Historic Trial Transcripts
Linda Kasabian: Day seventeen Testimony, August 18, 1970
LINDA KASABIAN,
called as a witness by and on behalf of the People, having been previously duly sworn, resumed the stand, was examined and testified further as follows:
REDIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)
BY MR. BUGLIOSI:
Q. Linda, was there any period of time after you left Spahn Ranch for the last time, was there any period of time thereafter that you wanted to contact the police and tell them about these two nights of murder?
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor, on the grounds—Does your Honor want me to enunciate it in the presence of the jury?
THE COURT: State the grounds.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I object on the grounds that it is improper—if this purports to be redirect examination it is improper redirect, and it has been asked and answered, your Honor, several times.
It calls for a conclusion and hearsay.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. BUGLIOSI: May I briefly be heard on this?
These are the issues that the defense raised during cross-examination. The People did not raise this issue, they raised it, every single one of them, they asked ten, fifteen, twenty questions on this.
THE COURT: Do you wish to approach the bench?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Yes, your Honor.
(Whereupon all counsel approach the bench and the following proceedings occur at the bench outside of the hearing of the jury:)
MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, the defendants—
THE COURT: Mr. Bugliosi, the question is whether she wanted to call the police.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Yes.
I am interested in her state of mind.
They are going to her state of mind: “How come you didn’t call the police when you were in Gallup, New Mexico? Was there a police station there?”
Mr. Shinn said: “When you were in New Hampshire why didn’t you call the police?” “Why didn’t you call the police in Miami?”
They were the ones exploring her state of mind.
This is redirect. They are making a big issue of it.
I think one of the biggest issues they are going to argue is that she never contacted the police.
They raised it, and I think I should have the right, on redirect, to explore her state of mind as to why she didn’t do it.
Her state of mind is all important.
In fact, if you look at the transcript on direct examination, I only asked maybe two or three questions about her state of mind. For instance, did she want to go along the second night?
On cross-examination, I think conservatively, there must have been, oh, perhaps a thousand questions asked of her about her state of mind. “Why she didn’t do this,” “Why did she do this?” “What were you thinking of at this particular moment?”
On direct examination, all I asked her was for the facts.
Now, on redirect, since they put her state of mind under a microscope on cross, I feel that I have to—or I want to anyway—examine her state of mind, to justify why she didn’t do certain things.
And I am still concerned about her leaving Spahn Ranch with Tanya there.
I think the reason is because at that time she never intended to call the police.
Yesterday the Court sustained objections on the ground that the question called for a conclusion. Now I intend to try to approach it from a different aspect where I would not be calling for a conclusion.
Again, I cite to the Court the case of Cope vs. Davidson, where a witness can testify to her state of mind when her state of mind is in issue. And I think Linda Kasabian’s state of mind is extremely important in this case and it is in issue, and, in fact, the issue was created by the defense during their cross-examination.
I don’t intend to ask too many questions.
THE COURT: What was the specific question again?
MR. BUGLIOSI: I said: After you left Spahn Ranch for the last time—she finally left a couple of days after these two nights—was there any period of time when you wanted to contact the police and tell them about these two nights of murder?
If her answer to that question is “yes,” then my next question is going to be: Was one of the times that you wanted to contact the police while Tanya was still at the Spahn Ranch?
And I believe her answer to that will be “no.”
She tells me that she never would have contacted the police while Tanya was at the Spahn Ranch because she felt that Charlie would have killed her baby.
The defense argument, of course, is that she left Tanya at the Spahn Ranch because, in her mind, these people weren’t murderers. These people were not murderers.
And what I am trying to show is the reason she left Spahn Ranch and left Tanya there is that at that point she never intended to call the police. All she was doing was running away.
If she had intended to call the police, she never, in a million years, would have left Tanya there.
It is an issue that the defense has raised. I did not go into this, but the defense, Mr. Fitzgerald—I am not criticizing him, I think it is a proper area—but they have raised this issue of why she left Tanya at Spahn Ranch when she is telling this jury and the Court that these people are murderers.
I think there is an explanation for it, and that is what I am trying to do right now.
THE COURT: Do you wish to be heard?
MR. KANAREK: Yes.
The form of this question is improper.
If he wishes to go into that—he has asked—the test isn’t how many questions he has asked. It is sort of analogous to the evidence; it is not how many witnesses you have, not how many questions you ask; we have certain rules.
He has gone into that with her, the record will reveal, already; and especially in view of the rapport between Mr. Bugliosi and she, the question is unfair and prejudicial on top of everything else.
We know what the question and answer is going to be at this stage of the proceedings.
It’s just that there is nothing to prevent this witness from just stating things that she has been programmed to state, therefore this type of question that solicits this—
THE COURT: That is not an objection at all, Mr. Kanarek. You can say that about any witness at any time.
MR. KANAREK: No, because there is no way, no way that this—she is judge and jury of that kind of a question.
It is just the penalty of perjury and all of that is meaningless.
THE COURT: The fact is the defense did go into her state of mind extensively as to why she did not call the police, whether there was any reason why she could not call the police.
MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor, but the question is what she did.
In other words, her state of mind at that particular point.
If we are going to go into this kind of detail that he is doing step by step, then we should have doctors appointed to examine her, to determine whether this woman is sane now and was sane then. We have asked for that previously.
If he can interrogate as to her state of mind without asking leading questions—on top of it this question is leading.
THE COURT: Well, I think you could ask her why she didn’t.
Whether she wanted to, I think is objectionable.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Whether she wanted to, there is only one way to find out whether she wanted to and that is to ask her.
Why she didn’t does not go to the issue of whether she wanted to or not. It does not explore the issue of her desire. That is a negative concept, to say, “why didn’t you do it?”
Incidentally, Mr. Kanarek made the statement that I have already gone into this.
Yesterday I went into why she did not contact the police while she was still here in Los Angeles when she came down to the Hall of Justice, when she was at the Spahn Ranch.
I did not go into this yesterday. Now I am talking about after she left Spahn Ranch.
THE COURT: I think you can ask her why, but whether she wanted to really does not go to anything.
MR. BUGLIOSI: It is foundational for the next question:
“Q. Did you within this period of time that you wanted to contact the police—”
THE COURT: I am going to sustain the objection to this question, Mr. Bugliosi. I think you can go into the subject but not this way.
MR. BUGLIOSI: They went into, your Honor, the fact that she did not contact the police.
I wanted to go into the area, did she want to contact the police. Then if she says yes, then I can ask her, “Why didn’t you?”
But to start out with the why, completely eliminates the desire.
I will ask her why when she tells me she wanted to but she didn’t; then I will say, “Why didn’t you?”
I don’t know why I should start out with why didn’t you, when she never said she wanted to.
You are asking the jury to infer that she wanted to do something without her testimony.
THE COURT: All right, I think in view of the examination so far that you are entitled to go into that area. All right.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Thank you, your Honor.
(The following proceedings were had in open court in the presence and hearing of the jury:)
BY MR. BUGLIOSI:
Q. Linda, after you left Spahn Ranch for the last time was there any period when you wanted to contact the police and tell them about these two nights of murder?
MR. KANAREK: Leading and suggestive, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. BUGLIOSI:
Q. Did you want to contact the police and tell them about these two nights of murder while Tanya was still at Spahn Ranch?
A. No.
MR. KANAREK: Leading and suggestive, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. BUGLIOSI:
Q. Was one of the periods when you wanted to contact the police and tell them about these two nights of murder while Tanya was still at Spahn Ranch?
MR. KANAREK: Leading and suggestive, your Honor.
MR. BUGLIOSI: I am asking her, your Honor, if that is one of the periods.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Would you repeat your question?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, could the court reporter read the question?
THE COURT: Read the question.
(Whereupon the reporter reads the pending question as follows:
“Q. Was one of the periods when you wanted to contact the police and tell them about these two nights of murder while Tanya was still at Spahn Ranch?”)
MR. KANAREK: Also it is assuming facts not in evidence your Honor.
I object to the use of the word “murder” at this stage of the proceedings.
THE COURT: It will be sustained on those grounds.
BY MR. BUGLIOSI:
Q. Was one of the periods when you wanted to contact the police and tell them about these two nights of killings while Tanya was still at Spahn Ranch?
MR. KANAREK: Leading and suggestive.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes, when I was at the bottom of the hill my first thought was to go to the police, but I couldn’t because Tanya was back there.
BY MR. BUGLIOSI:
Q. Well, we will have to go back a little now. I am talking about after you left Spahn Ranch.
Now, you testified that after you left Spahn Ranch for the last time there was a period of time when you wanted to contact the police and tell them about these two nights of killings, is that correct?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I object to the form of the question.
MR. BUGLIOSI: It’s foundational.
MR. KANAREK: Nevertheless it is leading and suggestive.
THE COURT: Overruled.
BY MR. BUGLIOSI:
Q. Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, I am directing your attention to this period of time after you left Spahn Ranch, did you want to contact the police and tell them about these two nights of killings while Tanya was still at Spahn Ranch?
MR. KANAREK: Leading and suggestive, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. KANAREK: And ambiguous.
THE WITNESS: No, I didn’t.
BY MR. BUGLIOSI:
Q. Why didn’t you?
A. Because Tanya was still back there and I did not know what they would do to her if I went to the police.
Q. Directing your attention, Linda, to Volume 49, page 6935, please read lines 15 through 26 on that page.
(Witness complies)
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, if I may, I think in fairness to all of us, counsel should have her also read the underlying question. He is having her read only her answer, your Honor, beginning at line 15.
MR. BUGLIOSI: 15 starts out with a question, Mr. Kanarek; it is a “Q”. “Q” stands for Question.
MR. KANAREK: I am sorry, I apologize, I apologize.
BY MR. BUGLIOSI:
Q. Have you read those lines?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, directing your attention to the following page, page 6936, will you read lines 1 through 4 to yourself.
(Witness complies.)
Have you read those lines to yourself?
A. Yes.
Q. To these questions by Mr. Kanarek did you give these answers:
“Q. Having in mind, Mrs. Kasabian—you say you left the Spahn Ranch on this night, and you went to Pasadena, you say. Now, when you left the Spahn Ranch on the night that you went to Pasadena, did you have in mind, as you left the ranch, what had occurred the previous night?
“A. Yes, I think I did.
“Q. You think you did or you know you did?
“A. Well, I remember one incident where I remember thinking about it.
“Q. Pardon?
“A. I can remember now one incident where I remember thinking about it.
“Q. There was one incident when you remembered thinking about the previous night?
“A. Yes.”
Did you give those answers to those questions?
A. Yes.
Q. What incident were you referring to?
A. When Charlie first came to me and told me to get my driver’s license and my change of clothes, I just knew we were going out again because we went out the night before and I knew it would be the same thing, but I was afraid to say anything and I just looked at him, and, you know, just sort of pleaded, please don’t make me go, but I could not say it.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I ask that all of that be stricken, and I ask to approach the bench, your Honor.
THE COURT: The answer will be stricken as not responsive.
MR. KANAREK: Would your Honor ask the jury not to consider it for any purpose.
THE COURT: The jury is admonished to disregard the answer.
MR. BUGLIOSI: What portion of the answer?
THE COURT: I will strike the entire answer. Put the question to her again.
Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: What incident were you referring to, Linda?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I object on the grounds it is calling for a conclusion.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. KANAREK: In this context, it is leading and suggestive.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: The incident I just told you about.
Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: Well, you will have to start all over again. You are not permitted—
THE COURT: Just answer the question and don’t volunteer.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may those words “the incident I just told you about” be stricken?
THE COURT: It will be stricken.
THE WITNESS: When Charlie first came to me—
Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: The second night.
A. The second night, yes.
Q. What incident now made you think of the first night?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor—your Honor, may we approach the bench?
THE COURT: No, you may not. Do you have an objection? State it.
MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor, I object on the grounds that in the context of these proceedings it is leading and suggestive.
I would like to inquire on voir dire.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. KANAREK: As to whether or not she had any conversations with the prosecution in the interim.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, with the Court’s indulgence I am just going to have to go back and go over these questions and answers again.
THE COURT: Very well.
Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: Linda, you recall I just showed you two pages of the transcript, and you read those to yourself.
A. Yes.
Q. Okay, to these questions did you give these answers?
“Q. (By Mr. Kanarek) Having in mind, Mrs. Kasabian—you say you left the Spahn Ranch on this night, and you went to Pasadena, you say. Now, when you left the Spahn Ranch on the night that you went to Pasadena, did you have in mind, as you left the ranch, what had occurred the previous night?
“A. Yes, I think I did.
“Q. You think you did or you know you did?
“A. Well, I remember one incident where I remember thinking about it.
“Q. Pardon?
“A. I can remember now one incident where I remember thinking about it.
“Q. There is one incident when you remembered thinking about the previous night?
“A. Yes.”
Did you give those answers to those questions?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Now, what incident were you referring to?
MR. KANAREK: I object on the ground that is leading and suggestive, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Then Charlie told me the second night to get my driver’s license and the change of clothes.
Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: You thought about what at that point?
A. What had happened the night before.
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, leading and suggestive.
Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, he is objecting as she is answering, your Honor.
THE COURT: Approach the bench, gentlemen.
(The following proceedings were had at the bench out of the hearing of the jury:)
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor—
THE COURT: Just a moment, you are doing two things, Mr. Kanarek, that I ordered you not to do.
One is to stop interrupting the witness, and you are interrupting the witness. You have done it several times.
The second is to make repeated objections to the same question after I have ruled on it.
I ordered you not to do that.
MR. KANAREK: If your Honor would have the record read back, Mr. Bugliosi asked—
THE COURT: I don’t need to have the record read back. I sat here and listened to everything that went on.
MR. KANAREK: Mr. Bugliosi asked another question—
THE COURT: Let’s proceed.
MR. KANAREK: He asked another question.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. KANAREK: I have heard it.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, shall I go back again with all these interruptions, I hate to do it.
THE COURT: I order you not to do it, Mr. Kanarek.
Let’s continue.
MR. KANAREK: Very well, your Honor.
(Whereupon, all counsel return to their respective places at counsel table and the following proceedings occur in open court within the presence and hearing of the jury:)
MR. BUGLIOSI: Q. Linda, what incident were you referring to when you gave those answers to Mr. Kanarek’s question?
MR. KANAREK: May I then object, before she answers, on the grounds that it is leading and suggestive in the context of these proceedings.
THE COURT: Bear in mind what I have told you.
MR. KANAREK: Yes. I am trying.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. KANAREK: If your Honor would ask the witness not to answer automatically, it would assist me immeasurably; and if Mr. Bugliosi would allow me the courtesy of interposing the objection, it would help me immeasurably, because I do wish to follow the Court’s orders in all respects, your Honor.
THE COURT: Proceed.
MR. BUGLIOSI: I will have to ask you again, Linda, and I apologize to you for Mr. Kanarek.
MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor, may I—
MR. BUGLIOSI: Q. What incident were you referring to when you gave those answers to Mr. Kanarek’s question?
MR. KANAREK: May I have the same objection?
THE COURT: All right, approach the bench.
(Whereupon, all counsel approach the bench and the following proceedings occur at the bench outside of the hearing of the jury:)
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may I—
THE COURT: Just a moment.
MR. KANAREK: I am not—
THE COURT: Just a moment, Mr. Kanarek.
MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: This is your last warning. If you interrupt once more, or if you make the same objection to the same question once more, I am going to find you in contempt of court.
I want that clearly understood.
MR. KANAREK: Yes.
THE COURT: You are interrupting the witness and you are making the same objection to the same question time after time after time.
MR. KANAREK: All right, your Honor.
THE COURT: You are interfering and interrupting the testimony.
MR. KANAREK: May I ask the Court if you can—
THE COURT: Don’t interrupt me.
MR. KANAREK: I am sorry, your Honor.
THE COURT: You are obviously doing it deliberately and in a calculated manner to interrupt the testimony of this witness.
Now, I am not going to warn you again.
Do you understand what I said?
MR. KANAREK: Yes.
THE COURT: Is there any doubt in your mind as to what I am talking about?
MR. KANAREK: Well—
THE COURT: Do you understand what I said?
MR. KANAREK: Yes.
THE COURT: Let’s proceed.
MR. HUGHES: May I be heard?
THE COURT: No, you may not.
MR. KANAREK: May I say, your Honor, that your Honor well knows that the Appellate Court says that if you don’t object, you can’t raise it on appeal.
THE COURT: That has nothing to do with what we are talking about.
You made the same objection six times to the same question, and every time I sustain the objection they have to re-ask the question, and then you make the same objection again.
Now, I have warned you, Mr. Kanarek.
MR. KANAREK: All right.
THE COURT: Don’t do it again.
MR. HUGHES: May I make a motion?
MR. KANAREK: I have a motion, too.
THE COURT: Let’s proceed.
MR. HUGHES: May I make a motion, your Honor?
THE COURT: You may not.
(Whereupon, all counsel return to their respective places at counsel table and the following proceedings occur in open court within the presence and hearing of the jury:)
THE COURT: You may make your motion after the next recess, Mr. Hughes, if you care to, but not now.
Let’s proceed.
BY MR. BUGLIOSI:
Q. Linda, do you have in mind the questions and answers that you read to yourself up at the bench about three or four minutes ago?
A. Yes.
Q. What incident were you referring to?
A. The same one that I just answered two times a few moments ago.
Q. Could you testify to it again?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may that last answer of hers be stricken.
I am sure your Honor will agree that that statement of hers that she just testified to, that that is a conclusion.
May that go out?
THE COURT: That will go out.
