Historic Trial Transcripts
Linda Kasabian: Day fifteen Testimony, August 14, 1970
LINDA KASABIAN,
the witness on the stand at the time of the adjournment, resumed the stand and testified further as follows:
REDIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Mrs. Kasabian, while you were at the Spahn Ranch you told us on cross-examination that you did smoke marijuana cigarettes from time to time, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Directing your attention to the quantity of these cigarettes, was it ten, 15, 20, 30—what was it?
A. At one time?
Q. No, the whole five or six weeks that you were there.
A. I don’t know, we used to smoke from a plant.
Q. What is that?
A. We used to smoke from a plant that was grown at the ranch.
Q. Did this plant have any particular name?
A. Yeah.
Q. What was the name of the plant?
A. Elmer.
Q. And was this plant nurtured by someone?
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor, immaterial, irrelevant, calls for a conclusion.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Now, this particular plant, did it grow right at the ranch or away from the ranch near the waterfall?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, irrelevant.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Now, then, with respect to the time around the first or second nights, do you recall smoking any marijuana either one of those nights?
A. No.
Q. Now, during your cross-examination you stated that you did smoke cigarettes during the first and second nights, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And those cigarettes were regular tobacco cigarettes?
A. Yes.
Q. And they were not catnip?
A. No.
Q. And they were not marijuana?
A. No.
Q. Now, you stated that you did not particularly understand the phrase “penalty of perjury,” but that you knew what perjury is.
Is that correct?
MR. KANAREK: Object, assuming facts not in evidence, paraphrasing of the witness’ testimony.
I object to the form of the question, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Do you know that perjury is a crime?
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. KANAREK: I object on the ground it’s leading and suggestive.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: And if you testify falsely under oath there are certain penalties attached to it.
MR. KANAREK: Leading and suggestive, your Honor, and it is immaterial and irrelevant in the form that he is asking it.
If he wants to question her state of mind, that is one thing.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Now, has anyone ever told you what the specific penalty for perjury in an ordinary case is?
MR. KANAREK: Object, ambiguous, immaterial, irrelevant, calls for a conclusion and hearsay.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Has anyone ever told you what the penalty for perjury in a capital case is?
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor, on the grounds conclusion, solicits a conclusion, hearsay, improper foundation, immaterial, irrelevant.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Do you have a state of mind as to what the penalty for perjury in a capital case is?
A. Yes.
Q. What is that penalty?
A. The death penalty.
Q. You know that the charges of murder will not be filed against you but that you could subject yourself to the death penalty if you testified falsely in a capital case?
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, on the ground it is argumentative, it is ambiguous.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Now, with respect to this issue of the death penalty, has anyone, police officers, Mr. Bugliosi, myself, anyone at all ever told you that you could get the death penalty unless you testified?
MR. KANAREK: Leading and suggestive, irrelevant, immaterial, ambiguous, your Honor.
It calls for a conclusion.
MR. STOVITZ: Your Honor, this was covered on cross-examination by both Mr. Shinn and Mr. Kanarek in a different form.
I just went to bring it out is this particular form.
MR. KANAREK: I have no objection if Mr. Stovitz has the ability to frame a proper question, if he will ask a proper question I won’t object, your Honor.
MR. STOVITZ: Your Honor, I stand on the record as to who is making a proper objection and who is asking a proper question.
THE COURT: All right, gentlemen, that will be enough.
The objection will be sustained.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: In any of your conversations with Mr. Bugliosi did he ever talk to you about the death penalty?
MR. KANAREK: Leading and suggestive, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Not that I can recall.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: In any of your conversations with either the first police officers that brought you to Los Angeles, or the subsequent police officers who may have talked to you, did any of those ever tell you that you would get the death penalty?
MR. KANAREK: Hearsay, your Honor, conclusion and also leading and suggestive.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Not that I can recall.
MR. STOVITZ: And did I ever tell you that you would get the death penalty unless you testified?
MR. KANAREK: Leading and suggestive, calling for a conclusion.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
MR. STOVITZ: Counsel, Volume 49, Page 6994, Line 15.
Q. Mrs. Kasabian, on cross-examination—
MR. KANAREK: May I have a moment, your Honor, to get that volume?
MR. STOVITZ: May I, with the Court’s permission, allow the witness to read it to herself starting with this line?
THE WITNESS:15?
MR. STOVITZ: Yes.
MR. KANAREK: May I be allowed to see it, your Honor, before counsel interrogates?
THE COURT: Certainly. Look at it.
MR. KANAREK: Yes, sir. I am trying to find that particular volume.
MR. STOVITZ: Have you had an opportunity to read to the bottom of the page?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: What lines were those?
MR. STOVITZ: Do you have Volume 49, Counsel?
MR. KANAREK: Yes.
MR. STOVITZ: What page is that, Mrs. Kasabian?
THE WITNESS: 6994.
MR. KANAREK: What lines?
THE WITNESS: 15.
MR. STOVITZ: 15.
MR. KANAREK: 15?
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Now, were you asked the following questions by Mr. Kanarek on Tuesday, August the 11th, 1970, in the morning session:
“Q. And directing your attention to your conversation that you say you engaged in in the automobile where you said, ‘Not that house, not that house.’ At that time that you uttered those words, you thought that Mr. True was in that house; is that correct?”
Your answer was: Yes.
MR. KANAREK: I believe Mr. Stovitz probably inadvertently, at Line 16, used the word “that” for “the.”
MR. STOVITZ: It was inadvertence, counsel.
I will have to hold the transcript a little further away.
“Q. And you did not quarrel about anything happening in the house next door; is that correct?
“A. No.
“Q. You had no quarrel with that?
“A. No.”
Were those questions asked to you in that sequence, and did you give these answers?
MR. KANAREK: I will object to the question as immaterial, unless he is challenging the record.
He is reading from the record, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes, they were asked.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. What did you mean when you stated that you did not quarrel about anything happening in the house next door?
MR. KANAREK: I will object, your Honor. That is assuming facts not in evidence.
THE COURT: What facts?
MR. KANAREK: Well, what he just said isn’t what this witness answered.
The question was: “And you did not quarrel about anything happening in the house next door; is that correct?” That was the question.
This witness didn’t utter those words.
MR. STOVITZ: But her answer was no.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, he can ask a proper question, that question is improper.
Also, your Honor, it is an improper attempt to rehabilitate an impeached witness.
MR. STOVITZ: I Your Honor—
THE COURT: That will be enough.
MR. STOVITZ: —that conduct is not proper in front of the jury.
This witness has never been impeached.
THE COURT: Mr. Stovitz, the form of the question was objectionable.
The witness’ answer was “yes.”
You way inquire as to that answer.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. What do you mean by your answer “No” to the question “And you did not quarrel about anything happening in the house next door”?
A. I didn’t quarrel with Charlie.
Q. By Charlie, all the time you meant Mr. Manson; is that right?
A. Yes.
THE COURT: All right. I misspoke. Apparently the witness’s answer was “No” rather than “Yes,” but the point is that the answer did not contain the word that you used in your question. That was the reason that the Court sustained the objection.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Did you know whether or not there were people living next door to Mr. True at that time?
A. No.
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, on the grounds it is an improper attempt to rehabilitate the witness, and it is irrelevant and immaterial.
THE COURT: Overruled.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. When Mr. Manson came back to the car and told you that he had tied the people up in the house next door, did you care whether or not those people were killed?
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor. It is assuming facts not in evidence, calling for a conclusion, a solicitation of hearsay, an improper attempt to rehabilitate, irrelevant, immaterial, and no foundation.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor—
MR. STOVITZ: One moment.
