denial of due process in that Mr.—and I say this with—Mr. Bugliosi is going to say I am accusing him of suborning perjury.
Mr. Bugliosi is an advocate. It is not for me to accuse him of suborning perjury.
I am merely stating facts. The fact is Mr. Bugliosi in many many interviews with him, it is my position, it is a fundamental denial of due process for Mr. Bugliosi to interview her and not record every word she has uttered, that is, stenographically and/or in a recording machine, because when Mr. Bugliosi was interviewing her he was—let us give Mr. Bugliosi every benefit of the doubt, he was programming her.
MR. STOVITZ: There is no regulation that we have to use a recording device, in Civil Service.
MR. KANAREK: I make a motion the prosecution give her immunity at this time.
THE COURT: I think she has already achieved her immunity.
MR. KANAREK: Let her know it.
THE COURT: I would have no objection to take her into chambers and tell her that.
MR. KANAREK: I ask the jury be excused and do it in open court.
THE COURT: I have no hesitation to tell her I will grant her immunity if she asks for immunity.
MR. FITZGERALD: Her status is crucial.
THE COURT: Wait a minute, the prosecutors have stepped away for a moment.
MR. STOVITZ: Your Honor stated that if we present a petition for immunity to your Honor your Honor would sign the petition for immunity, because in affect she has been granted immunity by the District Attorney’s office, making the representation or the agreement with her attorney for immunity.
THE COURT: I did not quite follow your statement.
MR. STOVITZ: We have prepared immunity papers.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. STOVITZ: We were going to ask a Superior Court to sign the order granting her immunity.
Your Honor could do it under Section 1099, if your Honor were required.
THE COURT: I would be willing to do it on condition that I first have an opportunity, I would like counsel to assist me in researching questions as to whether or not she has not already achieved immunity as a matter of law.
I believe she has.
MR. STOVITZ: I have the brief filed in Judge Parker’s court on the Mary Brunner case on writ of habeas corpus.
It has the latest cases on it, according to the reasoning of Judge Parker Miss Brunner had received immunity by the promise of immunity by the District Attorney’s office.
People vs. Schwartz, a 201 Cal. case, states when a District Attorney’s office makes an agreement with a witness for conditional immunity, if that witness does not fulfill the conditions the office not only cannot use the statement against that witness, but cannot prosecute that witness.
I have those cases, your Honor, and there is a much more recent case. I think it is in 3 Cal. 3rd, which I also have.
THE COURT: Isn’t there a United States Supreme Court case on this point?
MR. STOVITZ: Yes, your Honor, it might be a Circuit Court of Appeals, but I have those cases.
THE COURT: How long will all this take?
MR. STOVITZ: It will take me one minute to get the brief from my case, and it will take me about five minutes to go down to my desk, get the petition, and we can do it right now.
THE COURT: All right, we will take a recess then.
We will take a recess now and then resume when we are ready.
MR. HUGHES: It is 82 in the courtroom. I checked the thermometer.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Can this be handled in the chambers, the immunity bit?
THE COURT: I want to read the briefs first.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Yes.
THE COURT: I want to make sure I understand precisely what the law is on this point before I proceed.
MR. BUGLIOSI: The full discussion about the law?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Can that be handled in chambers?
THE COURT: Yes.
(The following proceedings were had in open court in the presence and hearing of the jury:)
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, do not converse with anyone, nor form or express an opinion regarding the case until it is finally submitted to you.
The Court will take a recess now for approximately 15 minutes.
(Recess.)