MR. KANAREK: Thank you.
BY MR. BUGLIOSI:
Q. What incident were you referring to?
A. When Charlie called me and told me to get a change of clothing and my driver’s license.
Q. Was that the second night?
A. Yes.
Q. And what did you think of at that time with respect to the first night?
A. That the same thing was going to happen this night as it did last night.
Q. Directing your attention to Volume 55, Linda, page 7549; specifically, lines 19 through 24.
Would you read those lines to yourself.
MR. SHINN: What lines were those, your Honor?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Lines 19 through 24.
MR. SHINN: Page?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Page 7549.
MR. SHINN: Thank you.
BY MR. BUGLIOSI:
Q. Have you read those lines to yourself, Linda?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you give this answer to this question by Mr. Stovitz. The question is:
“Q. Now, reflecting back on the second night, had you forgotten what had happened on the first night?
“A. Now, no. How could I forget that?”
Did you give that answer to that question?
A. Yes.
Q. My next question, Linda, I am going to have to repeat, in essence, Mr. Stovitz’s question.
Reflecting back at the present time, Linda, to the second night, on the second night had you forgotten what had happened the first night?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I must ask the Court to study this transcript. This is improper.
What he is doing, your Honor, he is taking portions of the transcript and—
THE COURT: State the grounds.
MR. KANAREK: The ground is that the question is ambiguous. There is improper foundation for it. And it is irrelevant and immaterial.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No, I couldn’t have forgotten about it. How can you forget about something like that?
But I just don’t really recall thinking about it other than the first instant.
BY MR. BUGLIOSI:
Q. Directing your attention to Volume 49, Linda, page 6994.
Would you read questions 15 through 25 to yourself?
(Pause while the witness reads.)
BY MR. BUGLIOSI:
Q. Have you read those lines to yourself?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you give these answers to these questions.
“Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Then directing your attention to your conversation that you say you engaged in in the automobile where you said. ‘Not that house, not that house.’ At the time that you uttered those words, you thought that Mr. True was in that house? Is that correct?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And you did not quarrel about anything happening in the house next door; is that correct?
“A. No.
“Q. You had no quarrel with that?
“A. No.”
Did you give those answers to those questions?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, when you answered, “No,” to Mr. Kanarek’s questions “and you did not quarrel about anything happening in the house next door; is that correct?” “And you had no quarrel with that?” What did you mean?
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor.
First of all, I object to the form of the question. It is an improper question.
The question is irrelevant, immaterial. There is no foundation for it. It is improper.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Well, number one, I didn’t say, “Not that house, not that house.”
I said, “You are not going to that house, are you?”
I think he misquoted me.
And by “quarreling,” that was his word, too. I didn’t use the word “quarrel.”
I just didn’t question Charlie when he gave me the answer, “No, I am not going to that house.”
MR. BUGLIOSI: Q. You didn’t question Charlie with respect to the other house?
MR. KANAREK: Leading and suggestive.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Q. The answer is no?
A. Yes.
Q. When you said no to those two questions to Mr. Kanarek, did you mean that you didn’t care what happened to the people next door?
MR. KANAREK: Leading and suggestive.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Of course I cared.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Q. Linda, you say that when you left the Spahn Ranch on the second night, the night that you ended up in front of Mr. True’s place, you say that Charlie had leather thongs around his neck? Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. At the start of the evening?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall testifying that you eventually parked in front of Mr. True’s place, and then Charlie got out of the car and disappeared up the driveway?
Do you remember that?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: I object.
He is paraphrasing. He can use the transcripts.
MR. BUGLIOSI: It is foundational.
THE COURT: You are interrupting again, Mr. Kanarek.
Read the question again.
(The question was read by the reporter.)
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Q. When Charlie returned to the car, did you notice whether the thongs were still around his neck?
MR. KANAREK: Asked and answered, your Honor, on direct examination by Mr. Bugliosi. I object on those grounds.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Foundational, your Honor, for the next question.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Q. Any time later that night, Linda, did you notice whether the thongs were still around Charlie neck?
A. Yes.
Q. When was that?
A. When we were walking on the beach.
Q. What did you notice?
A. I just didn’t see them around his neck.
Q. Did you look? Do you remember looking at his neck?
A. Yes.
I just remember they weren’t there walking on the beach.
Q. How would you describe Tex Watson, Linda?
MR. KANAREK: That is ambiguous, your Honor. It could call for a multitude of—
MR. BUGLIOSI: I draw the Court’s attention, your Honor, to page 7168 of the transcript, Volume 51, where Mr. Hughes asked Linda for her opinion—I can use the word “opinion” if the Court desires—with respect to Katie, Sadie and Leslie.
Now I am asking her what her opinion is of Tex Watson or, in the alternative, how she would describe him.
MR. KANAREK: Then, your Honor, I must object on the grounds that it denies us confrontation under the Sixth Amendment, and that Mr. Watson is not here on trial.
It is irrelevant and immaterial, and it is calling for a conclusion and hearsay, your Honor.
MR. BUGLIOSI: He is named as a co-conspirator in the indictment.
MR. FITZGERALD: The prosecution can’t put on character evidence as to a defendant whether he is here or not.
THE COURT: I think the question will have to be sharpened up, Mr. Bugliosi.
Sustained.
BY MR. BUGLIOSI:
Q. Incidentally, Linda, Tex’s name is Charles Watson. Now, throughout your testimony, Linda, you have been using the word “Charlie.”
When you used the word “Charlie,” were you referring to Charles Manson or Charles Watson?
MR. KANAREK: That is an improper question, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Charles Manson.
BY MR. BUGLIOSI:
Q. When you say “Tex,” you are referring to Charles Watson?
A. Yes.
Q. Directing your attention, Linda, to Volume 35, page 5511. Specifically, lines 8 through 13.
Will you read those lines to yourself.
(Pause while the witness reads.)
BY MR. BUGLIOSI:
Q. Have you read those lines to yourself?
A. Yes.
Q. Directing your attention to page 5516 of Volume 35, would you read lines 14 through 25 to yourself.
(Pause while the witness reads.)
BY MR. BUGLIOSI:
Q. Have you read those lines to yourself?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, in order to get the context, I would ask that counsel read—
THE COURT: You may do that on your examination.
MR. KANAREK: Very well, your Honor. Thank you.
BY MR. BUGLIOSI:
Q. To these questions, did you give these answers:
“Q. Didn’t you feel that you were a witch during the month of July, 1969?
“A. I was made to feel I was a witch, yes.
“Q. Did you refer to yourself as a witch?
“A. While I was there, yes; and at one point, once when I left, I referred to myself as a witch.”
Did you give those answers to those questions?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. What one time were you referring to?
A. When I was driving to New Mexico.
Q. When you spoke to Mr. Breckenridge?
A. Yes.
Q. On Page 5516, did you give these answers to these questions:
“Q. Later, when you left the Spahn Ranch, and you told somebody you were a witch, was it your intention or your state of mind that you wanted this person to believe that you were a witch?
“A. Well, my intention, I believe I told them a few other things that were put into me by these people, and I believe I just expressed all these things to them to see what their impression would be so that I would know if this was just, you know, if it was for real or if it was just, you know, whatever. I won’t use the word because I can’t think of another word.”
Q. Did you give that answer to that question by Mr. Fitzgerald?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. In your answer, when you said: “I believe I told them a few other things,” about whom are you referring when you use the word “them”?
A. The hitchhikers.
Q. And in your answer, when you say, “I believe I told them a few other things that were put into me by these people,” when you say, “these people,” about whom are you referring?
MR. KANAREK: Then, your Honor, I will object to any reference to anyone outside the scope of these pleadings, your Honor, as a statement of a conclusion.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: The Family back at the ranch.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may I have the answer read back?
THE COURT: “The Family back at the ranch.”
MR. KANAREK: Thank you, your Honor.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Q. Do you remember where you had this conversation with Mr. Breckenridge, Linda, where you told him these things these people told you?
A. Yes.
Q. Where?
A. In a restaurant in Albuquerque.
Q. Do you remember how you started out the conversation with Mr. Breckenridge?
A. Yes.
I think I told him something like: “I am going to tell you some things that were told to me, and I want you to tell me if it is the truth or if they are just crazy things.”
Maybe not exactly those words but similar to that.
Q. After you arrived in New Hampshire and eventually heard over the radio that you were wanted for these seven murders, did you run away?
A. No.
Q. Did you attempt to run away?
A. No.
Q. What did you do?
A. I spoke to my mother about it and told her I wanted to give myself up but I didn’t know how to do it.
She did it for me. She spoke to the police.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may that statement, “I told her that I wanted to give myself up” be stricken on the ground of hearsay, and that it is offered for the truth of the facts asserted.
THE COURT: That portion will be stricken and the jury is admonished to disregard it.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Q. Did you tell your mother not to call the police?
A. No.
Q. Did you ask your mother not to call the police?
A. No.
Q. Without going into what was said between you and your attorney, Mr. Fleischman, after you were arrested, and you were still in New Hampshire, without going into that conversation, did you, in fact, have a conversation, a telephone conversation with Mr. Fleischman concerning extradition?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you disagree with Mr. Fleischman?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I object.
If he is going into—
MR. BUGLIOSI: I am not going into the conversation.
MR. KANAREK: Clearly, this is a part of the conversation. It is a conclusion on her part which involves, obviously, the input of language between herself and Mr. Fleischman, and it calls for a conclusion.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. BUGLIOSI:
Q. After your arrest in New Hampshire, Linda, was it your state of mind that you wanted to remain in New Hampshire and resist extradition, or was it your state of mind that you wanted to come here to Los Angeles immediately?
MR. KANAREK: Leading and suggestive, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: I wanted to come back here immediately.
BY MR. BUGLIOSI:
Q. And did you, in fact, return to Los Angeles the day after your arrest?
A. Yes. The next night.
Q. Linda, during the past three weeks or so that you have been in court, have you ever looked at Charles Manson?
A. Sure.
Q. At any time that you looked at him, did he appear to be looking at you?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Object. Calling for a conclusion, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
BY MR. BUGLIOSI:
Q. Your answer is yes?
A. Yes.
Q. While you were looking at each other, did Mr. Manson make any motions to you with his hands?
MR. KANAREK: Object. That is calling for a conclusion on the part of the witness as to what the motive and intent was, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. KANAREK: And also it is ambiguous as to time.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. BUGLIOSI:
Q. When did this take place?
A. Off and on through the whole trial.
Q. Could you demonstrate to the Judge and to the jury some of the motions that Mr. Manson made to you with his hands?
MR. KANAREK: Object on the grounds that it is irrelevant and immaterial, calling for a conclusion as to whether or not this witness had anything to do whatever with what Mr. Manson did.
It is hearsay by conduct, it is solicitation of hearsay by conduct.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: What was your question?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, could you have the reporter read the question?
THE COURT: Read the last question.
(The question was read by the reporter.)
THE WITNESS: It was either the second or the first day that I testified.
You know, he plays with his beard, like he is doing now, and he went under his chin like this, and came up and put his fingers over his mouth.
MR. FITZGERALD: Would the Court describe for the record the motion demonstrated by the witness?
THE COURT: Would you care to describe it, Mr. Fitzgerald?
MR. FITZGERALD: Well, we will just get into interminable battles about what she is doing. That is why I appealed to you for the description as an impartial observer.
MR. BUGLIOSI: We will make an attempt to describe it.
If she will make one motion at a time, after each motion I will make an attempt to describe it for the record.
Would you describe it again?
THE WITNESS: He went like this.
MR. KANAREK: I would ask your Honor to do it rather than Mr. Bugliosi. I think we will proceed faster if your Honor would do it.
I would accept your Honor’s impartial adjudication of what this witness’ movements purport to be rather than Mr. Bugliosi.
THE COURT: The witness ran her left index finger under her—across her throat.
DEFENDANT MANSON: Under her beard.
THE COURT: What was that statement?
MR. STOVITZ: Mr. Manson made a statement, “Under her beard,” your Honor.
THE COURT: Anything else?
MR. BUGLIOSI: May the record reflect, your Honor, that, as the Court has indicated, with the index finger of her left hand she moved the index finger from left to right, horizontally and across her throat.
Would that be a correct or accurate description, your Honor?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor—
THE COURT: That is correct.
MR. KANAREK: —I would accept your Honor’s description.
There is no need for Mr. Bugliosi’s description.
THE COURT: There is no need for any comment from you, Mr. Kanarek.
Let’s proceed.
If you have an objection, just state it.
MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Okay.
Would you then illustrate or demonstrate to the jury the other motion or motions that Mr. Manson made to you.
THE WITNESS: Well, right after he did that under the chin, he came up to his mouth and put his finger over it like this.
MR. BUGLIOSI: May the record reflect that with the index finger of Mrs. Kasabian’s left hand, she placed her index finger at the left furthermost extremity—strike that—the right furthermost extremity of her lips, and moved the index finger horizontally across the entire length of her lips.
MR. HUGHES: Your Honor, I move that the witness be allowed to describe the motions as she makes them.
THE COURT: Well, she described them by indicating, by showing them. Now we need to have the record reflect what she did.
MR. HUGHES: Your Honor, I move that she be allowed to verbally describe them.
MR. BUGLIOSI: I will join in that. I have no objection.
MR. KANAREK: I would prefer the Court to do it.
THE COURT: Let’s proceed.
MR. BUGLIOSI: May the record reflect the last description that I gave?
THE COURT: Yes.
Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: Did he make any other motion?
A. Yeah, another time he went like that.
MR. BUGLIOSI: May the record reflect that the witness extended her tongue out of her mouth and with her index finger of the left hand rubbed it on the tip of the tongue several times.
So reflected, your Honor?
THE COURT: Very well.
Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: Did he ever place his index finger in an up-and-down or a vertical position over the lips?
MR. KANAREK: Leading and suggestive, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: Did he make any other motions to you other than the ones that you have already demonstrated to the Judge and the jury?
A. Well, another time when I was talking about a father hangup, he pointed up, then he pointed to himself and said, “One,” and he said, “I’m your father,” with his lips.
Q. Did he make any other motions to you?
A. No, that is all I can remember.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may I inquire on voir dire as to this, “I’m your father”?
If the witness is not percipient—
THE COURT: You can take that up on cross-examination.
MR. KANAREK: Very well, your Honor.
Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: This lady, Joan Didion from Life Magazine, Linda, who is writing a book about you, when did you first meet her?
A. I would say around June.
Q. June of this year, 1970?
A. Yeah.
Q. Was that the first time she spoke to you about the book?
A. Yes.
Q. Directing your attention, Linda, to Volume 57, page 7735, would you read Lines 6 through 13 to yourself?
(Witness complies.)
Q. Have you read those lines to yourself?
A. Yes.
Q. Directing your attention to Page 7736 of the same volume, Volume 57, would you read Lines 6 through 10 to yourself?
(Witness complies.)
Q. Have you read those lines to yourself?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you give these answers to these questions:
“Q. BY MR. HUGHES: Do you feel you are an emissary from God?
“A. I thought I just answered you.”
Then you said, “Do I feel that I am an emissary from God? Yes.”
Did you give those answers to those questions?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you give these other answers to these questions:
“Q. BY MR. HUGHES: How do you know that you are an emissary from God?
“A. I don’t really know definitely.
“Q. But in your heart you feel that?
“A. Yes.”
Did you give those answers to those questions?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Now, when you indicated that you might be an emissary from God, what did you mean, Linda?
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, on the ground it’s calling for a conclusion on the part of the witness.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: I feel that I am doing the will of God.
Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: Would you care to elaborate on that a little bit?
A. Well, I feel that what has been done is wrong; they did wrong and I did wrong, too; and I am truly repentant for it and being up here testifying to it is my repentance, and I just feel that is the will of God.
Q. Linda, do you recall that I interviewed you several times in the months before this trial, do you recall that?
A. Yes.
Q. Did I ever tell you what the answer should be to any of my questions?
MR. KANAREK: I object, calling for a conclusion on the part of the witness, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. KANAREK: Hearsay.
THE WITNESS: No.
Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: Did I ever give you any instructions at all with respect to how to testify?
MR. KANAREK: Calling for a conclusion of the witness, your Honor, and leading and suggestive.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Just to answer the questions and just to testify truthfully.
Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: Did I say there were any exceptions to that?
A. You said, “No exceptions, just tell it all.”
Q. Have you told Judge Older and these folks here on the jury the complete truth during your three weeks on the witness stand?
A. Yes, I have.
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, calling for a conclusion on the part of the witness.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. BUGLIOSI: No further questions.
THE COURT: We will take our recess at this time.
Ladies and gentleman, do not converse with any one nor form or express any opinion regarding the case until it is finally submitted to you.
THE COURT: We will recess for 15 minutes.
(Recess.)
THE COURT: All parties, counsel and jurors are present.
Have you completed your examination, Mr. Bugliosi?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Fitzgerald?
MR. FITZGERALD: Thank you, your Honor.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. FITZGERALD:
Q. Mrs. Kasabian, when you came from New Hampshire to Los Angeles, that was by way of airplane, was it not?
A. Yes.
Q. And it was in the company of two police officers, was it not?
A. Right.
Q. Did you tell them about what had occurred on the first and second night?
A. Yes.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Asked and answered, your Honor, on Mr. Fitzgerald’s original cross-examination.
THE COURT: Overruled. The answer is in.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. FITZGERALD:
Q. You already waived extradition, isn’t that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And before that you allowed your mother to turn yourself in to the police, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you wanted to tell everything you knew about this case, right?