Q. What was your state of mind as to what was going to happen after Charles Manson came back and said that he had had the people tied up next door?
MR. KANAREK: That is immaterial.
She’s no longer even a defendant in this case, your Honor.
This is calling for a conclusion, hearsay and irrelevant.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: That they were going to be killed.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. When Mr. Manson got back into the car at Harold True’s house, who assumed the driving of that car?
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor. Asked and answered. Improper redirect.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Charlie did.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. And did you, in fact, care whether or not the people next door to Harold True’s were killed?
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor. Calling for a conclusion, hearsay, immaterial, irrelevant.
THE COURT: I think the question should be fixed as to time, Mr. Stovitz.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. At that time that you made the statement—that Charles Manson made the statement about the people next door being tied up, did you care, in fact, whether the people were killed?
MR. KANAREK: Object. Assuming facts not in evidence, solicitation of hearsay, solicitation of a conclusion. It is irrelevant, immaterial, and an improper attempt to rehabilitate the witness, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Mrs. Kasabian, you then drove around town and you had a conversation with Charles Manson at some beach area; is that correct?
MR. KANAREK: That is ambiguous, assumes a fact not in evidence.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: The first beach area?
MR. STOVITZ: Yes.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. When you believed some police officer stopped you?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you, in fact, give Mr. Manson some peanuts?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Where did you get the peanuts from?
A. Gypsy. Just before we left the ranch, Gypsy had them.
Q. Do you recall testifying to giving Mr. Manson some peanuts at any time before just now?
MR. KANAREK: That is immaterial. Her recollection of what she testified to is irrelevant and immaterial. It is hearsay. It solicits a conclusion.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes, I believe I have testified to that.
MR. STOVITZ: All right.
Q. You and Charles Manson were eating those peanuts walking down the beach, and a discussion came about that another person might be killed that night; is that correct?
MR. KANAREK: Objection, leading and suggestive, irrelevant, immaterial.
It is improper redirect, it is ambiguous. It has actually two questions in it.
THE COURT: It is leading, Mr. Stovitz.
Sustained.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Did you then have a conversation about some man that you had met in the Venice area?
MR. KANAREK: Object on the grounds it is improper bifurcation.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: On the beach?
MR. STOVITZ: Yes.
A. Walking on the beach?
Q. Yes.
A. No.
Q. At some later time, did you have a conversation about a man in Venice?
A. Yes.
Q. Where was that?
A. In the car.
MR. KANAREK: May I object on the grounds that it is improper redirect?
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. STOVITZ: At that particular time, you had a particular man in mind; is that right?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor. Leading and suggestive, and it is ambiguous.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. STOVITZ: Did you know that man’s name at that time?
A. No.
MR. KANAREK: Object on the grounds that it is improper bifurcation.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Did you know whether or not that man was going to be home at that particular time?
MR. KANAREK: Object. Calling for a conclusion, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
MR. KANAREK: May I finish, your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Object on the grounds that it is calling for a conclusion. It is actually calling for hearsay. And also it is improper redirect.
This is part of what he should have solicited from her in the beginning, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. STOVITZ: Your answer was no, you didn’t know whether he was going to be home?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Now, when Mr. Manson was telling you, Susan Atkins, and this fellow Clem as to what to do at this man’s house, did you, in fact, want to kill this man?
A. No.
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor.
May the answer be stricken, your Honor? The witness is answering so fast—
THE COURT: I didn’t hear any answer.
Go ahead.
MR. KANAREK: I believe she did answer.
MR. STOVITZ: May the answer be stricken for the purpose of the objection?
THE COURT: The answer will be stricken if there was one.
MR. KANAREK: It is leading and suggestive, it is improper bifurcation under People vs. Carter.
It is irrelevant, immaterial, and it solicits a conclusion, it is hearsay.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Now, would you answer the question if you still remember it?
A. No, I didn’t want to kill him.
Q. But nevertheless you did go up to the door?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor, on the grounds it is improper bifurcation.
THE COURT: Overruled.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. At that time, did you know whether or not Mr. Manson. had left the area of that apartment home?
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor, on the grounds it is improper redirect.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: When I went up the second time with Sadie and Clem?
MR. STOVITZ: Yes.
THE WITNESS: Yes, I believe he did leave the area.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. When you rang the doorbell of this apartment that you believed to be the wrong apartment, did you intend to kill the person in that apartment?
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor.
May I have that question read back?
THE COURT: No. You heard it just as well as I did.
Overruled.
Let’s proceed.
MR. KANAREK: May I object, your Honor, on the grounds it is irrelevant, immaterial.
If it is at all proper, it would be part of the People’s case in chief when he first was questioning this witness.
It solicits a conclusion and it solicits hearsay.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: What was your question?
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Did you intend for you, Susan Atkins and Clem to go into that apartment and for that man, that stranger, to be killed?
A. No.
MR. KANAREK: I object. It is calling for a conclusion, on top of the other objections, as to other defendants, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Then, when some stranger did answer the door, you left; is that correct?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Object on the grounds that it has been asked and answered on People’s direct examination of this witness, and I object on People vs. Carter, bifurcation of the testimony of this witness.
THE COURT: Overruled.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. I show you Exhibit 4 in evidence again, and directing your attention to this circle next to a post.
I believe you stated that you saw a tall man emerge from the house depicted in this photograph, and appear at that post for a few seconds of time.
Q. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, on the grounds it is assuming facts not in evidence.
THE COURT: Overruled.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. What did you observe the man to do next?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may we approach the bench?
THE COURT: No, you may not, sir.
State your objection.
MR. KANAREK: My objection is that it is improper redirect.
He went into this previously on direct examination, your Honor. All of this matter was gone into. It is an improper bifurcation under People vs. Carter for Mr. Stovitz to reiterate the direct examination once again.
THE COURT: Overruled.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. What did you observe the man to do next after he was standing at that post?
A. He fell in the bushes.
Q. I am going to ask for a red Crayon here, or a red pencil, and I am going to ask you to put a square around the bushes that you saw the man fall into. A big one so the jury can see it later on. On Exhibit 4.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may I approach the witness?
THE COURT: You my.
MR. KANAREK: Thank you.
MR. STOVITZ: Go ahead.
(The witness complies.)
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. You have drawn a square about a quarter of an inch by a half an inch; is that right?
A. Yes.
MR. STOVITZ: Can counsel see it here?
MR. KANAREK: Thank you.
MR. STOVITZ: This is the square. I am trying to darken it, Counsel.
Q. Do you know whether or not those particular bushes broke at that time?
THE COURT: You may return to your seat, Mr. Kanarek.
MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Do you know whether or not those particular bushes broke at that time?
A. No.
MR. KANAREK: I object on the grounds of improper bifurcation of the People’s case under People vs. Carter.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Now, on direct examination you were asked about whether or not you had ever given Mr. Bugliosi notes; is that correct?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I think Mr. Stovitz inadvertently misspoke. He doesn’t mean on direct examination. I think he means cross-examination.
MR. STOVITZ: Cross-examination. I am sorry. Cross-examination. Thank you, Counsel.
Q. I hand you a six-page document written in pencil, front and back.
For the purpose of the record, your Honor, I know it is not in exact order, but may this letter be marked Exhibit 97 for identification?
THE COURT: It will be so marked.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. I show you Exhibit 97 and ask you whether or not this was one of the notes you gave to Mr. Bugliosi?
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor, on the grounds it is improper redirect examination. Unless counsel is representing that she is going to testify any differently concerning those three lines than I asked her.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: What was your question?
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Was this one of the notes that you gave to Mr. Bugliosi?
A. Yes.
Q. And this was written by you sometime while you were at Sybil Brand institute, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And your attention was directed to a photostatic copy of the very first three lines on the top of this first page of Exhibit 97.
Do you recall that?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you read those first three lines again?
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, on the grounds it is improper redirect.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: It says, “I have looked back and remember all that I have written. I can’t rightly recall any specific orders given to Tex by Charlie.”
Q. What did you mean when you wrote that note?
MR. KANAREK: I will object on the grounds of hearsay, conclusion, improper redirect, immaterial.
It is the fact that she uttered them, your Honor.
MR. FITZGERALD: And it is a violation of the parol evidence rule.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. BUGLIOSI: May we approach the bench?
MR. STOVITZ: Q. When you wrote that on the top of that page, Exhibit 97, did you have in mind just the two nights in question, or did you have in mind things that happened at the ranch in, say, the beginning of July and the middle of July?
MR. KANAREK: Object on the grounds, your Honor, that, first of all, it is leading and suggestive. It is immaterial, it is irrelevant it calls for a conclusion and hearsay.
Your Honor, may we approach the bench?
THE COURT: May I see it?
(Pause while the Court reads:)
THE COURT: All right, you may approach the bench.
(Whereupon, all counsel approach the bench and the following proceedings occur at the bench outside of the hearing of the jury:)
MR. BUGLIOSI: First of all, your Honor, we don’t want that letter to be marked as an exhibit.
MR. STOVITZ: It is not going to be received in evidence. It is going to be marked for identification only.
MR. BUGLIOSI: If we are not going to introduce it into evidence, why mark it as an exhibit for identification?
MR. STOVITZ: Because—
THE COURT: Gentlemen, why don’t you have your private conference off the record?
MR. BUGLIOSI: It is not private, your Honor.
I am saying that we don’t want it marked as an exhibit.
THE COURT: It is already marked as an exhibit.
Do you want to withdraw it?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Yes, your Honor, as an exhibit.
Here is the point: On the top of that letter it says words to the effect that “I can’t remember Manson giving Tex any specific orders.”
Now, Mr. Stovitz is merely asking what she meant by that, because Mr. Kanarek tried to impeach her.
He brought out the fact that she testified that Manson gave Tex orders on the second night, the LaBianca night, that he told Tex to get out of the car and go up there and kill the people.
Then he directs her attention to this note at the top saying that “I can’t recall Manson ever giving Tex any instructions.”
Now, what she meant by that, she wasn’t talking about the two nights in question, she was talking about other occasions at the ranch, and I think she should be permitted to say “I was not referring to the two nights in question when I wrote it.”
Mr. Kanarek is the one that brought it up for impeachment purposes. We have a right to ask her to explain.
THE COURT: Do you want to be heard, Mr. Kanarek?
MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor.
Counsel is willing to forget all of our law, all of our rules of evidence, your Honor—
THE COURT: Get to the point, Mr. Kanarek. What is the point?
MR. KANAREK: The point is that these words impeach her, and she has no right—she can’t just sit there on the witness stand and just come up with some kind of an explanation. There is no legal basis for it, your Honor.
THE COURT: Are you trying to tell me that you can bring out on cross-examination a statement, a bare statement, and that the witness has no opportunity to explain it?
MR. KANAREK: No. What I am saying, your Honor—
THE COURT: Is that what you are saying?
MR. KANAREK: What I am saying is that it impeaches her. It is for the jury to decide whether it impeaches her. It is immaterial and it is irrelevant and there is no foundation.
THE COURT: The question is whether or not she has a right to explain it.
MR. KANAREK: No, she has no right to explain it, because it impeaches her.
If he wants to rehabilitate her, he can—
THE COURT: It only impeaches her if it is inconsistent.
MR. KANAREK: No. Her conclusion, her subjective statement as to what those words mean, your Honor, is not admissible. It just isn’t.
She can’t explain it. Otherwise we could just go on and on forever.
If somebody made a statement that they didn’t like, then they could sit up there and try to weasel out of it.
MR. STOVITZ: Your Honor, there is only one weasel here, and there is only one person that goes on and on, and I would like to object to counsel’s improper objections.
If he can’t frame an objection in one or two words, I think that he ought to go back to law school.
THE COURT: There is no question about it, your objections are frivolous. They are obviously made, Mr. Kanarek, for the purpose of obstructing the proceedings.
Most of them are groundless. The manner in which they are made and the content of them indicate they are made without any thought whatever on your part, but simply to interpose something between the question and an answer.
They are not made in a way that a responsible lawyer makes an objection, that is, because of any apparent belief in the merit of his objection, but they are a trial device used by you to obstruct the proceedings and to distract the jury from concentrating on the questions and the answers.
I want the record to clearly reflect that.
Now, this is said by me after having observed you all the way through direct examination, now, and for a good portion of one day on redirect examination, and I can reach no other conclusion but that.
MR. KANAREK: May I respond?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Objections have more than one ground. If your Honor wishes I will be willing to go over the transcript—
THE COURT: That is not the point.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I tried to—
THE COURT: That is not the point, Mr. Kanarek. I know objections have more than one ground, but what I said is true.
I am convinced it is true after having seen you operate now.
MR. KANAREK: That is not so, your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, all right, that is your opinion.
MR. KANAREK: Counsel is asking improper questions; that is the genesis of the objections.
THE COURT: If they are improper, I sustain the objections, but that is not the point I am making.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, those objections are made in good faith. If counsel cannot frame a proper question—
THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek, when a lawyer objects to any question, regardless of how innocuous or perfectly valid it is, and how groundless the objection is, and does that consistently, repeatedly over an extended period, I can reach no other conclusion than what I have already indicated.
MR. KANAREK: I would be willing to go over those with your Honor.
THE COURT: There is no necessity.
MR. KANAREK: In fact I am refraining from making objections, but when I deem, your Honor, that it is hurting Mr. Manson’s position, that they are deliberately going into matters that they went into on direct.
THE COURT: In the first place, Mr. Kanarek, that is permissible.
MR. KANAREK: Not—
THE COURT: That is permissible and I suggest you take a look at the Evidence Code.
MR. KANAREK: I have looked at it, your Honor.
THE COURT: Look at it again, then.
MR. KANAREK: They cannot go into matters—they can only go into matters—
THE COURT: What you are saying is not true. I have heard enough from you now.
MR. STOVITZ: We intend to ask the witness to explain the comment that was read to her on cross-examination by Mr. Kanarek, as to what she meant when she said she had never seen or heard Charles Manson give Tex Watson any orders before the nights of August 8th, or was it on the nights of August 8th, 9th, and 10th?
MR. BUGLIOSI: What was she referring to?
THE COURT: All right, now, let me tell you, Mr. Stovitz, many of your questions are objectionable. The ones I sustain the objections to were on the ground you are leading the witness.
I would suggest you sharpen up your questions and not attempt to lead the witness.
MR. STOVITZ: I have always felt that leading a witness—if you give the witness the alternative of answering it either or is not leading.
THE COURT: It depends on the context.
MR. STOVITZ: If the answer calls for a yes answer, it is leading, except where the matter was covered in direct and cross-examination, and you are merely directing your witness’ state of mind to a particular subject matter.
THE COURT: It depends entirely on the context.
The context of some of these questions have been asked—
MR. BUGLIOSI: We can give the Court a case, if you ask the question in the alternative—
THE COURT: I don’t care what the case is, I know a leading question when I hear one.