A. Yes.
Q. But you did not tell anybody on the airplane, did you?
A. No, I did not.
Q. When was the first time you told any representative of law enforcement about what had occurred on the first and second nights?
A. When?
Q. When.
A. I am not sure of the date. It was around the beginning of the year, maybe February, some time like that.
Q. You decided to waive extradition, isn’t that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. After consultation with your attorney, isn’t that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Is one of the reasons you decided to waive extradition because you felt you would be just wasting six months in your life in New Hampshire and would have to return to Los Angeles anyway?
A. I did not know what the circumstances were, I just did not want to stay behind. I wanted to do it now.
Q. You did not discuss the length of time it would take to fight extradition with your attorney, is that right?
A. No, I had no idea.
Q. You testified yesterday afternoon that when you met Gypsy she referred to some people living together like a Family, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Gypsy however did not refer to the group as the Family, did she?
A. No.
Q. When you referred to the Group as the Family, that is your term, isn’t that correct?
A. I guess so.
Q. Now, so the record is clear, you took just one drug trip while you were at the Spahn Ranch during the months of July and August, 1969, is that correct?
MR. STOVITZ: Counsel, you are excluding marijuana from that?
MR. FITZGERALD: I am excluding marijuana.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. FITZGERALD:
Q. Now, the money that you stole from your husband and Charles Melton, it was hidden, wasn’t it?
MR. BUGLIOSI: A misstatement, your Honor, she said she stole the money and it was Mr. Melton’s money.
I object on that ground.
MR. FITZGERALD: Excuse me.
BY MR. FITZGERALD:
Q. The money you stole from Mr. Melton, it was hidden, wasn’t it?
A. Well, it was in a clothing bag.
Q. Inside the trailer?
A. Truck.
Q. Inside the truck?
A. Yes.
Q. And where was the clothing bag?
A. In a trunk.
Q. Inside a trunk?
A. Yes.
Q. So you actually had to open the trunk, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you had to go into the clothing bag, right?
A. Yes.
Q. And was the money inside some sort of container?
A. Yes, it was in a velvet tobacco pouch container, metal container.
Q. Did Charles Manson tell you where that money was hidden?
A. No.
Q. Did Tex Watson tell you where that money was hidden?
A. No.
Q. Did Gypsy tell you where that money was hidden?
A. No.
Q. Did any of these female defendants tell you where that money was hidden?
A. No.
Q. Only you knew where that money was hidden, isn’t that correct?
A. And the people that owned it, I mean that the money belonged to.
Q. Was the money in cash?
A. Yes.
Q. $5,000?
A. Yes.
Q. You testified yesterday afternoon that you did not form any intent to steal that money until July the 5th?
A. That’s right.
Q. Is that correct?
A. No, it was the night of July 4th.
MR. FITZGERALD: Counsel, referring to Volume 58, yesterday afternoon’s transcript, page 7839, referring to page 7839, line 8, et seq.
“Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: In addition to the hugging and kissing that took place at the orgy, did any other type of sexual activity take place?
“A. Yes.”
Q. Were you asked that question and did you give that answer, Mrs. Kasabian?
A. Yes.
Q. Dropping down to the bottom of the page, Counsel, line 25—line 24, excuse me:
“Q. You had sexual intercourse with Tex and Clem?
“A. No intercourse with Tex, with Clem I did, yes.
“Q. But you did have some type of sexual activity with Clem also?
“A. Yes.”
Were you asked those questions and did you give those answers?
A. Yes, but I think they are jumbled around.
Q. Would you like to explain that?
A. Yes.
Q. Please do.
A. There was hugging and kissing between Tex and I, but there was intercourse between Clem and I.
Q. And what sort of sexual activity did you engage in with Snake?
A. Hugging and kissing.
Q. And I take it you just hugged and kissed Leslie also?
A. Yes.
Q. There was no other form of sexual activity that took place between you and any other participant, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. With the exception of sexual intercourse with them?
A. Right.
Q. There was no form of oral sexual activity, is that correct?
(No response.)
BY MR. FITZGERALD:
Q. You did not orally copulate the penis of any male person present, is that correct?
MR. BUGLIOSI: I object on the grounds of undue harassment and embarrassment, your Honor. There is a section of the Evidence Code to that effect.
THE COURT: Overruled, you may answer.
THE WITNESS: What was your question?
THE COURT: Read the question.
(Whereupon the reporter reads the question as follows:
“Q. You did not orally copulate the penis of any male person present, is that correct?”)
THE WITNESS: What does that mean?
BY MR. FITZGERALD:
Q. Mrs. Kasabian, are you familiar with oral genital relations?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, I object on the grounds it is irrelevant; it has no bearing on the issues of this case whatever, your Honor.
MR. FITZGERALD: I agree, I agree, and we raised this objection when it was originally brought out by the prosecution.
MR. BUGLIOSI: The orgy had a lot of relevance in this case because Manson was part of the orgy.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
BY MR. FITZGERALD:
Q. Now, you said that when you would attend supper at the Spahn Ranch Manson would do most of the talking, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Was Manson at every supper you attended at the Spahn Ranch?
A. Mostly every supper, yes.
Q. Isn’t it true that there was very little talking of any kind and that there was mostly singing at suppers?
A. There was more singing than talking, but there was talking also.
Q. And Manson did most of the singing, is that correct?
A. Lead, like we were like the background.
Q. He played the guitar?
A. Yes.
Q. And he would sing?
A. Yes.
Q. And he was the lead guitar and the lead singer?
A. Yes.
Q. You were in love with Manson at the time?
A. I was in love with everybody.
Q. But you were particularly in love with him, isn’t that correct?
A. I worshipped him.
Q. Well, isn’t that a form of love?
A. Yes.
Q. So it’s possible then because of your emotional involvement with him that you thought he did most of the talking and most of the singing when in fact he did not, isn’t that correct?
A. No.
Q. Did you seriously believe that Charles Manson was Jesus Christ?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Asked and answered ad nauseam, your Honor, repetitious.
It has been gone into at great depth by the defense. They are just recreating new issues, your Honor.
She already testified about 25 times that she thought Charles Manson was Jesus Christ.
THE COURT: Objection sustained.
MR. FITZGERALD: I believe the prosecution went into this yesterday afternoon on their redirect examination, your Honor.
MR. BUGLIOSI: To clarify an issue on cross, your Honor.
MR. FITZGERALD: All right.
Q. Were you mentally ill during the month of July and August, 1969?
A. I don’t know what to be mentally ill is.
Q. Do you know what insanity is?
A. I don’t know, I don’t know if I have ever been insane so I cannot say.
Q. Do you know what it is to be crazy?
A. The same thing as being insane.
Q. Were you crazy during the month of July and August, 1969?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Ambiguous, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. FITZGERALD:
Q. Now, you testified that your husband Robert Kasabian is the father of your child, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And your child was born the 9th of March?
A. Yes.
Q. So when, according to your calculations, would your child have to have been conceived?
A. I believe it was June 27th or 28th.
Q. And you have no verification of the father of your child being your husband Robert Kasabian other than your feeling, is that correct?
A. Well, I saw my husband in the child’s face when he was born, and that gave me justification also.
Q. You looked at the child and saw the reflection of your husband Robert Kasabian?
A. Yes.
Q. You did not have any scientific test performed on the child to determine its parentage, did you?
A. No.
Q. You left your husband in April of 1969, is that correct?
A. Right.
Q. And you returned to him for a brief reconciliation on approximately June 27th, is that correct?
MR. BUGLIOSI: I object, beyond the scope of redirect examination.
MR. FITZGERALD: Simply foundational.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. FITZGERALD:
Q. Did you have intercourse with anybody during the month of June besides Robert Kasabian?
A. No.
Q. The first week in July you had intercourse with several men, isn’t that correct?
MR. BUGLIOSI: I object, your Honor, asked and answered.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. FITZGERALD:
Q. Clem could be the father of your child, could he not?
A. No, Clem was near the end of the month.
Q. Charles Manson could be the father of your child, isn’t that correct?
A. He could be, sure.
Q. Tex could be the father of your child, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Bruce could be the father of your child, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Chuck could be the father of your child, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, when we talk about Tex, there were two Tex’s at the Spahn Ranch, weren’t there?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. Do you know someone by the name of Charles Grant Pierce?
A. No.
Q. Lived in Richardson, Texas?
A. No.
Q. Now, it is your state of mind, or was your state of mind that on the first night you were afraid to call the police because of Tanya, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And Tanya was the most important consideration in your mind?
A. At that moment, yes.
Q. Why then when your daughter was safely out of the Spahn Ranch didn’t you contact the police?
A. I was just even more afraid then. I did not know how to go to the police, I was afraid of the police.
Q. You actually had a police officer on the telephone, the police officer was a Los Angeles Sheriff’s Deputy from the Malibu Sheriff’s Station, did you not?
A. That’s right.
Q. He informed you that your child was in the custody of the State of California, did he not?
A. Yes.
Q. You knew at that time then that Tanya was safe, isn’t that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Why didn’t you tell that police officer what had occurred?
A. I just had a thing in my head about cops and I did not know how to go to them.
Q. You thought they were pigs?
A. Yes.
Q. But if you had a police officer on the telephone there wouldn’t be any problem going to them, would there?
A. It just seemed impossible at the time. I did not know where the other people were and I was afraid.
Q. Afraid for yourself or afraid for Tanya?
A. Afraid for myself and Tanya.
Q. You had numerous opportunities after you left the Spahn Ranch and your child was safely with you to inform the police, did you not, Mrs. Kasabian?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Yet at each and every opportunity you failed to do so, isn’t that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And the reason you failed to do so is because you did not have anything to tell the police, isn’t that true?
A. That is not true.
Q. As a matter of fact you left the State of California on August 6th, 1969, isn’t that correct?
A. I don’t know what the date was when I left.
Q. Didn’t you tell Armand P. Kroger, a social worker for the Department of Social Services, North Dependency Unit, Pasadena, that you left the State of California on August 6th or 7th, 1969, to go to Arizona?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Beyond the scope of the redirect examination and also repetitious, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: I don’t know what date I gave him. If that was the date, that is what I gave him.
It was just the date off the top of my head. But I was there.
BY MR. FITZGERALD:
Q. You lied in order to get your child back, didn’t you?
MR. STOVITZ: That is assuming a fact not in evidence, your Honor, and it is argumentative.
MR. BUGLIOSI: It is also repetitious.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. FITZGERALD:
Q. You have told lies in your life, haven’t you, Mrs. Kasabian?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Irrelevant, your Honor, irrelevant unless we are going to examine the character of every witness that takes the stand, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. FITZGERALD:
Q. You told lies to the authorities in California in order to secure your child, did you not?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And you would lie any day of the week to save your child, wouldn’t you?
A. I don’t know, I can’t say.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Argumentative, too broad.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. FITZGERALD: You would in certain situations lie for your child, wouldn’t you?
A. I have in the past.
Q. And you would lie to save yourself, wouldn’t you?
A. No, I think that I think more of my children than of myself.
THE COURT: What was the answer? Read the answer.
(Whereupon, the reporter reads the answer as follows:
“A. No, I think that I think more of my children than of myself.”)
Q. BY MR. FITZGERALD: Now, you used the term “pigs” in relation to police officers, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. What does that mean?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Beyond the scope of redirect examination, your Honor.
It is opening up a new field that has been gone into several weeks ago.
MR. FITZGERALD: Volume 58, Page 7879, the witness was asked, “What were you afraid of?”
“A. I thought that policemen were pigs”
THE COURT: That is my recollection. Overruled, you may answer.
THE WITNESS: Just bad guys.
Q. BY MR. FITZGERALD: Now, you say that Mr. Manson has made some attempt to communicate with you in this courtroom, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you made any attempt to communicate with him?
A. Yeah.
Q. And you have also made an attempt to communicate with these three female defendants, haven’t you?
A. I have said a few things, yeah.
Q. One of the things you said was:
“Why don’t you save yourselves like I am doing?” Didn’t you?
A. No.
Q. You never said anything like that?
A. Not that I recall, no.
Q. Did you also make a statement from the witness stand to these girls to the effect that:
“I’m sorry I have to do it”?
A. Possibly, I don’t know.
MR. FITZGERALD: I have nothing further.
THE COURT: Mr. Shinn?
MR. SHINN: Yes, your Honor.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. SHINN:
Q. Mrs. Kasabian, getting back to the $5,000, when was the first time you saw this $5,000?
A. When I first came back from the East.
Q. When—
A. When I first came back from the East.
Q. And you saw this $5,000 the first day you came back from the East?
A. It was more than $5,000.
Q. Well, how much was it, how much was the full amount that you stole?
A. I don’t know.
Q. Was it more than $5,000?
A. That I what?
Q. Was it more than $5,000?
A. When I first saw it, when I came back from the East?
Q. Yes, the money you stole.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Object—
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. SHINN: Your Honor, I believe Mr. Bugliosi brought up the fact about this money, your Honor.
Now she says it’s more than $5,000.
THE COURT: I cannot hear you, Mr. Shinn.
MR. SHINN: I believe it is relevant to the question brought up by Mr. Bugliosi on redirect examination, or direct examination, I don’t know, he went into direct and redirect this morning, so I believe it goes to the issue, your Honor, why she took the $5,000, if she says there is more than $5,000—
MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, the Grand Theft issue was brought up by the defense.
Now they want to go into it again.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
MR. SHINN: Q. You say you saw this money the first day that you came back from the East?
A. Yes.
Q. And this was in a trailer or a truck?
A. A truck.
Q. Did someone show it to you or did you just happen to see it?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Irrelevant.
THE COURT: Read the last two questions.
(The record was read by the reporter.)
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. SHINN: Q. When you first saw this money, was it wrapped up, or was it out in the open?
A. It was in a small container, a velvet tobacco container.
Q. Did you find it or did someone show it to you?
A. They showed it to me and told me about it.
Q. At that time was it your state of mind that you wished you had this five thousand dollars?
A. No. I didn’t care about it.
Q. When was the next time that you saw this $5,000?
A. Well, the first time that I saw the money it was more than $5,000. The day I went to take it, it was five thousand dollars.
Q. After you first saw this money, you stated that your state of mind was that you did not want this $5,000; is that correct?
A. Right.
Q. And I believe then you left the ranch—I mean, then you left this truck?
A. I don’t understand your question.
Q. Did you leave the truck the next day or the same day?
A. That I saw the money?
Q. Yes.
A. No. I saw the money when I first got there.
Q. And was that the only time that you saw the money before you left for the ranch?
A. No.
Q. You saw it again?
A. Yes.
Q. When was the second time that you saw the money?
A. I don’t know. The money was always just there.
You know, we were going out buying things, going into town to get passports and, you know, the money was, you know, always there.
Q. Did the owner of the money at any time tell you you could have this money?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, this is irrelevant.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. SHINN: Q. When did you decide to take this money as your own?
A. When did I decide to take it?
Q. Yes.
A. The night of July the 4th.
Q. Is that while you were still living there?
A. No.
Q. And I believe you testified that you went back the next day to take this money; is that correct?
A. That’s right, yes.
Q. And I believe you stated that you were with Gypsy and Mary?
A. Right.
Q. Did you tell Gypsy and Mary that you were going to take this money?
A. Yes.
Q. You wanted them to come out there with you; is that correct?
A. I don’t know what the agreement was, but they came with me.
Q. Well, in other words, you wanted them to help you take this money; is that correct?
A. I just said I don’t know what the agreement was.
I don’t know if I wanted them to help me.
They drove the car.
Q. They drove you there?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you not tell Mary or Gypsy to look out and see whether anyone was coming at the truck?
A. No.
Q. Did they go inside the truck with you?
A. No.
As a matter of fact, they were about—quite a distance away on the beach.
Q. And no one was near the truck, either Mary or Gypsy, at the time that you took this money?
A. That’s right.
Q. And after you took this money, did you tell Gypsy and Mary anything about this money?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you later tell the owner of this money that you took this money?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Irrelevant, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. SHINN:
Q. Did you go back to the truck after you took this money?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Irrelevant. Beyond the scope of redirect.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. SHINN:
Q. Now, you testified that you saw Mr. Manson make some motions in court; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, do you recall what day this was?
A. Excuse me?
Q. What day? About what date was it?
A. It was right around the first time that I testified.
Q. Where were you when he made the motions?
A. Sitting over there. (Indicating.)
MR. STOVITZ: May the record indicate that the witness pointed to this area of the courtroom, commonly known as the witness chair—or the chair inside the rail.
THE COURT: Very well.
BY MR. SHINN:
Q. Were you sitting or standing when you looked at Mr. Manson?
A. I was sitting.
Q. Was anyone in front of you?
A. Well, from sitting over there, they are all in front of me.
Q. Well, then, was Mr. Manson standing or was he sitting?
A. He was sitting.
Q. You were sitting and Mr. Manson was sitting; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And there were people in between you and Mr. Manson; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And the only glimpse you got of Mr. Manson was if and when you moved or Mr. Manson moved?
A. No.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Assuming a fact not in evidence.
Mr. Shinn said “A glimpse.” She didn’t testify it was a glimpse.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. SHINN:
Q. Did you, at all times, have a clear view of Mr. Manson when you were sitting in court on that day?
A. No, not all the time.
Q. In other words, people were walking back and forth?
A. Yes.
Q. Sometimes they blocked your view; is that correct?
A. Right.
Q. Now, did you see Mr. Manson make these motions before that date at the ranch, or some place else?
A. No.
Q. In other words, this was the first time that you saw Mr. Manson make these motions?
Is that your testimony?