MR. STOVITZ: If it is asked on direct examination before the matter has been covered on cross-examination; but when the matter is covered on direct and cross, and you want to refer her back to a particular incident like, oh, a credit card, that is not leading.
THE COURT: That is an entirely different thing; that is not what I am referring to.
MR. STOVITZ: I will try to reframe my questions, your Honor, then, if I do that please bear in mind there must be some foundational questions asked.
There will be objections by Mr. Kanarek when I try to direct the witness’ attention.
So as to avoid these repetitious objections—
MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor, if I may I will object, your Honor, to this exhibit. This exhibit is marked—I will object to it being—
THE COURT: It is withdrawn.
MR. KANAREK: I object to it being withdrawn, your Honor.
Your Honor, may I have a ruling on that?
THE COURT: Overruled.
(The following proceedings were had in open, court in the presence and hearing of the jury:)
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Directing your attention again to the top of this note. You have had a chance to read it. What did you mean by that statement on top of that note?
MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor, may I have the objection it is a conclusion; it solicits a conclusion; it is hearsay, improper foundation for the question.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Well, I remember Mr. Bugliosi always asking me to remember and try to remember specific instructions that Charlie gave to Tex at the ranch, and I kept thinking and thinking, and I never thought of anything.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, then may I ask that that portion of that answer which refers to what Mr. Bugliosi told this witness, may that be stricken, your Honor, on the grounds of hearsay, and I would ask that the entire answer be stricken.
MR. FITZGERALD: I will object.
THE COURT: It is an explanation of the answer and is responsive to the question.
Overruled.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. So that we understand each other, the paragraph then refers to any instructions that you might have heard Mr. Manson give to Mr. Watson before the two nights in question, is that correct?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may I have that question read?
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. KANAREK: May I have that question?
THE COURT: No, you heard the question as well as I.
MR. KANAREK: It is leading and suggestive.
THE COURT: Overruled.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Did that paragraph have anything to do with the two [illegible] in question of your visit to the Tate house and your subsequent visit to the second night?
A. No.
MR. KANAREK: I object, it solicits a conclusion, it solicits hearsay and is improper redirect examination.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Now, do you recall answering some of Mr. Kanarek’s questions about your conversation with this tall man in the desert?
A. Yes.
Q. Some of the things you said, did you remember telling him some of the things you stated you did not remember?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Would your Honor instruct the jury, and ask Mr. Stovitz not to make argument at this time.
This last colloquy, or this last statement of Mr. Stovitz is improper, your Honor, as to this broad brushing some statements, that—
THE COURT: It was just preliminary. Overruled.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. All right, now, with respect to the statements that you did make to this tall man, that we here now stated his name to be Mr. Breckenridge, where did you get these ideas and where did you get this philosophy from?
MR. KANAREK: Calling for a conclusion, your Honor, hearsay.
THE WITNESS: I was just releasing what had been put into me.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. From whom?
A. From Charlie and the Family, their philosophy.
Q. And when you say “their philosophy,” can you remember any particular thing about Mr. Manson’s philosophy that you questioned while you were at the ranch?
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor, on the grounds it is improper redirect examination.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. KANAREK: It is a solicitation of a conclusion, and it is hearsay.
THE WITNESS: In my own mind I questioned just about all of it, because they were, you know, in little pieces of truth here and there, but there was a lot of lies, you know, not truths, confusion.
MR. KANAREK: May that be stricken, your Honor, on the grounds it is a statement of conclusion and hearsay.
THE COURT: Overruled. The motion is denied.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. You were talking to this Mr. Breckenridge, this tall man in the desert. Were you trying to influence this man?
A. I was trying to see what his reaction would be to this, you know, philosophy, these things I was telling him, to see if, you know, he is for real, you know. I mean—
Q. He is for real? By “he is for real,” you mean Mr. Manson?
A. Yeah.
Q. All right, now, you know Mr. Manson is for real; you have seen him here since July 27th, is that correct?
A. Yeah.
Q. Have you seen him make any motions to you while you have been testifying on the witness stand?
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, calling for a conclusion on the part of the witness, and hearsay, solicitation of hearsay by conduct.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: What motions—show the jury the motions, and you describe them for the record as best you can.
A. Let’s see, the day that June Emmer was here I looked over at him and he went like this and pointed to Mr. Kanarek so that it was his trip.
Then he pointed to Miss Emmer and he said, “Your father.”
And I said, “uh-uh, that is not my father,” and I pointed up, meaning God is my father.
And Charlie points out then, he points to himself, and he said, “I am your father.”
MR. KANAREK: I would ask, first of all, that the answer does not respond to the question.
Mr. Stovitz’s question solicited conduct, movement.
THE COURT: The answer will he stricken. The jury is admonished to disregard it.
MR. STOVITZ: The entire answer, is that correct?
THE COURT: The entire answer.
MR. STOVITZ: All right.
Q. This conduct that you have observed from Mr. Manson, directed to yourself now, I am just directing your attention to any conduct, any actions that Mr. Manson directed to you.
A. That is what I just said.
Q. Did this conduct sometimes include words?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, first of all I would ask whether it was directed to her or not is a conclusion.
I have no objection to her stating what she’s observed, but it is an improper question when Mr. Stovitz asks her to make the judgement as to whether it is directed to her or not.
She can say where she was, where Mr. Manson was and where everybody else was, but when she says it was directed to her, that is a conclusion and I must object on behalf of Mr. Manson to that.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. STOVITZ: Your Honor, I believe it goes into a conclusionary fact doctrine that some conclusions are admissible, but I will get at it another way.
Q. The actions that you observed of Mr. Manson, was he looking at any particular person?
MR. KANAREK: That is calling for a conclusion on her part as to whether he was looking at a person.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Was Mr. Manson looking in anyone’s direction?
MR. KANAREK: That is soliciting a conclusion, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. STOVITZ: And did you observe these things with your own eyes?
A. Yes. I did.
Q. Sometimes was the jury absent from the courtroom?
MR. KANAREK: Ambiguous, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: At a time when the person by the name of June Emmer was in the courtroom did you observe certain actions from Mr. Manson that you observed with your own eyes?
MR. KANAREK: I object, and I would like to approach the bench in connection with that, your Honor.
The jury was not present. It is this witness—she is going to make conclusions, hearsay statements concerning June Emmer, and she is no more a witness to that than your Honor, the clerk, or me, the jury was not present.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Where were you at the time that you noticed these motions by Mr. Manson at the time that June Hamer was present?
MR. KANAREK: Assuming facts not in evidence, your Honor, and it calls for a conclusion and it is immaterial.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Did you at any time observe any motions or actions by Mr. Manson while you were on the witness stand?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall whether it was on direct-examination, cross-examination or what?
A. I believe it was on direct.
Q. Mr. Bugliosi was questioning you, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you remember whether it was your first, second, third or fourth day of direct examination?
A. I don’t remember.
Q. And do you remember whether or not his conduct was attached with words?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may I inquire on voir dire?
THE COURT: I don’t understand the question, Mr. Stovitz.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Did the conduct accompany certain words uttered by Mr. Manson?
MR. KANAREK: That would be a conclusion, your Honor. Also I would like to inquire on voir dire whether she has the ear capacity to hear from this distance.
THE COURT: It is still unclear.
Are you talking about spoken, audible words? If so, the question should clearly reflect it.
MR. STOVITZ: We can only go one step at a time, because I have been restricted to directing the witness’ attention to a particular point, so I will try to do it in conformity with the Court’s order.