A. Yes.
Q. You never saw him touch his beard before?
A. Oh, yes, sure.
Q. You did see him touch his beard before?
A. Uh-huh, yes.
Q. When was the last time that you saw him touch his beard before coming to court?
A. I don’t know.
Q. Was it at the ranch?
A. He just has a thing. He always plays with his heard.
Q. In other words, you did observe Mr. Manson playing with his heard all the time before he came to court; is that correct?
A. I don’t understand what you are saying.
Q. Well, you saw him touch his beard before, you said?
A. Yes.
Q. You also stated that he always played with his beard?
A. Yes.
Q. Will you demonstrate how he plays with his beard?
A. Excuse me?
Q. Will you demonstrate to us how he plays with his beard?
MR. STOVITZ: Then or now, Counsel?
MR. SHINN: Then.
THE WITNESS: Just like he is doing now.
MR. SHINN: In other words, Mr. Manson is just stroking his beard; is that correct?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may Mr. Manson stand up and play with his beard?
I say that in all seriousness. Just so there is no question about it. If Mr. Manson can move his hands about his beard, and this witness can say that that is the same motion, then we will have it in tune and in harmony at the same time, your Honor.
THE COURT: Let’s proceed, gentlemen.
MR. KANAREK: May he do that?
THE COURT: No, he may not.
MR. SHINN: Q. Now, looking at Mr. Manson playing with his beard at the present time, would you say that the movements were similar to the ones that you testified to this morning?
A. Yes.
Q. And you saw him play with his beard like that many times before coming to court; is that correct?
A. I never saw those exact motions, no.
Q. Well, similar motions?
A. Yes.
Q. The fact that he brings his finger across his—under his chin, Mrs. Kasabian, doesn’t mean anything to you, does it?
A. It did at the time, but now it doesn’t.
Q. Well, what do you mean that it did at that time but now it doesn’t?
A. Well, it was right around the first time I was testifying, and I got the impression he was telling me to keep my mouth shut.
Q. Oh? You got that impression?
A. Sure.
Q. He didn’t tell you verbally or write you any notes to tell you to keep your mouth shut; is that true?
A. No.
Q. You could have been mistaken then?
A. Sure. It was a conclusion on my part.
Q. And you could have been mistaken, that he was just playing with his beard and he had no intention to communicate with you; is that correct?
A. I don’t know what his intention was.
Q. Well, did he look at you?
A. Yes.
Q. How long did he look at you?
A. I don’t know. I didn’t count the minutes, the seconds.
Q. Was it one second? Two seconds?
A. I don’t know.
Q. Did you look at him?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you make any motion towards Mr. Manson?
A. Not that I recall, no.
Q. Did you smile at him?
A. I just stared at him.
Q. Then it is only your belief or your imagination or your speculation that Mr. Manson was making a specific type of motion towards you; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. It is only a guess on your part?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you try to communicate with Mr. Manson at other times during the court session?
A. Yes.
Q. When was that?
A. I don’t know when. I haven’t been counting the days as they go by.
Q. In other words, you were trying to get Mr. Manson’s attention, is that correct, many times?
A. Somehow we just always managed to fix each other’s eyes on one another.
Q. My question was, Mrs. Kasabian, that you tried to contact Mr. Manson at various times yourself? Is that correct?
A. No.
Q. You never did?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever look at Mr. Manson?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you trying to get his eye when you looked at Mr. Manson?
A. Not all the time, no.
Q. Well, sometimes?
A. Maybe.
Q. In other words, you were trying to communicate with Mr. Manson, is that correct, in some form or in some manner?
A. I was just more or less checking him out to see where he is at.
Q. What do you mean “checking him out to see where he is at”?
A. Just sitting there now, just to see where he is at, you know.
Q. You said you wanted to check him out. What do you mean, you wanted to check him out?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Asked and answered, your Honor.
MR. SHINN: Not at all, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
You may answer.
THE WITNESS: That is all I can say. I was just looking to see where he is at.
BY MR. SHINN:
Q. What do you mean “where he is at”?
A. Where his head is at.
Q. What does that mean to you?
A. His thoughts, what he does, whatever.
Q. Did you ever try to speak to him with the movements of your mouth, without any actual voice sounds?
A. Yes.
Q. When was this?
A. When he spoke to me.
Q. When did he speak to you?
A. He spoke to me a number of times.
Q. Do you remember the first time that he spoke to you?
MR. STOVITZ: Are you talking about in the courtroom, Counsel?
MR. SHINN: Yes. In the courtroom.
THE WITNESS: I am not sure if it was the first time, but about that father trip I was just testifying about.
BY MR. SHINN:
Q. Did he actually talk to you or try to communicate with you?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you get the message?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall the message?
A. Well, I remember he pointed to himself and said “One,” and he said, “I am your father.”
Q. Now, you said he said “One.”
Did you hear him say “One”?
A. No, he didn’t say “One,” he just went like this. (Indicating.)
MR. STOVITZ: May the record show that she has her left index finger up.
THE COURT: Very well.
BY MR. SHINN:
Q. Was this a type of signal that was used before between you and Mr. Manson, before coming to court?
A. No.
Q. Then you don’t know whether or not that one finger means one thing? You are just guessing; is that correct?
A. I just felt that it was obvious, that is what he was saying.
Q. You mean you felt?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Argumentative.
THE WITNESS: What do you think when you put up one finger (indicating). It means one. That is, as far as I am concerned.
BY MR. SHINN:
Q. Did you respond to his conduct?
A. I think I just looked at him. I didn’t say anything.
Q. Did you smile?
A. No. I think I just stared at him.
Q. And when was the second time that he communicated with you or tried to communicate with you?
A. Another time when, I believe, June Emmer was in the courtroom. We fixed each other’s attention on one another. He went back and said, “Uh-uh,” and he pointed to Mr. Kanarek saying “That is his trip, not mine.” Then he said, “Your father.”
And I said, “Uh-uh, he is not my father.”
MR. SHINN: Q. Now, did he actually say the words, “that is his trip, not mine”?
A. No, no.
That was a silent message, pointing to his attorney and going like this, “Phew.”
Q. Then you just imagined those were the words, then?
A. Yes.
Q. It could have meant something else; is that correct?
A. I don’t think so, no.
Q. In other words, you have such powers to determine what Mr. Manson is saying just by gestures?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Argumentative, your Honor.
MR. SHINN: Just asking, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. SHINN: Do you have powers?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Ambiguous, your Honor.
MR. SHINN: I didn’t finish my question.
MR. BUGLIOSI: I apologize.
Withdraw the objection.
MR. SHINN: Q. Do you have powers, Mrs. Kasabian, to look at a person, and by looking at his gestures to determine what he is trying to say?
MR. STOVITZ: That is ambiguous, your Honor.
Sometimes it can be done and sometimes it can’t be. It depends upon the gestures.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: He just answered my question. I mean your question.
MR. SHINN: Your Honor, may the answer be stricken?
MR. FITZGERALD: Let’s swear Mr. Stovitz.
MR. STOVITZ: Gladly, Counsel.
THE COURT: The answer will be stricken.
Read the last question.
Listen to the question and then answer it.
(The question was read by the reporter.)
THE WITNESS: Sometimes.
If you want to call that power.
MR. SHINN: Q. Well, you say sometimes. What do you mean by sometimes?
A. Sometimes I am not able to pick up on what they are trying to say, or what anybody is trying to say, through their hands or motions, you know.
Q. You get these things called vibes or vibrations?
A. Yes.
Q. How long has this been going on?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Ambiguous, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. SHINN: Q. How long did you possess these powers? Since you were born, or since the last four years, or since you were taking drugs, or what?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Ambiguous. Also assumes a fact not in evidence.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. SHINN: Q. When did you know about these powers that you possess?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Same objection.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. SHINN: Q. When was the next time that Mr. Manson tried to communicate with you?
A. Another time was when I was saying that I had sexual intercourse with him four times. I was sitting over there, and he was going “uh uh,” and I was going “uh-huh, uh-huh.”
And he said, “One time.” And I said, “No, Charlie, four times.”
Q. Did you hear him say the word “time”?
A. I didn’t hear it.
I didn’t hear him say “time,” no.
He just said “one time,” and then he said, “the waterfall.”
Q. Did you read his lips saying “Time”?
A. Yes.
Q. In other words, you could read lips?
A. Yes.
Q. When did you acquire that ability?
MR. STOVITZ: I object to this as immaterial.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. SHINN:
Q. At any time during this trial, did you try to communicate with the defendants Susan Atkins, Patricia Krenwinkel and Leslie Van Houten?
A. Sometimes when they would walk by, they would say a little thing or something, and maybe I would say something back.
Q. My question was: Did you try to communicate with them at any time, either by words or by motions or vibrations?
A. By vibrations, yes.
Q. You did?
A. Yes.
Q. When was this?
A. I do it all the time.
Q. In other words, you tried to communicate with these female defendants all the time?
A. Not all the time but sometimes.
Q. When was the first time?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Ambiguous, your Honor.
MR. SHINN: The first time during this trial, your Honor.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Withdraw the objection.
THE COURT: What is that?
MR. BUGLIOSI: I have withdrawn the objection, your Honor.
THE WITNESS: Are you waiting for an answer?
MR. SHINN: Yes.
THE WITNESS: What was your question?
When was the first time?
MR. SHINN: Q. Yes.
That you tried to communicate with these lady defendants?
A. I don’t know when the first time was.
It could be when I first saw them, or just any time throughout the trial. I don’t know.
Q. In other words, you were trying to communicate with them?
A. I was just putting out thought vibrations.
Q. What kind of vibrations were you putting out?
A. Thought vibrations.
Q. What kind of thought vibrations?
MR. STOVITZ: The substance of it?
MR. SHINN: The substance of it.
MR. STOVITZ: I object to that as calling for hearsay, your Honor.
MR. SHINN: It goes to her state of mind, your Honor.
THE COURT: I don’t understand the question, Mr. Shinn.
MR. SHINN: Well, she said that—
THE COURT: Reframe the question.
MR. SHINN: Very well.
BY MR. SHINN:
Q. What type of vibrations were you trying to put out to the defendants?
A. Mostly for them to, you know, tear away their face and step into the light.
Q. Tear away their faces?
A. Yes. The little game faces that they wear on their faces while they are in court.
Q. What is a game face?
A. People put on faces, and they are putting on faces.
Q. You mean a mask?
A. An invisible mask, yes.
Q. All people?
A. Yes, sometimes, usually.
Q. Do you have a mask on now?
A. No, not right now.
Q. When did you take it off?
A. What?
Q. When did you take it off?
MR. BUGLIOSI: That assumes a fact not in evidence, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. SHINN:
Q. When was the second time you tried to communicate with the lady defendants?
A. I don’t know. I don’t know the times. I didn’t count the times. I don’t know when the times were.
Q. Was it many times?
A. When I tried to communicate to them?
Q. Yes.
A. Mostly just through thought vibrations.
Q. Did you have any vocal communications with the lady defendants at any time during the court session?
MR. STOVITZ: Whether she initiated them or the defendants initiated them?
MR. SHINN: Initiated by either party.
THE WITNESS: Sometimes they were walking by and they would say a few words like “God is your judge,” and, “I let go of everything.”
Things like this.
Q. Did you respond?
A. Sometimes I just looked at them, and maybe I would laugh, or whatever.
Q. Were there any other types of communications between the defendants and yourself at any time during this court session?
A. Just looking at each other and laughing, or whatever; or just staring.
Q. Were there any notes passed?
A. Notes?
Q. By you or the defendants, yes.
A. I received a note from Charlie.
Q. From the girls? Anything from the girls?
A. No.
Q. When you saw these communications by motions, did you tell anyone about them?
A. Yes.
Q. Who did you tell?
A. My attorney. Just small talk. Whatever.
Q. Small talk, did you say?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you call it to the attention of Mr. Bugliosi or Mr. Stovitz?
A. Yes.
Q. When was this?
A. They asked me the same questions you are asking me now, if there was any communication.
Q. Did they ask you every day, or did they ask you once a week, or what?
A. No. I don’t know when he asked me or—or he just asked me once maybe. I don’t know.
Q. You don’t recall how many times they asked you or you told them?
A. I think I only told them once.
Q. And which one was that? Which motion did you tell Mr. Stovitz and Mr. Bugliosi? Which one was that?
A. Everything that I am telling you.
Q. My question was directed at the motion or communication.
Did you tell Mr. Stovitz or Mr. Bugliosi?
A. I didn’t understand your question.
Q. You indicated that you told Mr. Bugliosi and Mr. Stovitz about this communication with the defendants in court; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. My question was: Which of these motions or communications did you tell Mr. Stovitz and Mr. Bugliosi about?
MR. STOVITZ: That is ambiguous, your Honor.
MR. SHINN: Not at all.
THE COURT: Do you understand the question?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: The motions between Charlie and I, and his playing with his beard, and things like that, and everything I have just been telling you.
MR. SHINN: I have nothing further, your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek?
MR. SHINN: Pardon me, your Honor. I have one more question.
Q. Mrs. Kasabian, what would you think would happen to your testimony if Mr. Manson could have asked these questions?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, that is preposterous. I object on the ground—
MR. STOVITZ: Calling for speculation.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Conclusionary.
MR. SHINN: I have nothing further.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. SHINN: Nothing further.
THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek?
MR. KANAREK: Yes. Thank you, your Honor.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Mrs. Kasabian, do you understand what the word “goofy” means?
A. What?
Q. Goofy?
A. Goofy?
Q. Yes.
A. Crazy.
Q. What is your understanding of the word goofy?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Asked and answered.
THE WITNESS: A funny crazy thing.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Have you ever told anyone that you thought you were goofy?
A. No.
Q. You never have said that?
A. No, I don’t believe I use that word.
Q. You don’t believe?
A. I know that I don’t use that word.
Q. But have you ever used the word “goofy” in connection with yourself?
A. No, sir.
Q. That is for sure?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, these vibrations that you have told us about, Mrs. Kasabian. Have you used these vibrations before you came into this courtroom?
A. Concerning what?
Q. Concerning anything.
A. Sure.
Q. Like in 1969, were you communicating by vibrations?
A. Yes.
Q. With people?
A. Uh-huh, yes.
Q. And would you tell us, how do you set this process going, this process of communicating with vibrations?
A. You just be still, you sit and you be still, and you concentrate all your energy on a particular object, a person, and your thoughts go out to this person, and if they are aware, if they are tuned into you, then they pick up on what you are saying.
Q. I see. Then how do you determine in advance whether someone is tuned in or aware?
A. How do you do what?
Q. How do you determine in advance as to whether someone is tuned in or are aware?
A. Sometimes I just don’t know.
Q. Well, on what occasions do you use this vibration approach?
A. I don’t understand your question.
Q. Well, on what occasions do you sit down and use these vibrations to try to accomplish something?
A. No special occasions?
Q. Well, what are the types of occasions that you use vibrations?
A. If I just happen to be thinking about somebody, then I just sit down and put all my energy into thinking about them.
Q. Like in the year 1969. Did you use any vibrations?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you tell us the occasions when you used vibrations in 1969?
A. I used them all the time.
Just maybe sitting in a room with some people I know and I don’t feel like opening my mouth and talking, I just say something in my mind. I think about something.
Q. Your state of mind is that by doing that you then convey by this vibration what your thoughts are without stating them?
A. Not all the time, because most people don’t pick it up.
Q. Well, can you tell us times when people have picked it up?
A. Yes.
Once I was thinking about my mother back East, and she called me that day. So, she picked it up.
Do you want another instance?
Q. Yes.
MR. BUGLIOSI: I would make a motion to strike “she picked it up,” your Honor, on the grounds that would appear to be a conclusion of the witness.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, this witness is testifying as to her state of mind in connection with her conduct, what she is doing.
THE COURT: The motion is denied.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Would you give some other example, Mrs. Kasabian?
A. That day that my husband called me from California, and when I was in New Hampshire, the phone rang, and I just knew it was him and I hadn’t heard from him in two months.
Q. And your husband told you he was going to South America?
A. Right.
Q. Right?
A. Yes.
Q. And he told you that Mr. Melton had $5,000?
A. No, $20,000.
Q. He had $20,000?
And Mr. Melton told you that he and—pardon me, your husband told you that he and Mr. Melton were going to South America?
A. And a few other people.
Q. Right?
A. Yes.
Q. But he did not want you to go to South America with him, did he?
A. When he called me?
Q. Right.
A. Yes, he did.
Q. He wanted you to go to South America with him?
A. Yes.
Q. At some time, Mrs. Kasabian, after you came to California, your husband decided he did not want you to go to South America with him, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And after he told you that he did not want you to go to South America with him, your state of mind was that you were going to frustrate him in going to South America and at the same time gather yourself a fast $5,000, isn’t that correct?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Compound, beyond the scope of redirect examination.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Well, Mrs. Kasabian, then did you use any vibrations, Mrs. Kasabian, in communicating to your husband the fact that you were taking $5,000 at the time that you took it?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Beyond the scope of redirect examination.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Now, Mrs. Kasabian, you have told us that all of us put on faces at times.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Well, Mrs. Kasabian, have you put on any faces in this courtroom?
A. Sometimes, yes.
Q. Sometimes you have told us things that are not quite true, right?
A. That has nothing to do with putting on faces.
Q. Would you distinguish for us, please, the difference between putting on faces and the truth? Would you give us that?
A. What I meant by putting on faces was like when you look at somebody and you are trying to hide yourself, you know, you just make all kinds of facial expressions, you know, to get away from yourself.