Q. The actions that you observed Mr. Manson make, where was Mr. Manson sitting at that time?
A. Actions or words?
Q. Actions. We are talking about actions while you were on the witness stand.
A. While I was on the witness stand—I don’t recall actions, I recall words.
Q. You recall words that Mr. Manson direct to you?
A. Yes.
Q. While you were sitting on the witness stand?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you overhear these words?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: May I inquire on voir dire?
THE COURT: No, you may not, sir.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Do you know whether or not the jury was present at the time the words were uttered?
A. I believe they were.
Q. And did you make a response to these words?
A. Yes, I did.
MR. KANAREK: I object, calling for a conclusion, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. And do you recall what the words were and what your response was?
MR. KANAREK: Assuming facts not in evidence also, your Honor, calling for a conclusion; and it is hearsay and it is immaterial.
THE COURT: Approach the bench, please. Counsel.
(The following proceedings were had at the bench out of the hearing of the jury:)
THE COURT: What are you attempting to get at, Mr. Stovitz?
MR. STOVITZ: On this particular occasion, your Honor, Mr. Manson shouted—not shouted, but he spoke in an audible tone that she has told three lies, and she said to Mr. Manson “Oh, no, Charlie, I have spoken the truth, and you know it.”
Now, on cross-examination she was asked—
THE COURT: What is that supposed to show?
MR. STOVITZ: Well, on cross-examination she was asked whether or not she gets any vibrations now from Charlie Manson, and this is what I am attempting to show, the vibrations.
Another time Mr. Manson—
THE COURT: Vibrations!
MR. STOVITZ: This is what she calls vibrations.
MR. SHINN: Vibes.
MR. STOVITZ: Vibes.
Another time Mr. Manson put his finger to his throat and made a motion indicating throat slitting, and the witness observed this as well.
We are also going to go into some of the conduct the witness observed the girls made to her while she was on the witness stand. This occurred during cross-examination.
MR. KANAREK: If I may, your Honor, I believe this would be part of rebuttal, actually it is really not part of redirect.
When, after we put on our case, they can rebut with, this kind of—
THE COURT: I am inclined to agree with Mr. Kanarek. I have serious questions about this.
MR. BUGLIOSI: May I briefly be heard, your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. BUGLIOSI: It is my understanding that Mr. Manson looked at Mrs. Kasabian and went like this.
Now, that is conduct which shows a consciousness of guilt.
He also put his fingers like this over his lips.
THE COURT: Assuming that that is what he did, and of course that is always open to interpretation, it would not appear to be a proper part of redirect examination.
MR. BUGLIOSI: I see your point. I see your point.
Yes, I think the Court is right—in fact, I know the Court is right.
Could we reopen direct, then, on this extremely important issue? The Court is well aware that if the jury finds Mrs. Kasabian to be an accomplice, we have got to corroborate her testimony, and the law is clear, and I will give the Court cases on this that furtive conduct on the part of a defendant can constitute legal corroboration.
THE COURT: Where and when?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Well, for instance—
THE COURT: This is not furtive conduct.
MR. BUGLIOSI: I am giving the Court an example:
Furtive conduct is one thing—
THE COURT: I would like to see the authority on that.
MR. BUGLIOSI: The authority on that?
THE COURT: We don’t have to do it now.
MR. BUGLIOSI: But the fact that Manson is in court does not immunize him from statements or conduct.
If he were to get up in open court and say “I am guilty”—
THE COURT: The jury can see these things. They are sitting directly opposite; they are watching him all the time.
MR. BUGLIOSI: I thought about that. There is one problem, we cannot argue that.
It is not evidence. I could not get up in front of the jury and argue—
THE COURT: But you can argue.
MR. BUGLIOSI: There has to be testimony from the stand that he made those motions.
THE COURT: If he takes the stand, I don’t know of course whether he intends to do that, if he testifies then you can argue as you could about anybody in determining credibility.
Well, that is a question too as to whether or not the demeanor while not testifying may be considered.
MR. BUGLIOSI: I cannot tell the jury, “Ladies and gentlemen, I don’t know whether you saw it, but didn’t you see Mr. Manson one time make a slitting throat motion to Linda Kasabian?”
I cannot do that.
THE COURT: That’s right.
MR. BUGLIOSI: So what I am doing now, we are putting on evidence of the fact that he made motions like that.
But I agree with the Court, I haven’t even thought about it, this is not proper redirect examination.
THE COURT: I am going to sustain the objection at this time. You may consider it further. I would like to see any authority on the subject that you may have.
MR. BUGLIOSI: I don’t know if there has been quite an example exactly like this where someone in court is doing something, but I know legal corroboration could be furtive conduct, demeanor on the witness stand, I know that, and I think demeanor in court.
THE COURT: I think here there is too much possibility of confusion.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Won’t this go to the weight, your Honor? Can’t Mr. Manson take the stand and say “No, I wasn’t looking at her; I was looking at someone else”?
THE COURT: You cannot force a defendant to take the stand and deny something like that.
MR. BUGLIOSI: We intend to put witnesses other than Linda on the stand who saw the same thing, witnesses who were sitting in the courtroom that saw the motions, looking at Linda.
THE COURT: I would like some authority.
MR. KANAREK: I make the motion it be stricken.
THE COURT: I have. It has already been stricken.
MR. KANAREK: I make a motion, your Honor, instruct the jury that all of the alleged conduct of Mr. Manson be stricken.
THE COURT: I did strike it.
MR. KANAREK: I mean all of the testimony concerning conduct, all of that be stricken, inform the jury.
THE COURT: I don’t know what you’re talking about.
MR. KANAREK: Not just the last question, but all of it.
THE COURT: All of what?
MR. KANAREK: All of her testimony concerning this supposed conduct on his part, may that be stricken at this time and the jury admonished not to consider it for any purpose?
THE COURT: What other conduct?
MR. KANAREK: There were several questions other than the last one.
THE COURT: You show me on the record when you get the transcript. If there is anything I have not admonished them on I will.
MR. KANAREK: Very well, then I would ask for a mistrial because of the prejudicial effect.
THE COURT: The motion is denied.
(The following proceedings were had in open court in the presence and hearing of the jury:)
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Now, Mrs. Kasabian—
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, would your Honor inform the jury as to the striking of the last question?
THE COURT: They were so informed and admonished, let’s proceed.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Mrs. Kasabian, the night that you went out to the home on top of the hill that you later learned to be the Tate residence, had you ever been in that house before that time?
A. No.
Q. Were you in the house that night?
A. No.
Q. Are you certain of that?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: That calls for a conclusion, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: As you were running down that hill you told us on cross-examination that you did not hear any screaming from the house, is that correct?
MR. KANAREK: Assuming facts not in evidence, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: When I was running down the hill?
Q. Yes.
A. No.
Q. Now, with respect to the—
MR. KANAREK: I don’t think there was an answer, your Honor. Was there an answer?
THE WITNESS: I said no.
MR. KANAREK: I’m sorry.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: With respect to this incident in Boston, that you have told us about, that happened in August of ’57, do you remember Mr. Kanarek asking you—
A. What!
Q. ’67, I’m sorry.
Do you remember Mr. Kanarek asking you whether or not you had been convicted of a felony, and you gave the date of April, 1967.
A. Oh, yeah.
Q. How old were you then?
A. 17.
Q. And was a judgment finally entered in that case?
A. Yes.
Q. And what was the judgment for?
A. What was it for?
Q. Yes, I mean did you plead guilty?
A. Yes, I guess so.
Q. What did you plead guilty to?
A. Being present when narcotics were found and possession of pills, two pills.
Q. And to your knowledge that was not a felony.
MR. KANAREK: That is a conclusion on the part of this witness, and hearsay.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Were you sentenced to the State Prison?
A. No.
Q. Were you given any time in custody?
A. No.
Q. Were you put on probation?
A. Yes.
Q. And how long was the period of probation?
A. One year.
Q. Aside from that, and a traffic ticket that you once did not answer, were you ever arrested for anything else?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, your Honor, I object to the question on the ground that it is immaterial, irrelevant.
MR. STOVITZ: I will withdraw the question.
Q. Aside from that particular incident, a traffic offense, and a time that you surrendered for these charges, were you ever arrested for any other offense?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, your Honor, irrelevant.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Going back again to the leather thong that Charlie Manson gave you the night of the second night, now—
A. Yes.
Q. Now that you have seen Exhibit 95 and 75, you state that either one of those things look similar, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. How, do you recall the particular length, whether it was a yard long, a yard and a half long, two yards long, of the thong that Charlie gave you?
A. I don’t know because it was wrapped up.
Q. All right, now, did you see where Charles Manson got that particular thong from that he gave you at the Spahn Ranch?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial and irrelevant.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: You have a definite recollection of putting that thong in a pocket of yours, is that right?
MR. KANAREK: Calling for a conclusion, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Now, later that night at any time that night did you ever see that thong again after you put it in your pocket?
A. No.
Q. Do you remember seeing it around Charlie at any time that night?
A. No.
Q. And this particular thong, like you have told counsel, is no different from the thongs that you have used to sew up leather goods, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you seen Charlie Manson weather leather thongs like that on other occasions?
MR. KANAREK: Irrelevant and immaterial.
It is prejudicial. The prejudicial value outweighs the probative value.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Did you see leather thongs anywhere on Charlie’s clothes at any time the second night?
A. Around his neck.
Q. When was it you first observed leather thongs around Charlie’s neck?
A. When he got in the car.
Q. Was that before you got to Harold True’s house or after you get to Harold True’s house?
A. Before.
Q. Where was it you saw that?
A. When we first left the ranch.
Q. The Spahn Ranch?
A. Yes.
Q. Later on when the police officers stopped you at the beach did you notice whether or not Mr. Manson still had the leather thongs around his neck?
A. No, I did not notice that he did.
Q. Did you notice that he did not have them?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, the question has been asked and answered. He is asking in the negative the same question, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Do you recall now when you last saw Charles Manson on the evening of the second night, probably the morning hours, did he have the same leather thong around his neck?
MR. KANAREK: It has been asked and answered, your Honor.
The question is exactly the same subject matter and same question.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No, I did not see them.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: What made you pay any particular attention, if you did, to whether or not the thong was around Charlie’s neck or not?
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, it calls for a conjecture, a conclusion.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Was there anything that particularly called your attention to whether or not Charlie Manson had that thong around his neck or not?
MR. KANAREK: Calls for a conclusion. It is the same question.
THE COURT: What time? It is ambiguous.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Later on at the beach after you left Harold True’s house and after you had driven around the city, at that time was there any particular reason for noticing Charles Manson’s clothes?
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Assuming a fact not in evidence, your Honor.
She stated she did not.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: There was no reason, I just don’t remember seeing it when we were walking along the beach.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: And that is your definite recollection, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, you told us something about a sword that you saw Charles Manson with on the night of the second night; is that correct?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, that is clearly outside the scope of cross-examination.
There was no questioning of this witness by, I think, any of defense counsel.
MR. STOVITZ: I can show counsel the page and reference number.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: What was your question?
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: A sword that you saw Charles Manson with on the second night when you left the Spahn Ranch—
A. Yes.
Q. —could you with your hands indicate the length of that sword?
A. The blade or the whole sword?
Q. Let’s take the blade first, about 16 inches, would you say, or more than that?
A. I guess about like that.
MR. STOVITZ: All right, if you will just hold that, I notice a ruler—there it is.
Q. Are your fingers tired?
A. Yes.
Q. That is 16-1/2 inches.
All right, now, you were shown a sword on direct examination in two parts, do you recall the handle part of that sword?
A. Yes.
Q. Was the handle part of the sword that you were shown, Exhibit 47 by reference, was that handle similar to the sword Charlie had the second night?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Calling for a conclusion.
THE COURT: Overruled.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Was this sometimes called a pirate’s sword?
A. That is what I refer to it as, yes.
Q. Did you see whether or not Mr. Manson had that sword with him when he left the Ford automobile when it was parked in front of Harold True’s house?
A. I don’t know.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, if I may, that is outside of the scope of the cross-examination.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: I don’t know what it was. but he stuck something in his pants.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: So you don’t know whether it was a handkerchief or gun—
A. No. It was either a gun or a sword, but I don’t know which.
THE COURT: We will take our recess at this time, Mr. Stovitz.
Ladies and gentleman, do not converse with anyone nor form or express an opinion regarding the case until it is finally submitted to you.
The Court will recess for 15 minutes.
THE COURT: All parties, counsel and jurors are present.
You may continue, Mr. Stovitz.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Mrs. Kasabian—Counsel, I direct your attention to Volume 43, Thursday, August 6, page 6406, on line 20.
While counsel is looking for that, would you read to yourself line 20 and on to the next page, Mrs. Kasabian.
(Pause while the witness reads.)
MR. STOVITZ: Have you found it, Counsel?
Q. Were you asked the following questions and did you give the following answers?
“Q. Mrs. Kasabian, directing your attention to your state of mind when you left the Spahn Ranch on the second night. Was your state of mind such that you felt that you had participated in the events which resulted in the killing of five people?
“A. I guess maybe I did.
“Q. You guess maybe you did?
“I can’t remember thinking about it, if that is what I thought, but here now that is what I feel.
“Q. Well, you mean you don’t remember whether you had thought about it or not on the second night?
“A. I don’t remember thinking about it on the second night.”
Do you recall being asked those questions in that sequence and giving those answers?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may I inquire what page that is?
MR. STOVITZ: I am now on page 6407.
Q. Then you were asked the question:
“You had forgotten about it on the second night?”
And you gave the answer:
“I might not have forgotten about it but I cannot remember now if I thought about it.”
Did you give that answer to the previous question I just asked?
A. Yes.
Q. Then you were asked the question:
“Well, would you think for a minute and let us know whether you, on the second night, had forgotten what happened the night before?”
Your answer was:
“I don’t know.”
“Q. You don’t remember whether you forgot about it or not?
“A. Right.”
Did you give those answers to those questions in that sequence?
A. I guess so, yes.
Q. And as you sit here now, can you remember back to the second night and tell us whether or not on the second night had you forgotten about what had happened on the first night?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I must object to that question in the context of this interrogation.
First he reads her a series of—
THE COURT: State the objection.
MR. KANAREK: The objection is that it is immaterial, this question, and it is ambiguous.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: What was your question?
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. The question is: Now, reflecting back on the second night, had you forgotten what had happened on the first night?
MR. KANAREK: Leading and suggestive also.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Now, no. How could I forget that?
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. And do you now, as you have testified on direct examination and cross-examination and redirect examination, do you still remember the events that took place the first sight?
A. Sure.
MR. KANAREK: Assuming facts not in evidence, ambiguous, your Honor, calling for a conclusion.
THE COURT: Overruled.
What was the answer?
THE WITNESS: Sure.