Q. I see. Well, you have told us that, then, while you were on the witness stand you have put on faces from time to time?
A. I did not say on the witness stand.
Q. I see.
Well, in the courtroom here in your place of repose here, next to your attorney, have you been putting on any faces?
A. Yes, I have a few times.
Q. But you have not put on any faces on the witness stand?
A. No.
Q. You have disciplined yourself so there wouldn’t be any faces put on by you on the witness stand?
A. Yes.
Q. I see. And is there some reason that you disciplined yourself in connection with putting on faces on the witness stand?
A. Because it’s myself coming out and I have no reason to hide it.
Q. It’s yourself—what is yourself coming out?
A. Myself, me.
Q. What do you mean, you have no reason to hide it? When you say—would you explain that? I don’t quite understand it.
A. I have no reason to hide myself. I am up here telling you the truth and I am being completely myself.
Q. That is the real Linda, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Right now, when you are on the witness stand you are the real Linda?
A. Yes.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, I object to these argumentative questions which imply there is another Linda.
THE COURT: The answer is in, lets proceed.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Well, Mrs. Kasabian, then are you telling us that when you stole the $5,000 from your husband, for instance, that was not the real Linda?
MR. BUGLIOSI: I object, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Well, directing your attention, Mrs. Kasabian, to the, let’s say, the year 1969, during that year, Mrs. Kasabian, were you the real Linda?
MR. STOVITZ: Ambiguous, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Then when you say putting on faces, Mrs. Kasabian, are you referring to telling the truth in any way?
A. No.
Q. That has nothing to do with telling the truth?
A. No.
Q. Or telling a lie?
A. What I mean—I think you totally misunderstood me.
Q. Please tell us.
A. Like sometimes when people talk to you and you don’t feel like laughing and you don’t feel like smiling and you don’t feel like responding whatsoever, but you do it anyways.
That is all, that is putting on a face.
Q. All right, now, you think I am dishonest, right?
A. To a certain extent, yes.
Q. Well, to what extent am I dishonest?
MR. STOVITZ: Objected to.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: It goes to state of mind, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Well, now, then, is your state of mind, Mrs. Kasabian, that when I am asking you questions that you are putting on faces?
MR. STOVITZ: On the witness stand?
THE WITNESS: No.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Well, you say you put on a face when you’d rather not have conversation, right?
A. What I mean is, responding like with a smile or whatever.
Q. Well, when I am speaking with you would you rather not have the conversations going on?
A. I really enjoy speaking to you.
Q. You enjoy it?
A. Yes.
Q. Then you are not putting on any faces?
A. No.
Q. I see.
Notwithstanding the fact that I am dishonest you feel that you enjoy—
You are now telling the truth, as you sit there on the witness stand, you are telling us that you have enjoyed the conversation, the questioning that has gone on between us?
MR. STOVITZ: Ambiguous, your Honor, compound.
MR. KANAREK: Talking about her state of mind, your Honor.
I think the jury is entitled to have a response to that as well as all of us.
THE COURT: Overruled, you may answer.
THE WITNESS: What was your question?
MR. KANAREK: May it be read, your Honor?
THE COURT: Reframe the question.
MR. STOVITZ: The reason for my objection, your Honor, is that it is ambiguous as to what portion—did she mean she is enjoying the conversation now, some portion of her seven or eight days of her cross-examination, some portions were amusing to all of us, I am sure.
THE COURT: Reframe the question.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Mrs. Kasabian, are you telling us the truth when you say that you have enjoyed the questions and answers and all of that that has gone on between you and me?
A. All the questions and answers? The whole—
Q. Do you understand the question, Mrs. Kasabian?
A. Not completely, since he objected.
Q. Well, do you understand the question that I am asking you?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you please give us an answer.
A. I have enjoyed some of the questions and answers, yes.
Q. I see, you have not enjoyed all of the questions and answers.
A. No.
Q. So it wasn’t true when you said that you have enjoyed speaking with me—
MR. STOVITZ: Argumentative and unintelligible, your Honor.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Also irrelevant, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Now, Mrs. Kasabian, when you used the word “pigs,” when you thought that the police were pigs, this was after, you tell us, that you thought Mr. Manson was Jesus Christ.
A. Yes.
Q. Right?
A. Yes.
Q. This was like after, like maybe the middle of August, all times after you left the Spahn Ranch, is that right?
A. Yeah.
Q. Up until the time that you left the Spahn Ranch you were under the influence of Mr. Manson?
A. Say that again.
Q. Up until the time you left the Spahn Ranch you were under the influence of Mr. Manson, is that correct?
A. Not completely, no.
Q. What do you mean “not completely”?
A. The second night when he told me to kill somebody, I didn’t do it, so I wasn’t under his influence.
Q. I see, so that is the beginning point when you were not under his influence, is that right?
A. For that instant, yes.
But then the next day, or the day after that, excuse me, he told me to do something and I did it so I was under his influence.
Q. At that time you thought he was Jesus Christ?
A. No.
THE COURT: It’s 12:00 o’clock now, Mr. Kanarek.
MR. STOVITZ: May I ask, did the reporter get the last answer?
THE REPORTER: Yes.
THE COURT: Do not converse with anyone nor form or express an opinion regarding the case until it is finally submitted to you.
The court will recess until 2:00 p.m.
(Whereupon the court stood in recess until 2:00 o’clock p.m.)
2:05 o’clock p.m.
(The following proceedings occur in open court, all defendants, counsel and jurors present:)
THE COURT: All parties, counsel and jurors are present.
You may continue, Mr. Kanarek.
MR. KANAREK: Thank you, your Honor.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Mrs. Kasabian, you have told us that the paramount thing in your life is the welfare of your child?
A. Yes.
Q. And is your state of mind such that you consider that the welfare of your child depends upon your being with your child?
A. No.
Q. Then you are telling us that your state of mind, in August of 1969, was such that you didn’t think that your being with your child was very important for your child’s welfare?
MR. STOVITZ: I object to the question as ambiguous as to what is very important.
THE COURT: Well, I think the form of the question is objectionable, Mr. Kanarek.
Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Certainly, your Honor.
I will try to re frame it, your Honor.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. In August of 1969, September of 1969, did you consider your physical presence near your daughter Tanya was important in connection with your daughter’s welfare?
A. At what time?
Q. At any time.
A. At any time?
Q. Yes.
A. Sometimes I felt it was important that I be with her; and then while I was at the ranch, I felt that it wasn’t important that I be with her.
Q. When you were at the ranch, you felt it wasn’t important that you be with her?
A. Yes.
Q. And after you left the ranch, you felt it was important that you be with her?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you feel that this—what other factors were important as far as your child’s welfare was concerned?
A. I don’t understand.
Q. Well, were there any other factors to be considered in determining your child’s welfare as far as your state of mind was concerned other than just your physical presence with her?
A. I still don’t quite understand.
Q. Do you consider that—you always have it in mind, the welfare of your child, right?
A. Yes.
Q. And one of the important things as far as the welfare of your child is concerned is that you, her natural mother, be with her?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, were there any other matters affecting your state of mind as to the welfare of your child other than your physical presence?
A. I am really not sure what you are asking me.
Q. You don’t understand the question?
A. No.
Q. One of the factors to be considered, your state of mind is such you certainly recognize one of the factors to be considered in the welfare of a child is the mother’s physical presence, right?
A. Yes.
Q. But if the mother is a narcotic addict, or the mother is a convict, or the mother associates with people of that character or, let us say, the mother steals money, the mother does various things, then these other factors are to be considered also in determining the welfare of the child as far as your state of mind is concerned?
MR. STOVITZ: Objection, irrelevant, immaterial, nothing to do with the issues of this case.
It calls for a conclusion of this witness.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, she has professed—
THE COURT: The objection is sustained, Mr. Kanarek.
MR. STOVITZ: The reason she cannot understand it, I submit, your Honor, the question is unintelligible.
THE COURT: The objection has been sustained.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Mrs. Kasabian, is your state of mind such that you can recognize that the welfare of Tanya, or did you recognize at that time in the summer of 1969 that the welfare of Tanya was not dependent solely upon your physical presence?
A. That’s right.
Q. And what were the other factors that you considered concerning the welfare of Tanya?
A. Food.
Q. What?
A. Food and clothing, and attention and love from other people.
Q. Right. Now, you have come to this court and you have told us all, right? Everything?
A. Yes.
Q. Right?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, when you went to the Juvenile Court of Referee Lebow, out in Sylmar, did you tell everything?
A. No.
Q. And the reason you did not tell everything was because—
What was the reason you did not tell everything concerning your background, the background of Tanya and everything that had occurred that you are now telling us?
MR. STOVITZ: Object to the question, your Honor.
In this courtroom she is asked questions and gives answers. In that courtroom she is not asked questions and she only answers the things she is asked.
MR. KANAREK: I wonder if counsel recognizes what is pregnant in that last statement of his, your Honor.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Did you hear Mr. Stovitz’s last remark?
A. I wasn’t really listening to it.
THE COURT: Ask your next question.
MR. KANAREK: Very well.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. When you were in court in Sylmar did you feel that you did not have to tell everything—
Did you feel you did not have to tell the whole truth, is that what you felt?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Ambiguous and irrelevant.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Was your state of mind such, Mrs. Kasabian, that you felt you did not have to tell the whole truth when you were in Sylmar?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Same objection.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Did you tell the whole truth, Mrs. Kasabian, when you were in front of the court in Sylmar?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Ambiguous and too broad, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. When you were in Sylmar before the Referee that heard the Superior Court matter last September, Mrs. Kasabian, was your state of mind such that you wished to hide something from the court?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Ambiguous, irrelevant, too broad.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may we approach the bench?
THE COURT: Very well.
(Whereupon, all counsel approach the bench and the following proceedings occur at the bench outside of the hearing of the jury:)
THE COURT: Mr. Darrow, do you have the Penal Code?
THE CLERK: Yes, I do, your Honor.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, the point is that this witness has testified as to her state of mind, that she is interested in the welfare of Tanya.
We certainly are allowed to impeach her if, in fact, that is a specious argument, because if her state of mind was that the welfare of Tanya depended upon factors other than her mere physical presence and she did not reveal these matters to the Court in San Fernando, then it is relevant and material to show that she is lying in connection with that motive about the welfare of Tanya.
THE COURT: The objection will be sustained.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, would you ask Mr. Kanarek how long he will anticipate cross-examination?
We have other witnesses to call and I would like to know whether to bring them down.
We have had several of them come and go the last couple of days.
THE COURT: Of course, Mr. Hughes has to cross-examine yet.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Can we briefly get an idea whether you are going to be through today?
MR. KANAREK: I doubt it, your Honor.
Mr. Bugliosi has opened up—we opposed his opening up these matters, and these matters are wide open so far as we are concerned at this point.
THE COURT: I don’t know what you mean by “these matters.”
MR. FITZGERALD: I personally anticipate that we would conclude today.
I would certainly agree to hold harmless the D.A. if he excused his witnesses and ordered them to return tomorrow.
Is that your concern about the witnesses this afternoon?
MR. BUGLIOSI: We have one witness here. The next witness whom we intend to call is not here.
I wonder if we should call him in right now.
MR. FITZGERALD: I don’t think so, but my personal opinion is that the examination ought to be concluded this afternoon.
MR. KANAREK: I will represent to the Court that I will not ask for a dismissal because this witness is not present, Mr. Bugliosi’s witness.
THE COURT: What about a mistrial, Mr. Kanarek, or an evidentiary hearing?
MR. KANAREK: Neither of those other two, your Honor. I so represent to the Court.
I am sure that Mr. Bugliosi recognizes the fact that—
MR. BUGLIOSI: If we finish at a quarter to 4:00 today, would the Court adjourn until tomorrow?
THE COURT: If we run out of witnesses this afternoon, we will certainly adjourn.
MR. BUGLIOSI: I have got another one. I don’t know whether to have him come in. He was here all day yesterday.
THE COURT: All right.
(Whereupon, all counsel return to their respective places at counsel table and the following proceedings occurred in open court within the presence and hearing of the jury:)
MR. KANAREK: Now, Mrs. Kasabian, you have told us that you were scared to call the police?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And when you were in court in San Fernando, out there in the juvenile court, were you, at that time, scared to tell Referee Libow the things that you are telling us in these last few days?
A. Yes.
Q. You were scared?
A. Yes.
Q. And would you tell us, Mrs. Kasabian, why you were scared?
A. Why I was scared?
Q. Yes.
A. Because they represented authority, the police, and I was just afraid. I didn’t know how to go about talking to them.
I was afraid they would say I was crazy, and I didn’t know where the Family was.
I just didn’t know what would happen.
Q. Let’s take those one at a time, Mrs. Kasabian. You felt that they would think you were crazy?
A. Yes.
Q. And because you felt—you thought—you really believed that they would think you were crazy; is that right?
A. I guess so, yes.
Q. Well, you guess so or you know so?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you afraid if they thought you were crazy that they would lock you up and put you in Atascadero or at Patton, or some mental institution?
A. I didn’t know what they would do.
Q. You were afraid that you would be found crazy?
A. I just didn’t know what would happen.
Q. But one of the ideas was you felt that they would think you were crazy?
A. Something like that, yes.
Q. And why did you think that if you told Referee Libow, or the bailiff sitting in the courtroom about where Mr. Skupen is sitting, why do you think that they would think that you were crazy?
A. I don’t know. I don’t know.
Q. You have no reason for thinking that, for telling us this story about your being crazy; that is not a story, that is the truth?
A. Say that again?
Q. It is the truth that you thought that they would think you were crazy if you told them the story?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you now told us all of the reasons as to why you think that they would think you were crazy?
A. I don’t know. I don’t know.
Q. Pardon?
A. I don’t know.
Q. You mean that is a question that sort of corners you in and you don’t know what to say, so you are saying—you are sort of making up this “I don’t know”?
A. I just—
MR. BUGLIOSI: Argumentative, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
THE WITNESS: Excuse me.
MR. KANAREK: Q. You really don’t know, Mrs. Kasabian, or is there some other reason?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Argumentative.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: I just didn’t know what they would do.
I mean, this is a fantastic thing, and I just didn’t know how they would react, and I thought maybe they would think I was crazy.
Q. Then what was your next—what was the next process in your thinking? If they thought you were crazy, then what would happen to you?
A. I don’t know. I don’t know what they would do.
Q. Did you think about what they might do if they thought you were crazy?
A. No.
Q. Were you concerned that they might think that you were crazy?
A. No. It was just a thought why I didn’t.
Q. How long did you think about it?
A. I don’t know. I didn’t dwell upon it.
Q. I mean, was it a short vibration?
A. It was just a passing thought that held me back from going to the police.
Q. And this passing thought, was this like an instant, flash?
A. Yes.
Q. And when did you have this instantaneous flash in the proceedings that we have been speaking about? Was it while you were before the Judge, or was it while you were talking to Mr. Fleischman, or would you tell us when you had this passing thought?
A. When I had that thought?
Q. Yes.
A. I don’t know when I had it.
I believe it was even before I spoke with Mr. Fleischman, but I don’t know exactly when.
Q. You mean you might have had it in New Mexico?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you have it in New Mexico?
A. I think so, yes.
Q. All right.
So, then, when you came and you were standing in front of the Judge there in Sylmar, you no longer thought that they would put you away because if you told them this you would be crazy; right?
MR. BUGLIOSI: That assumes a fact not in evidence.
She never testified that she thought they would put her away, your Honor. These are his words again.
THE COURT: I understand him to be putting the question directly to the witness.
I don’t see any objection to it.
MR. BUGLIOSI: He said: You no longer thought that they would put you away.
THE COURT: Sustained for that reason, Mr. Kanarek.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Then, Mrs. Kasabian, as you were before the Court there in Sylmar, your state of mind no longer had anything in it concerning the thought that somebody might think you were crazy if you told them what you are telling us now, because that happened back in New Mexico; right?
A. Yes.
Q. So, therefore, when you were before the court, that reason didn’t apply about your thinking that somebody would think you were crazy?
A. But that is why I didn’t say anything, because I decided back in New Mexico that I wouldn’t.
Q. You decided back in New Mexico that you weren’t going to say anything in Sylmar?
A. I didn’t know if I was going to Sylmar.
Q. Well, wherever you were going, whatever court you were going, or wherever, in order to get Tanya in your possession, you had already made up your mind that you weren’t going to say something; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And so, when you stood before the court there back in the summer of 1969, that was water over the dam, no longer were you considering the fact that you might be crazy or that somebody might think you were crazy?
A. I don’t understand what you are saying.
Q. As you stood before the court there in Sylmar, the crazy aspect of this had no place because you had already made up your mind, you are telling us now, that you weren’t going to bring this up, these matters up, because of the fact that somebody might think you were crazy?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Beyond the scope of the redirect, your Honor.
MR. KANAREK: It certainly is not, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
Do you understand the question?
THE WITNESS: Yes. That thought was no longer in my head.
MR. KANAREK: All right.
Q. Then that thought not being in your mind as you were before the Court, there in San Fernando or Sylmar, would you tell us what was in your mind?
A. Just to get Tanya.
Q. Right?
A. Yes.
Q. Just to get Tanya?
A. Yes.
Q. And you wanted the physical possession of Tanya and you didn’t care whether you lied, stole, killed; you would do anything to get the physical possession of Tanya at that time: right?
MR. BUGLIOSI: That is a compound question, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: I don’t think I would go to the extent of killing, no.
MR. KANAREK: Q. But you would go to the extent of almost anything to get Tanya because you, Linda Kasabian, wanted Tanya in your immediate presence; is that correct?
MR. BUGLIOSI: That is unintelligible, your Honor. It is also irrelevant.
If he wants to ask her if she did lie, and what was the nature of the lie, that is something else.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: —All right I will accept Mr. Bugliosi’s question.
Q. Did you hear Mr. Bugliosi’s question?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. Would you answer that?
A. If I lied?
MR. STOVITZ: I object to that, your Honor. It is an improper question.
THE COURT: Frame the question, Mr. Kanarek.
MR. KANAREK: Yes, sir.
Q. Mrs. Kasabian, would you tell us, as you stood before the Court there, did you lie?
A. I don’t even think I said anything before the Court.
Q. Well, did you say anything or didn’t you?
A. I don’t believe I did, no.
Q. You came into the court and nobody asked you anything?
A. I think my attorney spoke for me.
Q. I see. And would you tell us who was present?
A. Police officers.
Q. Yes?
A. And my attorney and myself.
Q. And was there a referee there?
A. What is a referee?
Q. The man sitting in a place similar to Judge Older, or perhaps at a desk.
A. He was sitting at a table.
Q. The man doing the deciding?
A. Yes.
Q. Was his name Libow?
A. I don’t know.
Q. Was there a probation officer present?
A. Yes.
Q. And there was a court reporter present; is that correct?
A. I don’t know about that.
Q. Do you remember a Mrs. D. Smith being present?
A. No.
Q. Well, was there a court reporter present?
A. I don’t know.
Q. Was there a clerk present?
A. I don’t know.
Q. So, at the present time, you are telling us that you don’t know whether you said anything there or not?
A. I didn’t say—I didn’t tell any lies, I know.
I think I said who I was, my name; and it seems to me that my attorney did all the talking to the referee.
Q. Would you tell us what your attorney said?
A. I don’t know. I don’t remember.
It just lasted for about a minute.
Q. Well, what was the gist of what your attorney said?
A. That I was here to get my child, and that I should get my child, that there was no reason, or something like that, why I shouldn’t.
Q. And did the referee or the probation officer, or anyone there, ask any questions of you?
A. Not that I can recall now.
MR. KANAREK: May I have a moment, your Honor?
(Pause.)
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Now, Mrs. Kasabian, I have here a file which is denominated “In the Matter of Tanya Kasabian, Superior Court State of California for the County of Los Angeles, Juvenile Court, File No. 385486.”
I would ask you, if you would, please, to read over, beginning at page 4.
(Mr. Kanarek hands the file to Mr. Bugliosi.)
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Now, is it a fair statement, Mrs. Kasabian, that in connection with, the present proceeding, the case concerning which you are testifying today, that you recognize—your state of mind is such—that one of the benefits that you are getting from this immunity is that you will be able to be in the physical presence of Tanya?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, I object on the grounds it is beyond the scope of the redirect examination.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, this goes to the very matters that Mr. Bugliosi raised. It goes to her state of mind in connection with what she is uttering at this very instant.
THE COURT: Overruled, you may answer.
THE WITNESS: What was your question?
MR. KANAREK: May it be read, your Honor?
THE COURT: Read the question.
(Whereupon the reporter reads the pending question as follows:
“Q. Now, is it a fair statement, Mrs. Kasabian, that in connection with the present proceeding, the case concerning which you are testifying today, that you recognize—your state of mind is such—that one of the benefits that you are getting from this immunity is that you will be able to be in the physical presence of Tanya?”)
THE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. KANAREK: May I approach the witness, your Honor?
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. I show you, Mrs. Kasabian, and I ask you if you would read over to yourself, beginning at page 4, line 8, ending at—begin where it says: Parent’s Statement, and ending on page 5, line 4, where it says “Individual,” what appears to be a social worker’s report.
Would you read those lines over to yourself, please.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, if this is a statement before the court then apparently it would be impeachment.
If it is not, then I object on the ground that this is hearsay.
THE COURT: What statement?
MR. BUGLIOSI: If it is a statement made before the court.
He asked her if she made any statement before the court.
Now apparently he is showing her something. If this is a statement which Mr. Kanarek represents was made before the court, then I withdraw my objection.
If he cannot represent that, then I object on the grounds it is hearsay.
MR. KANAREK: I am asking her to look at it. She hasn’t testified to anything, your Honor.
MR. BUGLIOSI: All right.
MR. STOVITZ: May we, with the permission of the Court, ask that after the witness looks at it, may the Court look at it so before the question is put to the witness so the context of it will be intelligible to all concerned.
MR. KANAREK: I have no objection to your Honor reading the report. I have not asked a question yet.
(Witness reads the report silently.)
MR. KANAREK: May I approach the witness, your Honor?
MR. STOVITZ: May the Court be allowed to read the statement so that the question that is put to the witness can be properly objected to?
MR. KANAREK: I have no objection to the Court’s reading the statement.
THE COURT: What portion is it, Mr. Kanarek?
MR. KANAREK: Well, I have various questions, your Honor.
THE COURT: I understand. What portion?
MR. KANAREK: The beginning, where it says “Parent’s Statement”, your Honor.
We asked her to read over the Parent’s Statement.
Thank you.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Now, Mrs. Kasabian, directing your attention to this Parent’s Statement that you read over, did you, prior to this time—
THE COURT: Just a moment. That is an improper characterization of it, Mr. Kanarek.
It is an inaccurate characterization of it.
MR. KANAREK: Parent’s Statement, your Honor.
THE COURT: That is what it says there. Is it a signed statement?
MR. KANAREK: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: It is someone else’s statement typed in.
MR. KANAREK: That is what I am going into right now.
THE COURT: Then the characterization at least at this point is inaccurate.
MR. KANAREK: Very well, I will reframe it.
MR. BUGLIOSI: I am going to object prospectively, your Honor, on the ground that the question itself contains hearsay, and if he is asking, say, for a yes answer, it would be an adoption of hearsay, unless it is being offered for impeachment purposes, your Honor.
THE COURT: Let’s hear what the question is first.
Go ahead, Mr. Kanarek.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Mrs. Kasabian, did you, prior to the time that you went to court, meet with a social worker?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And did you have a conversation with the social worker?
A. Yes.
Q. And, having read over this “Parent’s Statement,” does this “Parent’s Statement” reflect the substance of your conversation with the social worker?
MR. STOVITZ: Object, immaterial, irrelevant, outside the scope of redirect examination.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, this is completely analogous to Mr. Stovitz’s reading to her out of the transcript and asking her whether those are her questions and answers.
THE COURT: No, it is not, sir.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, there is no distinction.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
MR. KANAREK: May I ask on what basis, your Honor?
THE COURT: Irrelevant.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, it is offered on the issue of state of mind, her state of mind.
THE COURT: You may ask additional questions, Mr. Kanarek.
MR. KANAREK: Very well, thank you.
THE COURT: Questions that will be proper, but that question is objectionable.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Now, when you met with the social worker, Mrs. Kasabian, would you tell us where it was that you met with her?
A. Where? It was a he.
Q. It was a he?
A. Yes.
Q. Where did you meet with him?
A. At his office.
Q. Where was that?
A. I don’t know, I don’t remember now.
Q. Was it in Los Angeles, in the Los Angeles area?
A. Yes.
Q. And in whose presence were you other than the social worker when you met with him?
A. It was a small office and he had secretaries here and there, but it was just him and me.
Q. That was how long before you went to court out at Sylmar?
A. I will say about three weeks.
Q. And during that three-week period were you in the Los Angeles area?
A. No.
Q. You came to his office?
A. Yes.
Q. Then you went to court subsequent to the time you went to his office, right?
A. Excuse me?
Q. After you went to his office you went to court sometime?
A. Yeah.
Q. In this period between the time that you went to his office and the time you went to court, where were you?
A. In New Mexico.
Q. You went back to New Mexico?
A. Yes.
Q. And how many times did you meet with the social worker?
A. Just that once, and then I believe he was in the court that day.
Q. The day of the hearing?
A. Yes.
Q. And when you met with him did he ask you questions and did you give him answers?
A. Yes.
Q. It was conversation between you?
A. Yes.
Q. And was the subject matter Tanya?
A. Yes.
Q. And was the subject matter the welfare of Tanya?
A. Yeah.
Q. What was best for Tanya?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that right?
A. Right.
Q. And so he asked you questions and you said, you gave him answers.
Now, directing your attention then, Mrs. Kasabian, at the time that you were speaking with the social worker, were the events of the first and second night that you have spoken of in this courtroom, were they in your mind?
A. Possibly.
Q. You don’t know for sure?
A. No—I may have been thinking about it.
MR. BUGLIOSI: I object to the line of questioning, ambiguous.
“Were you thinking about them,” or “were they in your mind?”
THE COURT: What was the answer?
THE REPORTER: “Possibly.”
THE COURT: That is the answer.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Was your state of mind, Mrs. Kasabian, such that you felt that if you told the social worker what you had done on what you have called the first and second nights, was your state of mind such that you felt that if you stated what you had done that you would not get Tanya?
MR. BUGLIOSI: That calls for a conclusion, your Honor.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, Mr. Bugliosi opened the subject matter about this witness’ state of mind in connection with Tanya.
THE COURT: Overruled, you may answer.
THE WITNESS: What was your question again?
MR. KANAREK: May that be read, your Honor?
THE COURT: Read the question.
(Whereupon, the reporter reads the pending question as follows:
“Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Was your state of mind, Mrs. Kasabian, such that you felt that if you told the social worker what you had done on what you have called the first and second nights, was your state of mind such that you felt that if you stated what you had done that you would not get Tanya?”)
THE WITNESS: I don’t know if I thought that or not. I was just afraid to say anything.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: So, as you sat there in front of the social worker you were afraid to say anything about the first and second nights?
A. Yes.
Q. My question, Mrs. Kasabian, is were you afraid to say anything about the first and second nights because you were afraid that if you said anything you would not get Tanya, that is my question.
MR. STOVITZ: That question was asked of the witness. She gave her answer the best she could.
I submit it is repetitious and outside the scope of redirect examination.
MR. KANAREK: She has not given an answer the best she could.
THE COURT: Overruled, you may answer.
THE WITNESS: I don’t know, I’m not sure.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: What are you not sure of?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Argumentative, your Honor.
MR. KANAREK: I am asking her to explain. Counsel has gone into great length, he read transcripts, to have her explain.
MR. BUGLIOSI: She said she is not sure of his question.
MR. KANAREK: I suggest that is not the purport of her statement, your Honor.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
She answered the question, Mr. Kanarek.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: You have just stated you are not sure, right?
A. Yes.
Q. May I ask you, what do you mean by those words which you just stated, that you are not sure?
A. I wasn’t sure at the time—wait—I’m not sure how to put it.
I am just not sure, that’s all.
I wasn’t sure. I am just not sure.
Q. When you say those words, “I am not sure,” what do you mean, Mrs. Kasabian?
A. That if I had said anything I would not get Tanya back. I am not sure if those were my thoughts.
Q. Now, then, as you sat there in front of the social worker, Mrs. Kasabian, were the things that you had done on the first and second nights in your mind as you spoke with the social worker?
MR. BUGLIOSI: I object on the ground it is ambiguous, your Honor.
“In your mind” meaning were you thinking about it as opposed to what was in your mind subject to recall.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: All right, very well, I will ask you this, Mrs. Kasabian:
Q. As you sat, picture you and the social worker are sitting across from each other, right?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Would you tell us, Mrs. Kasabian, as you sat there across from the social worker were you thinking, as you conversed with the social worker, of the events wherein you had participated in what you have called the first and second nights?
A. I don’t remember thinking about them, no.
Q. And when you say you don’t remember thinking about them, is it true that you at the time—
At the time you spoke with the social worker, discussing Tanya and her welfare, isn’t it true that at that point you had forgotten the first and second nights, what had occurred?
A. Forgotten them?
Q. Yes.
A. No, I don’t think I could ever forget them.
Q. Well, then as you sat there speaking with the social worker, in your mind were the events that you had participated in the first and second nights, is that correct?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Same objection, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. As you sat in front of the social worker, Mrs. Kasabian, were you actively thinking of the events you participated in the first and second nights as you spoke about the welfare of your daughter Tanya?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Repetitious, with the exception he added the word “actively,” your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Mrs. Kasabian, did you, directing your attention to your state of mind, did you with deliberation and with intent to deceive, withhold any conversation on your part from the social worker concerning the events of the first and second nights that you participated in?
MR. BUGLIOSI: I object, your Honor, ambiguous.
Did she withhold any information that was requested of her?
THE COURT: It is also compound.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Also compound.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. As you sat in front of the social worker, Mrs. Kasabian, was your state of mind such that you felt that the social worker—I will withdraw that.
As you sat in front of the social worker, Mrs. Kasabian, discussing the welfare of Tanya, did you intend to deceive the social worker by not volunteering to him the events of the first and second nights?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Ambiguous and irrelevant, your Honor.
MR. KANAREK: It goes to her state of mind concerning Tanya.
Mr. Bugliosi raised that very issue.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Did the social worker, Mrs. Kasabian, ask you to say something like, words to the effect, “Would you please tell me what this is all about?”
MR. BUGLIOSI: Ambiguous, “Please tell me what this is all about”!
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I am asking the witness—
THE COURT: That is a preliminary question. Overruled.
Was there an answer?
THE REPORTER: No.
THE WITNESS: What was your question again?
MR. KANAREK: May that be read, your Honor?
THE COURT: Read the question.
(Whereupon the reporter reads the pending question as follows:
“Q. Did the social worker, Mrs. Kasabian, ask you to say something like, words to the effect, ‘Would you please tell me what this is all about?’”)
THE WITNESS: I don’t know if he said that, but he asked me why I left Tanya.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. And what did you tell him—
He asked you why you left Tanya at the Spahn Ranch, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Pardon?
A. Yes.
Q. All right, and what did you tell him?
A. I think I told him something like I had to hitchhike to New Mexico or something to that effect, and I did not want to hitchhike with my little girl, and I left her with some people.
Q. You told him you left her with some people?
A. Yes.
Q. What people did you tell him you left her with?
A. I believe I said Mary Brunner.
Q. What else did you tell him?
A. That was my reason why I left Tanya there that I told him.
Q. What was the reason, Mrs. Kasabian?
A. That I had to hitchhike to New Mexico to get my husband and I did not want to hitchhike with my little girl.
Q. Did you tell him anything else?
A. Sure, we had a conversation.
Q. Well, what else did you tell him?
A. I don’t know, I can’t remember.
Q. Would you think for a moment and reflect perhaps?
A. Concerning why I left her there?
Q. Anything that you told him, Mrs. Kasabian, whatever.
THE COURT: She is asking you I believe if you want additional answer to the same question or whether you are asking another question.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. No, what I am asking, Mrs. Kasabian, is for you to tell us the complete conversation you had with the social worker.
A. I think I—excuse me.
MR. BUGLIOSI: I object on the grounds it is too broad.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Then, your Honor, I would invoke the equal protection of the law in that your Honor has ruled previously, I believe it was yesterday, that if part of a conversation goes in, then all of it should go in, and based on that I ask that all of this conversation go in, invoking the equal protection clause, your Honor.
MR. BUGLIOSI: If the other party brings in a part.
This is a situation where he started bringing it out in the first place. So, 356 does not apply.
MR. KANAREK: I submit, your Honor—
THE COURT: All right, gentleman. The objection will be sustained.
Let’s proceed. Ask your next question.
MR. KANAREK: Q. Mrs. Kasabian, would you tell us what else was stated by you and stated by the social worker at this meeting other than what you have already told us?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Too broad a question, your Honor.
Calls for hearsay.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Q. Mrs. Kasabian, after you told the social worker about the hitchhiking to New Mexico, that you didn’t want to hitchhike with your daughter to New Mexico, was there any further conversation?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Object on the same grounds.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Q. Was there conversation, Mrs. Kasabian—let me ask you this:—then, as you spoke with the social worker and told the social worker that you didn’t want to hitchhike with your daughter to New Mexico, your state of mind was such that you knew that you were telling a lie; is that correct, Mrs. Kasabian?
A. Yes.
Q. And you knew that you were deliberately deceiving the social worker; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you were deliberately deceiving the social worker so that you could later on perform a fraud on the Superior Court of the State of California and get your baby under false pretenses? Was that your state of mind, Mrs. Kasabian?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Argumentative, your Honor, calls for a conclusion. Ambiguous.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Q. Your state of mind, Mrs. Kasabian, was to ask and talk with the social worker so that later on you could come to a Superior Court and get your child, based upon the utterances that you were making to the social worker; is that correct?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Immaterial, compound.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Q. What was your purpose and motive and intent, Mrs. Kasabian, in lying to the social worker?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Immaterial, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Q. Now, Mrs. Kasabian, in fact, Mrs. Kasabian, the first night—I will withdraw that.
In fact, the first time, Mrs. Kasabian, that you went to the Spahn Ranch—I am now referring to the first time when you went with Gypsy, the first day you met Gypsy, and the day of the night that you had intercourse with Tex Watson—at that time, your purpose was merely to visit the Spahn Ranch and not to stay there; is that correct?
A. No.
Q. Then I refer you to your language—may I approach the witness, your Honor?
THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek, if you are going to use that—
MR. KANAREK: No. There is a specific portion of it that I am going to direct your attention to.
THE COURT: I am talking about your language.
MR. KANAREK: Pardon?