MR. STOVITZ: Now, Mrs. Kasabian, when you went to the Spain Ranch on August the 4th, 1969, did you intend, at that time, to take the $5,000 with you at the time that you first went there with Gypsy?
A. Not August the 4th. July the 4th.
Q. I am sorry. July the 4th.
Did you, at that time, when you went there with Gypsy on July the 4th, intend to take the five thousand dollars with you?
A. No.
Q. After the five thousand dollars was taken to the ranch you stated that you believed that you gave it to Leslie. Are you certain about that?
A. No, I am not positive.
Q. And your references to Leslie are Leslie Van Houten, the defendant in this case?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you, yourself, ever see the five thousand dollars again?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever benefit by it by being bought any clothes or shoes or cars, or anything like that?
A. No, not that I know of.
Q. Now, you stated that at one time you did have a conversation with Mr. Manson concerning this money; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember when it was?
A. Yes.
Q. When was it?
A. It was the same day that I took the money, in the afternoon.
Q. Where did that conversation take place?
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor.
THE COURT: State the objection.
MR. KANAREK: I would like a foundation as to who was present, your Honor.
THE COURT: Is that your objection?
MR. KANAREK: On the basis of improper foundation.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. STOVITZ: I have forgotten the question. May it be read, your Honor?
THE COURT: Read the question.
(The question was read by the reporter.)
THE WITNESS: Up behind the ranch.
MR. STOVITZ: Do you remember who else was present besides you and Charles Manson?
A. Yes.
Q. Who else?
A. Gypsy, Mary Brunner, Snake, Brenda, and my little girl, Tanya.
Q. Can you tell us now what you said, what Charlie Manson said, and if any of the other girls joined in, what they said?
A. I remember his asking me why I came to the ranch.
And I told him that my old man didn’t want me—my husband didn’t want me, and that I was told that I would be welcome here as part of the Family.
I don’t know if I told him I stole the five thousand dollars. I don’t remember saying that.
But I remember him asking me why I took the money.
And I told him to help him go to the desert.
And that is about all I remember.
Then I remember him checking out my legs.
Q. Was there any further conversation with Mr. Manson concerning this five thousand dollars in your presence?
A. Possibly but I can’t recall it.
Q. All right.
Now, going to the second night again.
You stated that you definitely saw Mr. Manson with what you have described as a pirate’s sword; is that right?
MR. KANAREK: I object to that. It is leading and suggestive.
THE COURT: I didn’t hear the question.
What was the question?
(The question was read by the reporter.)
MR. KANAREK: It is leading and suggestive, and it assumes facts not in evidence.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: I don’t quite understand.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. You remember the sword that you described for us, about 16 inches—the length of the blade—and the handle, and you described it—that is what you called it, a pirate’s sword?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you see anyone else—by anyone else, I mean either Clem Tufts, or Steve Grogan, which is his true name, Patricia Krenwinkel, Leslie Van Houten, Susan Atkins, Tex Watson, or yourself—did you see anyone else with any particular type of knife, gun or sword on that particular second night?
MR. KANAREK: That is ambiguous.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Whom did you see and with what?
A. I saw Clem with a gun. And in the bunkroom I saw Charlie with the sword.
That is it.
Q. Did you ever see Tex Watson with any type of instrument whatsoever on that second night?
A. No.
Q. Now, after going back to the ranch, the second night, did you ever see that pirate’s sword again, to your knowledge?
A. No. I didn’t look for it.
Q. You didn’t look for it?
A. No.
Q. It might have been there and you just didn’t see it?
A. It could have been but I didn’t see it.
Q. And this pirate’s sword was usually kept where?
A. Sometimes in the bunkroom, sometimes in the dune buggy.
That is it.
Q. Yesterday you told us that you sometimes feel vibrations, and that you are feeling them from the defendant right now.
Do you remember saying that?
A. Yes.
Q. What do you mean by these vibrations?
A. It is sort of like emotions, feelings, that you put out to other people.
Q. It is not like the air blowing from that fan, is it?
A. No.
Q. When you said that you thought that you could talk to dogs, or dogs could talk to you, or horses could talk to you and you could talk to horses, what did you mean by that?
MR. HUGHES: This is an improper characterization of her testimony, your Honor.
MR. STOVITZ: I will try to characterize it properly.
Q. When you said that you could communicate with animals, what did you mean by that?
A. Just through vibrations and senses. Like when you see a dog, he can sense if you are going to hurt him or love him, and you can sense if he is going to love you or hurt you.
Q. You used the word “stoned” and then you told us that that meant high; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Is it a certain type of highness, like you are completely way out of it, or does it just mean high-high, or just normal high?
What does the word “stoned” mean as characterized by being stoned on drugs?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, that is ambiguous.
Does he mean what she means it means?
MR. STOVITZ: Yes. What she means it means.
THE WITNESS: Yes. Just like with alcohol, just different levels of being stoned.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Most of the jurors know or have seen people under the influence of alcohol and their different states. You can be under the influence of alcohol and you could be drunk, and you could be dead drunk.
A. Yes.
Q. You are not actually dead, you are just out.
A. Right.
Q. Is “high” a phrase that you use when you are under the influence of some type of drug or marijuana?
A. Yes.
Q. Is “stoned” some type of phrase that you use when you are more intensely under the influence of drugs or marijuana?
A. Well—
Q. Or is it the same?
A. It can be the same, yes.
Q. The same frequency?
A. Yes.
Q. When you said something about children are stoned, what do you mean by that?
A. What did I think then when I said that?
(Pause.)
Oh, well, children are naturally stoned.
Q. What do you mean by that?
A. Well, they are just—they are natural and they are pure and they are innocent, and their level of consciousness it high.
They are not, you know, conditioned to a lot of the thing, that we are.
Q. I see.
When a person is stoned, let us say, on marijuana or a drug, you feel that he is not conditioned in the way we are; is that right?
A. Sometimes.
Q. All right.
Now, you stated that sometimes under acid—and I am talking about acid in the context you use it, LSD, psilocybin; whatever acid you referred to—that your thoughts are not clear.
What do you mean by that?
MR. KANAREK: That is assuming facts not in evidence.
The only acid that she has referred to as acid is LSD, your Honor, and that is assuming facts not in evidence.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: What was your question?
MR. STOVITZ: I will break it down so counsel can follow it.
Q. In your direct examination and cross-examination, I believe, you told us that you used acid, and that, in your terms, acid meant more than just LSD.
Is that correct?
A. Well, no. Acid is LSD.
Q. All right.
Does it include other types of drugs besides LSD?
A. No, not really. Not the term.
Q. But in your explanation, you told us that when you had these 50 acid trips, it included—
A. I meant all the trips itself.
Q. —mescaline and psilocybin?
A. Yes.
Q. Then you told us that when you are under acid your thoughts are not clear.
Do you remember that?
A. Right. Yes.
Q. What do you mean by “your thoughts are not clear”?
A. Sometimes it is hard to keep your attention on one thought and you just lose it.
It is just a matter of willpower, I guess.
Q. All right.
Talking about this so-called willpower, have you ever had an experience whereby you did anything under the influence of acid that you would not have done had you not been under the influence of acid?
A. I don’t quite understand.
Q. Did someone ever tell you to drive a car and you didn’t want to drive the car, but because you were under the influence of acid you drove the car?
A. No.
Q. Do you recall any specific instance whereby you later found out that you did something that you didn’t want to do but you were under the influence of acid?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I object to that. It is calling for a conclusion, hearsay and conjecture.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Now, with respect to the term “lovemaking.” You said, “We made love.”