THE COURT: You had better approach the bench, sir.
MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor.
(Whereupon, all counsel approach the bench and the following proceedings occur at the bench outside of the hearing of the jury:)
MR. STOVITZ: Mr. Fitzgerald says he would like to waive his presence.
MR. FITZGERALD: If you want us, we will come. We don’t feel it is necessary.
THE COURT: You apparently were about to show the witness the file from the juvenile proceedings? Is that right?
MR. KANAREK: Yes.
THE COURT: And you said something there about her statement.
I didn’t see anything in there about her statement.
MR. KANAREK: It is the “Parent’s Statement.” That is her statement to the social worker.
MR. FITZGERALD: I think I can clarify it.
THE COURT: That is what you say.
MR. FITZGERALD: I think I can clarify it much shorter.
MR. KANAREK: I want to lay the foundation.
MR. FITZGERALD: If you will allow me to interrupt.
I will get the file and show you precisely and exactly what is going on.
THE COURT: The point is that you can’t impeach her with this statement. There is no foundation for it. It isn’t a statement that she made.
MR. KANAREK: It is her statement.
MR. FITZGERALD: It purports to be in quotes.
THE COURT: That doesn’t make it her statement.
MR. FITZGERALD: I agree.
MR. STOVITZ: Your Honor has read enough probation reports that paraphrase the defendant’s statement.
THE COURT: You will have to do it some other way, not that way.
MR. KANAREK: I will ask her if she made this statement to the social worker.
THE COURT: That is not the way you started out.
The reason I stopped you was because you talked about her statement.
MR. KANAREK: Very well, I will rephrase it.
THE COURT: It assumes a fact that isn’t in evidence, that it is her statement.
In any event, even if she said it was her statement, this is a typewritten sheet made up by someone who listened to what she said, perhaps.
MR. FITZGERALD: I think he can ask her if she, A, made a statement, and B, what she said in the statement.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. STOVITZ: If it is material to the issues in the case, he can.
MR. KANAREK: Right.
MR. FITZGERALD: My personal feeling is—as a matter of fact, I have the social worker under subpoena, and I would prefer to call the social worker.
THE COURT: For impeachment you can certainly ask those questions.
That is not the reason I stopped you. The reason that I stopped you was because you were misstating what the facts are with respect to that statement.
MR. KANAREK: Very well.
MR. SHINN: May we have a recess at this time? One of the defendants has to go to the restroom.
THE COURT: All right. We will take it right here.
(Whereupon, all counsel return to their respective places at counsel table and the following proceedings occur in open court within the presence and hearing of the jury:)
THE COURT: Ladies and gentleman, we will take our recess at this time.
Do not converse with anyone nor form or express any opinion regarding the case until it is finally submitted to you.
The court will recess for 15 minutes.
(Recess.)
THE COURT: All parties, counsel and jurors are present.
You may continue, Mr. Kanarek.
MR. KANAREK: Q. Mrs. Kasabian, did you tell the social worker that you and your daughter Tanya returned to Los Angeles on July 1, 1969?
A. Possibly, yes.
Q. Did you tell the social worker “It was our plan to join friends going to South America. These plans did not work out”—
MR. BUGLIOSI: I object.
MR. KANAREK: “Robert”—
Your Honor, this is exactly what—
MR. BUGLIOSI: Whether the answer is yes or no, your Honor.
THE COURT: Have you completed the question, Mr. Kanarek?
MR. KANAREK: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: Complete the question.
MR. BUGLIOSI: The question itself contains hearsay. He is reading hearsay.
MR. KANAREK: It is not offered certainly for the truth of the matters asserted, it is offered for the utterances that this lady made.
THE COURT: Complete the question.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Did you tell the social worker, “It was our plan to join friends going to South America. These plans did not work out. Robert, my husband, originally planned to come to Los Angeles, but remained in Mexico”?
A. The first part sounds right. I don’t know about the last part.
Q. When you say “the first part,” what is that?
A. That we planned to go to South America.
Q. But this part—and what is the last part that is not correct?
A. I think it says something like he stayed in New Mexico, or something like that.
I don’t know that I said that.
Q. I see.
Now, did you tell the social worker “At this time I met a girl by the name of Gypsy who took me to visit Spahn’s Movie Ranch”?
MR. STOVITZ: I object to the question, your Honor, as immaterial and irrelevant, and has nothing to do with redirect or recross-examination.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Well your Honor, it goes to show—
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
MR. KANAREK: May we then approach the bench?
THE COURT: Unnecessary.
MR. KANAREK: Then, your Honor, I would make the motion to, if indeed it is not a part of our cross-examination, I make a motion to open up cross-examination for this purpose, and I cite your Honor’s allowing Mr. Bugliosi to open up, and I would like to open up just for this matter of Gypsy.
MR. STOVITZ: My objection primarily is aimed at the fact that if it is offered for an inconsistent statement, it is an inconsistent statement on an immaterial point.
MR. KANAREK: It impeaches this witness in that she stated she went there on the first day to live there.
MR. STOVITZ: A collateral matter, your Honor, I believe the Evidence Code still provides impeachment on a collateral matter—
THE COURT: Objection sustained. Let’s proceed, Mr. Kanarek.
MR. KANAREK: May I make the offer of proof, your Honor?
THE COURT: You don’t have to make an offer of proof on cross-examination, let’s proceed.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Did you tell the social worker, Mrs. Kasabian, this was near the end of July?
MR. STOVITZ: I object to the question, your Honor, as immaterial and irrelevant. It is collateral matter.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, then I do make the motion to open up cross-examination analogous to what Mr. Bugliosi did in connection with his—
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. Let’s proceed.
MR. KANAREK: Is the motion denied, your Honor?
THE COURT: The motion is denied.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Did you tell the social worker, “I planned to return in about a week to pick up Tanya, to return to New Mexico, and when I called Spahn Movie Ranch they told me that Tanya had been placed in custody”?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Objection, your Honor, it is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial and calls for hearsay.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: It goes to this witness’ state of mind, on Tanya, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may I then approach the bench in connection with this matter?
THE COURT: It is not necessary, Mr. Kanarek.
Ask your next question.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Now, Mrs. Kasabian, when you went with Gypsy, the first time you ever went to the Spahn Ranch, did you go there to visit or did you go there to live?
A. To live.
MR. KANAREK: Then, your Honor, may I approach the bench?
THE COURT: It won’t be necessary, Mr. Kanarek.
Ask your next question.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Now, during this time, Mrs. Kasabian, that you tell us that you considered Mr. Manson to be Jesus Christ, that period of time while you were at the Spahn Ranch, did you do everything that Charles Manson asked you to do blindly, without any question whatsoever?
A. I did not hear the first part of your question.
MR. KANAREK: What part—may it be read, then, your Honor?
THE COURT: Read the question.
(Whereupon, the reporter reads the pending question as follows:
“Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Now, during this time, Mrs. Kasabian, that you tell us that you considered Mr. Manson to be Jesus Christ, that period of time while you were at the Spahn Ranch, did you do everything that Charles Manson asked you to do blindly, without any question whatsoever?”)
THE WITNESS: Yes.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: You did?
A. Yes.
Q. And you made—there was no questioning on your part as to anything Mr. Manson asked you to do?
A. No.
Q. Now, then, I ask you, Mrs. Kasabian, to read over Volume 36—
MR. BUGLIOSI: I will object to this line of questioning on the grounds that it is beyond the scope of redirect.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, it is exactly in line with the redirect.
THE COURT: What is the question?
MR. KANAREK: Yes. Just a moment.
Would you read over lines 8 through 14, Volume 56, page—
MR. STOVITZ: 56?
MR. KANAREK: Sorry. 36. Page 5600.
MR. STOVITZ: 5600?
MR. KANAREK: Yes. Line 8 through 14.
(Pause while the witness reads.)
MR. STOVITZ: I believe the witness has complied, Counsel.
MR. KANAREK: You have read that?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. BUGLIOSI: I would ask the Court to look at that portion of the transcript, your Honor, and preclude any further questioning on it on the rationale that it does not constitute impeachment.
MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor, Mr. Bugliosi interrogated on this very point.
MR. BUGLIOSI: It does not constitute impeachment, your Honor.
MR. KANAREK: How can he tell? I haven’t asked the question.
MR. BUGLIOSI: I know the area of the transcript that you pointed out, Mr. Kanarek.
THE COURT: Ask your question.
MR. KANAREK: Q. Did you so testify, Mrs. Kasabian?
A. Yes, I did.
MR. KANAREK: May I approach the witness, your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Page 5600, lines 8 through 14.
“Q. Did you disagree with his philosophy in some”—
“Q. Did you disagree with his philosophy in some respects?
“A. Yes, I did.
“Q. And you told him that you disagreed with it when he told you?
“A. No. Because I was told never ask why.”
Now, Mrs. Kasabian, you followed everything that Mr. Manson told you to do without any question; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Then, when you stated, in answer to the question “Did you disagree with his philosophy in some respects?” “Yes, I did,” was that a true statement?
A. Yes.
Q. All right.
Then, you were operating under your own free will and you, at times, disagreed with Mr. Manson; right?
A. Within my own self, yes.
Q. What do you mean by within your own self?
A. I never expressed any disagreement to him.
Q. Well, now, you went out on a creepy-crawly mission; right?
A. When?
Q. Well, did you, while you were at the Spahn Ranch, go out on a creepy-crawly mission?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Beyond the scope of the redirect examination.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, this goes to show that the witness is being less than candid, and I have a right to go into this.
MR. BUGLIOSI: I object to that gratuitous and inflammatory remark, your Honor.
THE COURT: That will be stricken, and the jury is admonished to disregard it.
MR. FITZGERALD: I will object on the ground that it is beyond the scope.
THE COURT: The objection will be sustained.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Do you want to take the witness stand, Mr. Kanarek?
MR. KANAREK: Q. Mrs. Kasabian, then you did operate under your own free will. You thought some of the things—you didn’t do everything that Mr. Manson told you; is that right?
MR. STOVITZ: Ambiguous and compound, your Honor. “Some of the things” and “all of the things” are ambiguous and compound.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Well, Mrs. Kasabian, it is a fair statement, you have told us that you disagreed with some of Mr. Manson’s philosophies; right?
A. Yes.
Q. All right.
So that you were not under any trance, you were not hypnotized, you were free to think, and you did think that some of the things that Mr. Manson said you didn’t agree with; right?
A. Yes.
Q. All right.
Now, when you were going to the Tate residence, your state of mind was that you were going there to steal; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you were going because you, Linda Kasabian, wanted to do it; right?
MR. BUGLIOSI: I will object, your Honor. Beyond the scope of redirect examination.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, counsel interjected this exact issue. He read from the transcript. He interrogated on this very point.
THE COURT: Where?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Are we going to put on the case all over again?
MR. KANAREK: He read this to her. I can show you.
MR. BUGLIOSI: That testimony is not impeachment.
THE COURT: I don’t want to hear colloquy on the record in front of the jury.
MR. KANAREK: May I approach the bench and show the Court where?
THE COURT: Yes, you may.
(Whereupon, all counsel approach the bench and the following proceedings occur at the bench outside of the hearing of the jury:)
MR. KANAREK: These are the exact lines, your Honor.
THE COURT: What transcript?
MR. KANAREK: Volume 58, your Honor, Page 7842.
MR. FITZGERALD: I will join in the prosecution’s objection that it is beyond the scope of this limited examination.
MR. KANAREK: There is no limited examination.
MR. FITZGERALD: We will be here forever if we continue this.
MR. KANAREK: I can’t help it if Mr. Bugliosi opened up this matter, your Honor.
THE COURT: What are you referring to?
MR. KANAREK: Page 7842.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. KANAREK: He asked her to read Lines 1 through 14 on Page 5600.
It is the exact subject matter I am going into right now.
MR. BUGLIOSI: I asked her, your Honor, “Did Manson ever”—
THE COURT: Just a minute. Let me read this so I can understand what he is talking to out.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Sorry.
(Pause while the Court reads.)
THE COURT: The reason it was asked, Mr. Kanarek, is shown on Page 7845 where the question was asked: “Did Charles Manson ever himself tell you never to ask why?”
In other words, that was the only purpose for reading the other testimony.
Now you are reading it for an entirely different purpose.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, the subtlety involved is that there is a difference between an act and a thought.
The question was never asked—the question was—
THE COURT: I don’t know what you are talking about.
MR. KANAREK: What I am saying is this, your Honor—
THE COURT: It was opened up for the purpose of asking a specific question as to whether Mr. Manson ever told Linda never to ask why.
That was the only purpose for opening it up.
MR. KANAREK: No.
THE COURT: Look at the transcript.
MR. KANAREK: He cannot limit his purpose, your Honor.
THE COURT: But you are limited on recross to the scope of their redirect testimony.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, if we are talking about acts as well as thoughts, then—
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. It is beyond the scope.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I have a right to go into what he has—
THE COURT: Let’s proceed. I have ruled, Mr. Kanarek.
MR. KANAREK: Yes, sir.
(The following proceedings were had in open court in the presence and hearing of the jury:)
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Now, Mrs. Kasabian, is it a fair statement, Mrs. Kasabian, that many things that Mr. Manson told you were completely rejected by you?
MR. STOVITZ: At the time or now, Counsel? I object to the question as being ambiguous.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I used the word “were.” Does your Honor wish me to rephrase it?
THE COURT: Rephrase it.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Mrs. Kasabian, at the time that you were at the Spahn Ranch, is it a fair statement that you were operating under your own free will, and you rejected many of the things that Mr. Manson told you?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Compound question, also beyond the scope of redirect examination, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor, it’s right here at Page 7843 where Mr. Bugliosi questioned concerning that very subject matter.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Now, Mrs. Kasabian, would you read—
MR. KANAREK: May I approach the witness, your Honor?
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Would you read Page 5599, Mrs. Kasabian, Lines 23 through 26?
Would you read those?
A. I just did.
Q. Would you read them out loud, the question and the answer?
A. (Reading:)
“Q. And did Charlie speak with you at length about his philosophies?
“A. I guess so, I can’t even remember half the things he told me, they just never seemed to take root.”
MR. KANAREK: May I approach the witness, your Honor?
Q. That question was asked of you and you gave that answer?
A. Yes.
Q. Right?
A. Yes.
Q. So, in fact, Mr. Manson not only had no control over what you did, Mr. Manson in fact had no control even over what you were thinking, is that right, Mrs. Kasabian?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Compound question, calls for a conclusion.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: You have testified, Mrs. Kasabian, in answer to the question:
“And did Charlie speak with you at length about his philosophies?”
And you answered: “I guess so, I can’t even remember half of the things he told me; they just never seemed to take root.”
Now, what did you mean by that, Mrs. Kasabian?
A. His ideas, you know, his way of thinking, his way of doing things at the time that I was there—after a while I accepted them, but when I left I just sort of got rid of them.
They did not take root; they did not stay with me.
Q. They just never seemed to take root; right?
A. Right.
Q. So they never took root whatsoever, right?
A. They did for a little while.
Q. They did for a little while?
A. Yes.
Q. So then when you uttered these words, “They just never seemed to take root,” that is not what you meant?
A. They did not stay with me. They did not take root. They were in my mind and I did some of these things, but after a while I did not do them any more; they did not stay with me, I got rid of them; I did not believe in them.
Q. Mrs. Kasabian, what does the word “never” mean to you?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Argumentative.
MR. KANAREK: She used the word, your Honor, she put it in this record.
We have a right to know what that word means.
THE COURT: In what context? Are you talking about a particular phrase in the record?
MR. KANAREK: Her particular language, she used these words.
THE COURT: Then read that portion that you are asking about, Mr. Kanarek.
MR. KANAREK: Yes.
THE COURT: So the witness has the advantage of seeing and hearing it in context.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Is the word “never” in your vocabulary, Mrs. Kasabian?
A. Yes.
Q. All right, then, would you tell me what do you mean when you use the word “never”?
A. Actually, I should never use the word never. I don’t know exactly what it means even when I use it.
Q. There are a lot of words you use that you don’t know what they mean when you use them.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Argumentative.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. KANAREK: Have you now told us, Mrs. Kasabian, your meaning of the word “never”?
THE COURT: Place it in context, Mr. Kanarek, it is meaningless in a vacuum.
If you are referring to some portion of the transcript, specify what portion you are talking about so the witness can answer you.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Well, may I ask you this, Mrs. Kasabian, when you testified here on the witness stand on July 31st, 1970, You told us:
“I can’t even remember half the things he told me.”
Now, directing your attention to July 31st, 1970, has anything happened between that date and this date to make you remember more or better or worse than you did on that date?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Ambiguous, your Honor, irrelevant.
THE COURT: Do you understand the question?
THE WITNESS: Not completely.
MR. STOVITZ: Not to interrupt counsel, your Honor, we have two witnesses waiting outside. May we excuse them until 9:45 tomorrow?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. STOVITZ: Thank you.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. In fact, Mrs. Kasabian, when you were at the Spahn Ranch you came and went as you pleased, is that correct?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Beyond the scope of redirect examination, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, my impression was—
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. Ask your next question.
MR. KANAREK: May I inquire of the Court, your Honor, I believe counsel opened up a portion of direct examination.
His representation to the Court was that direct was being opened up also in his requestioning of Mrs. Kasabian.
I direct your Honor’s attention to that.
THE COURT: I don’t understand what you are saying.
MR. KANAREK: Counsel, I believe, represented—
THE COURT: Yes, but what has that to do with this?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, this is part of the subject matter.
THE COURT: Where? Show me in the transcript.
MR. KANAREK: May I approach the bench?
THE COURT: Yes.
(The following proceedings were had at the bench out of the hearing of the jury:)
MR. STOVITZ: Our objection goes to the point that this is fully covered on cross-examination.
THE COURT: There is no question about that. I don’t recall any of this on redirect.
MR. STOVITZ: There was nothing on redirect.
MR. KANAREK: He represented to the Court he was opening up both direct and redirect.
THE COURT: That has nothing to do with what we are talking about, Mr. Kanarek.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor—
THE COURT: The question is, what in fact did he examine on. I don’t care what he called it.
MR. KANAREK: He represented to the Court he was opening up on direct examination and redirect.
THE COURT: I don’t understand what you are saying. I say it is beyond the scope.
If you have a transcript reference, you can show me; show me, otherwise let’s get on with it.
The fact is it is beyond the scope.
MR. KANAREK: All right, here it is.
Your Honor, in order to facilitate matters I make a motion that I open up my cross.
Mr. Bugliosi, your Honor, has imposed upon the Court and upon all of us by not doing his job—
MR. STOVITZ: Where is the reference?
MR. KANAREK: What I am saying, I can dig it out, I am sure, your Honor will remember he stated he was opening up on direct and redirect.
THE COURT: I will tell you what, Mr. Kanarek, in view of the fact that you seem unable to find it—
MR. KANAREK: I can find it. I don’t want to take the time. I will find it, your Honor.
THE COURT: If you will stop interrupting me, sir, we will try to conduct this proceeding in an orderly manner.
What I am trying to tell you is in view of the fact you are having difficulty in finding the transcript reference and since we obviously are not going to finish today, you may look for it overnight and give me the reference in the morning.
MR. KANAREK: Very well, your Honor.
MR. STOVITZ: But please, I implore counsel not to use up the rest of the time. Maybe Mr. Hughes can recross-examine now and counsel can look for it overnight.
THE COURT: That is not necessary.
MR. STOVITZ: I mean not for him to take up the rest of the afternoon.
THE COURT: If there is any reason, if any counsel has good reason to reopen the examination at any time I will consider it. That goes for any counsel.
MR. KANAREK: Then while we are here, your Honor—
THE COURT: So if you finish today or not does not make any difference. If you want to find a reference overnight and want to reopen for a little purpose tomorrow, you may do that.
MR. KANAREK: I will make the motion at the bench to save time that I be allowed to open, if your Honor does deem it to be cross-examination, I would ask to reopen concerning—
THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek, it is not a question of whether it is cross-examination or recross-examination or re-recross, that is not the point.
The point is whether or not it has been covered and how it’s been covered.
The reason I let Mr. Bugliosi reopen this morning for a limited purpose in a limited area was because I thought the ends of justice required it.
Now, part of that, as I explained to you on the record, was because of your own conduct and the manner in which you objected and made motions, and I think tried to interrupt the testimony of this witness.
I felt the jury did not have an adequate opportunity because of that to hear some of these matters.
Other matters were simply explanation matters that came out on cross-examination and were proper redirect.
Two matters I recall were a reopening of the direct examination, perhaps only one matter.
So simply because the People did it is not a good enough excuse. There has to be a reason for doing it.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may I then open up my cross-examination and I will represent to the Court that this witness told the social worker that she went, the first time she went to the Spahn Ranch, she went to visit and not to move there.
And I ask that I be allowed to open up to ask her concerning that.
I make the motion to do that.
I represent to the Court that she told the social worker that when she went with Gypsy that first day, it didn’t say that first day, but she said when she went with Gypsy she went to visit.
THE COURT: It would be impeachment if at all on a totally collateral point.
It has no bearing. It is so remote it has no bearing.
MR. KANAREK: She said she started to live there on the first day.
This is important, your Honor, because of the fact it is our position that she started to live there on the second day, and that the real motivation, this is not collateral, the real motivation to go there was not the first day, she did not come there to live the first day, she came there the second day because she stole the money and she had to have a place to hide out.
THE COURT: She already said that.
MR. KANAREK: But the prosecution is going to argue she did not move there the first day. The prosecution is going to argue—
Pardon me, the prosecution is going to argue she did move there the first day but she did not in fact move there the second day.
Our position is she just visited the first day and she did not actually move there. Therefore it is not on a collateral point.
THE COURT: You went into that completely on cross-examination. There is no point, no necessity to reopen.
MR. STOVITZ: He had the file on cross-examination too, your Honor.
In fact, Mr. Kanarek had this file long before we ever saw it.
MR. KANAREK: I would ask to interrogate her. I will just ask that one question.
THE COURT: What question?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor indicates that he at no time will foreclose counsel.
I will just ask her the one question, “Did you”—I represent to the Court I won’t ask her anything else concerning Gypsy except that one question;
“Did you tell the social worker when you went with Gypsy that you went there to visit?”
That is all I will ask about it, in line with your Honor’s statement that you will never foreclose counsel from getting to a point.
THE COURT: I did not mean I would let you go on forever, Mr. Kanarek.
What I said was that I would always listen if counsel has a good reason to reopen, even though he may have already closed, if there is some compelling reason to do so, and the ends of justice would be served by doing it.
I would listen to such argument. If I think it desirable I would permit it.
I did not mean we would go on endlessly.
MR. KANAREK: I will represent to the Court I will only ask that one question in connection with that matter.
I won’t ask any other questions, I will just ask her whether she told the social worker that she went there to visit the Spahn Ranch.
May I do that?
THE COURT: Yes, I will permit it.
MR. KANAREK: Thank you.
(The following proceedings were had in open court in the presence and hearing of the jury:)
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Mrs. Kasabian, would you read to yourself lines 1 through 7 at page 5600 of Volume 36.
MR. KANAREK: May I approach the witness, your Honor?
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Would you read lines 1 through 7?
(Witness complies.)
Would you read that out loud.
THE WITNESS: (Reading.)
“Q. So, what you told the Court and the jury on your direct examination about his philosophies was an incomplete statement of what he told you inasmuch as you can’t remember some of what he told you?
“A. Well, a lot of it I have forgotten, you know, I just sort of let go of it because I know that it was not true.”
MR. KANAREK: Thank you.
Q. Now, Mrs. Kasabian, I have another question to ask you concerning—
THE COURT: Just a moment, did you say “another question”?
MR. KANAREK: No, your Honor, that wasn’t—
THE COURT: You haven’t asked a question.
MR. KANAREK: Then my question is:
Q. You did so testify, Mrs. Kasabian?
A. Yes, I did.
MR. KANAREK: Thank you.
THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek—
MR. KANAREK: Yes—yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right, let’s proceed and I will talk to you about that later.
MR. KANAREK: Pardon?
THE COURT: I said I will talk to you about that later.
MR. KANAREK: Oh, the sequence of what I got permission to do I changed. I changed the sequence, your Honor.
What I am saying, I did not want to ruin the continuity of the previous subject matter, your Honor, I am still going to ask only this one question that I indicated to the Court on this other subject matter.
THE COURT: Proceed.
MR. KANAREK: I understand your Honor’s thinking.
Because we were in the previous subject matter I thought it would be appropriate to ask what I just asked.
THE COURT: You did not help me at all.
Let’s proceed.
MR. KANAREK: Very well, your Honor, because I am following the Court’s instructions explicitly, your Honor.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Now, Mrs. Kasabian, did you tell the social worker when you were there at his office in the summer of 1969:
“At this time I met a girl by the name of Gypsy who took me to visit Spahn’s Movie Ranch.”
Did you so state to the social worker?
A. Possibly yes.
Q. Well, did you tell the social worker that you were going to visit or you were going to live there when you went with Gypsy?
A. I really don’t know what I told him.
Q. I see. Now, you told us this morning, Mrs. Kasabian, you told us something about passports.
Did you have a passport?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And when did you obtain this passport?
A. Maybe the second or third day after I arrived in Los Angeles.
Q. And you obtained this passport because you had hoped to go to South America with your husband. Mr. Kasabian?
A. Yes.
Q. And is it a fair statement, Mrs. Kasabian, that your state of mind was such that when you found out that your husband did not intend to take you to South America, you were unhappy?
MR. BUGLIOSI: It is beyond the scope of redirect examination. It was gone into on original cross-examination, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Well, Mrs. Kasabian, who else obtained passports in connection with going to South America besides yourself?
MR. BUGLIOSI: It is irrelevant and calls for a conclusion.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Now, when you were speaking of the vibrations that you had testified to, Mrs. Kasabian, do you remember this morning speaking of vibrations?
A. Yes.
MR. BUGLIOSI: This was on recross-examination, your Honor, so I will object right now. This was not redirect.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, we have a right to interrogate—
THE COURT: Overruled, you may proceed.
MR. KANAREK: Thank you.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Now, at times when you had these vibrations, when you communicated by way of vibrations, is there ever any color involved in connection with the vibrations?
A. Color? I don’t understand.
Q. Well, in your mind, in your mind when you communicate by these vibrations that you are speaking of, in your mind do you see any colors at the time that these vibrations are occurring?
A. No.
Q. Now, referring to these vibrations, is there any actual movement you feel in your mind, any movement back and forth, fast back and forth movement that you consider to be vibrations?
A. Yes.
MR. FITZGERALD: Immaterial, your Honor.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Objection. Immaterial.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I am entitled to get a description of what she actually means by the word “vibration.”
THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer.
THE WITNESS: What was your question?
MR. KANAREK: May I have the last question and answer read back, your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
(The record was read by the reporter.)
MR. KANAREK: Q. Would you describe these movements for us, Mrs. Kasabian?
A. It is energy. It is an awareness of energy being transmitted.
I can’t—that is all I can say about it.
Q. You say that you feel these physical—you feel the physical movements?
A. Yes.
Q. Well, would you describe where in your body do you feel the physical movements?
A. Right here (indicating).
Q. Pointing to right above your—in between your eyebrows but a little above the eyebrows; Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Are those vibrations localized at that point in your head?
MR. FITZGERALD: That is immaterial and irrelevant.
I think counsel is misquoting the witness.
The “vibration” is a figure of speech. I don’t think the witness necessarily has to mean it literally.
MR. KANAREK: I disagree with my esteemed colleague. I do not consider it a figure of speech.
MR. STOVITZ: I submit that if she had true vibrations, Mr. Kanarek would have stopped questioning long ago.
THE COURT: Overruled.
You may answer.
THE WITNESS: What is the question?
THE COURT: Read the question.
(The question was read by the reporter.)
THE WITNESS: I don’t understand.
MR. KANAREK: Q. You pointed to a place on your head where you tell us that the vibrations are located; is that correct? You pointed to a spot on your head?
A. Yes, I know what I pointed to.
Q. Is that where the vibrations are located?
A. Yes.
Q. How deep inside your skull is the place where these vibrations are located?
MR. FITZGERALD: That is immaterial and irrelevant. I object to this whole line of questioning.
MR. KANAREK: It is most relevant and most material, your Honor, otherwise we are just playing charades here, your Honor.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
Let’s proceed.
MR. KANAREK: Q. Mrs. Kasabian, these vibrations that you say that you actually feel, are they on the surface of your skin?
A. No.
Q. They are deep inside your—right deep inside your head; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And they are at about the location that you have indicated?
A. Right in here.
Q. Right.
Then, beginning there, how far back through your head do they go?
A. I have no idea how far back.
Q. At the time that these vibrations occur, your whole head, as far as you are concerned, seems to vibrate; right?
A. No.
Q. Just this portion of your head? That is what? About how much in diameter?
A. Well, it doesn’t have boundaries. It is limitless. It is boundless. That is all I can say.
Q. It is limitless and it is boundless?
A. Yes. I mean, it doesn’t have walls, you know.
It just keeps—I can’t explain it. It is like a channel leading to the universe. It is just a limitless amount of space, boundless.
Q. I see.
And in connection with your testimony here in court, what place do these vibrations play?
MR. BUGLIOSI: That assumes a fact not in evidence.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. You have testified here in court for some days now, Mrs. Kasabian?
A. Quite a few days.
Q. Right?
A. Yes.
Q. And has anything that you have related to us, anything that you have told us, has anything that you told us come by way of these vibrations?
A. I don’t quite understand what you mean.
Q. Well, you used these vibrations because this gives you some kind of a communication with people; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, when you were speaking with Mr. Bugliosi over there at the Sybil Brand institute, did you feel any of these vibrations?
A. Not that I can recall.
Q. My question is: In connection with some of the things that you have told us, is the source of information part as a result of these vibrations you feel?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Ambiguous.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Have you used these vibrations to obtain any of the information that you have told us here in court, Mrs. Kasabian?
A. Concerning the two nights or everything I have talked about?
Q. Concerning anything you have talked about.
A. Did I use vibrations for what now?
I am still not quite sure what you are saying.
Q. I am not saying. I am just asking.
A. Asking, whatever.
MR. KANAREK: May that question be read, your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes. Read the question.
(The question was read by the reporter.)
THE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. KANAREK: All right.
Q. Would you tell us, Mrs. Kasabian, what you have told us here in court that has been dependent upon these vibrations as a source of information?
A. A lot of it had to do with conversations about my drug taking, about my God realization, my ESP experience.
That is about all I can think of at the moment.
Q. And what you have told us about your drug taking, would you tell us how this information came to you by way of these vibrations?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Irrelevant, your Honor.
MR. KANAREK: It is most relevant.
MR. BUGLIOSI: It is beyond the scope of redirect examination.
MR. KANAREK: It goes to the very fundamental credibility of the witness.
THE COURT: Overruled.
You may answer.
THE WITNESS: What was the question?
MR. KANAREK: May the question be read?
THE COURT: Read the question.
(The question was read by the reporter.)
THE WITNESS: What I meant was that when I actually took the drug itself, some of the things that came to me came through vibrations.
MR. KANAREK: Well, tell us what, Mrs. Kasabian?
MR. STOVITZ: That is immaterial and irrelevant.
MR. KANAREK: It is most material.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may I approach the bench on this subject?
THE COURT: No.
Let’s proceed, Mr. Kanarek.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Mrs. Kasabian, you have told us that pending this trial you sat there at Sybil Brand and that vibrations—you felt vibrations, you emanated them and you received them—while you were sitting there preparing to testify in this trial; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. All right.
So, in preparation to testify here and tell us the things that you have told us from the witness stand, Mrs. Kasabian, you prepared yourself by communicating with the universe, the all universal universe, apart from your physical body; is that correct?
A. Yes.
MR. STOVITZ: Objected, to as ambiguous and compound, your Honor.
MR. HUGHES: She already answered, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
The answer will be stricken.
MR. KANAREK: Q. Mrs. Kasabian, in preparation to come here and testify, you felt vibrations from outside your body in order to get certain information that you have talked about here in court; is that correct?
A. To get certain information?
Q. Yes.
A. No.
Q. You don’t understand the words “certain information”?
MR. STOVITZ: No, she does understand the words.
She answered the question, your Honor. He is arguing with the witness now.
MR. KANAREK: Q. Do you understand the words “certain information”?
A. Yes.
Q. All right.
Now, my question is: In your preparing to come to court here to testify, have you received certain information by way of vibrations from the universe outside your physical body?
A. Yes.
Q. All right.
Tell us what information you received from the universe outside your physical body that you have testified to in this courtroom?
A. That to be here now testifying is the will of God.
Q. Have you finished?
A. Yes. That is the size of it.
Q. That is the size of it, what you have just said?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, in connection with getting that information from the outside universe, did you first send out vibrations yourself to the universe?
A. Yes.
MR. STOVITZ: Objected to, your Honor, it calls for hearsay.
THE COURT: Overruled.
You may answer.
THE WITNESS: Yes, I did.
MR. KANAREK: Pardon?
THE WITNESS: Yes, I did.
MR. KANAREK: May I have the last question and answer read back?
THE COURT: The answer was “yes, I did.”
MR. STOVITZ: “Did you send out certain communications” was your question, Counsel.
MR. KANAREK: Q. Mrs. Kasabian, would you state for us what are the communications—what are the vibrations that you sent out?
A. It is sort of like when you get down on your knees and you pray. Then you wait for an answer.
That is how I can put it.
Q. I see.
And so, a part of this process that you went through prior to coming to court was to get down in your hands and knees and pray; is that right?
A. Not on my hands and knees, no.
Q. Well, part of the process was your locating your body in a certain manner to send out vibrations and wait for the return, for return information to your vibrations; is that correct?
A. Right.
Q. Would you tell us, what is the time interval between the time you send out the vibrations and the time you get some information back?
MR. STOVITZ: I object to the question as immaterial and irrelevant, your Honor.
MR. KANAREK: I think it is most material. It goes to the credibility of this witness.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Then may I approach the bench, your Honor?
THE COURT: No, sir.
Let’s proceed.
MR. KANAREK: Q. Is there a time interval, Mrs. Kasabian, between the time that you send out these vibrations and the time that you get returned to you information as a result of your sending out the vibrations?
MR. STOVITZ: Immaterial and irrelevant, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I would like to approach the bench concerning this subject.
THE COURT: It is time to adjourn, Mr. Kanarek.
Ladies and gentlemen, do not converse with anyone or form or express any opinion regarding the case until it is finally submitted to you.
The Court will adjourn until 9:45.
MR. FITZGERALD: Your Honor, could I quickly approach the bench on a non-related matter?
THE COURT: Yes.
(Mr. Fitzgerald alone approaches the bench and confers with the Court.)
(Whereupon, at 4:14 p.m. the court was in recess.)