A. Yes.
Q. Did you use that term to be synonymous with sexual intercourse?
A. What is synonymous?
Q. Synonymous means the same.
A. No.
Q. Were there occasions when you made love with some man where you did not engage in sexual intercourse with him?
A. Yes.
Q. With Charles Manson, when you told us about the four times you made love with him, were these four times of sexual intercourse, or just the hugging and kissing that you described yesterday?
A. No, they were the actual intercourse.
Q. Now, going back again to the LSD and your thought processes are not clear.
Did they, in fact, affect your thinking powers?
A. What was that again?
Q. Did your LSD trips actually affect your thinking powers?
A. My thinking powers? While I was on the trip?
Q. Yes.
A. Well, like I said, sometimes I couldn’t hold on to a thought, or if I was thinking and then I let go of the thought, sometimes if I tried to go back and grasp the thought, I couldn’t; or I would have to really, really exert my will power to grasp it.
Q. Did you ever see people coming into the room that didn’t come into the room?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever see your mother when you knew your mother wasn’t there?
A. No.
Q. And I am talking about while you were under LSD?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you ever see your newborn child Tanya—that is, when you were pregnant with Tanya—what she looked like while you were under the influence of LSD, when she wasn’t even born yet?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever see a train or a plane crashing when, in fact, a train or plane did not crash?
A. No.
Q. Now, with respect to your belief in God and your religious training.
Do you recall when it was that your religious training stopped?
A. Yes.
Q. When was that?
A. When I [illegible] years old I dropped out.
Q. Did your belief in God continue after your religious training stopped, if you can recall?
A. I never really thought about Him at that age.
Q. Then, sometime after you turned 16, you started to think about God again; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. What happened between seven and sixteen?
A. Concerning God?
Q. Yes.
A. I was just too—I was just more into the physical plane. I didn’t think about, you know, the spirit plane.
Q. Did Charles Manson ever tell you he was Jesus Christ?
A. No, He never said “I am Jesus Christ,” no.
Q. Now, your belief that he was Jesus Christ, then, arose from what circumstances?
A. Just—
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I will object to that. I don’t think this witness has any capacity to say that, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. What circumstances caused your belief that he, while you were at the Spahn Ranch, was Jesus Christ?
A. Well, within my own self, that is what I was looking for, and that is what I saw in him.
Q. Did he have a beard when you first moved to Spahn Ranch?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he shave his beard off at some time?
A. Yes, later on he did.
Q. Have you ever seen Jesus Christ pictured in any picture without a beard?
A. No.
Q. When Mr. Manson shaved off his beard, did you still believe he was Jesus Christ?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you ever stop believing he was Jesus Christ while you were still living at the Spahn Ranch?
A. Yes.
Q. When was that?
A. The first night.
Q. That was the night that you visited the house on top of the hill?
A. Yes.
Q. And why was it that you changed your mind that night?
A. Why?
Q. Yes.
A. Well, I guess you could call it a vision, I had a vision in my head who he really was when I witnessed these things happen.
Q. As you were sitting down on the ground there next to that Ford automobile after seeing and hearing what you heard that night, were you thinking of Charles Manson at that time?
A. No. I didn’t think of him until I looked into Mr. Frykowski’s eyes.
Q. And what did you think of Charles Manson then?
MR. KANAREK: That, your Honor, I will object to.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. What was your belief as to who Charles Manson was at that time?
MR. KANAREK: I will object, your Honor, on the grounds that it is a conclusion, self-serving.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Was it the killings that you saw that made you change your mind?
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor. Calling for a conclusion, your Honor.
I would like to approach the bench, if I may.
THE COURT: That question is ambiguous.
Sustained on that ground.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Do you remember at which point it was, during the night of the visit to the Tate residence, the house on top of the hill, that made you change your mind?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, your Honor.
Also, it is calling for a conclusion.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. When was that?
A. The moment I saw Mr. Frykowski.
Q. And why was that?
A. Why?
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor. Calling for a conclusion.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. STOVITZ: You may cross question, Counsel.
THE COURT: Mr. Fitzgerald?
MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, your Honor. Thank you.
May I remain seated while I address questions to the witness?
THE COURT: Yes, you may.
MR. FITZGERALD: I am going to refer to some testimony, Counsel. Volume 38, page 5863.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. FITZGERALD:
Q. Mrs. Kasabian, I am going to read you a question and answer directing to you as a witness.
“Q. You are not taking any tranquillizers of any kind?
“A. No. I stopped taking them before I made my testimony.”
Were you asked that question and did you give that answer?
A. If I did, it is not right, because I took one tranquilizer the first day.
I thought I made that clear.
Q. But to the best of your recollection, were you asked that question and did you give that answer?
A. Possibly, yes.
Q. Did you later testify that you had taken tranquilizers on one occasion during the course of your testimony?
A. I don’t understand.
Q. Well, let me ask you the question directly. Have you taken any tranquilizers while you have been testifying here in court?
A. Yes.
Q. And on how many occasions?
A. Just once.
Q. Are you sure of that?
A. Yes.
Q. Are you positive?
A. Yes.
Q. On July 27th, at approximately 10:00 p.m., did you take five milligrams of Valium, a tranquilizer?
A. I don’t know the milligrams and what they were, but it was a tranquilizer, yes.
Q. Was it on July 27th at approximately 10:00 p.m.?
A. Was that the first day?
Q. Did you begin your testimony on July the 27th?
A. I don’t know. I guess so. I don’t know the date.
Q. On July 29th, did you also take a 5-milligram tablet of Valium?
A. I just remember taking it the first day I came to court.
Q. And that was in the morning before your testimony?
A. Yes.
Q. Was there some reason for that?
A. I felt that I might be nervous, you know, my first court appearance, so I thought it might calm me down a little bit.
Q. Now, you have previously testified that on certain occasions you were removed from the Los Angeles County Jail; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. On some occasions you testified you were taken to court; on other occasions you went to certain places within the County of Los Angeles with some police officers.
Is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you removed from the Los Angeles County Jail on Tuesday, March 3rd, between the hours of 1:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m.?
A. I don’t know the date.
Q. Were you removed from the Los Angeles County Jail on Saturday, March the 7th. during the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m.?
A. I believe that was the day that they took me to the hospital.
Q. When did you give birth to your child?
A. The 9th.
Q. Do you remember when you were returned to the Los Angeles County Jail?
A. The following Friday.
Q. The Friday following the 9th?
A. Yes.
Q. On Sunday, March 15th, were you removed from the jail between the hours of 8:30 a.m. and 6:30 p.m.?
A. I am not sure if that is the date, but it was soon after I gave birth, yes.
Q. On May 7, a Thursday, were you removed from the jail between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m.?
A. I don’t know the date.
Q. And on Monday, May 18th, were you removed from the jail between the hours of 5:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m.?
A. I don’t know if that is the date.
Q. Were you removed some time from the Los Angeles County Jail at nighttime, during the night?
A. It was before nighttime, but it was nighttime when I came back.
Q. Do you remember any of the dates on which you visited with your attorneys in the Los Angeles County Jail?
A. The dates?
Q. The dates.
A. No, not really.
Q. Do you remember any of the dates on which you visited Mr. Bugliosi or Mr. Stovitz in the Los Angeles County Jail?
A. Dates, no.
Q. Do you remember any of the dates you visited with representatives of the Los Angeles Police Department in the jail?
A. No.
Q. Do you remember any of the dates you visited with your husband or any other visitors in the Los Angeles County Jail?
A. No.
Q. During the month of December, did you receive visitors in the jail? December, 1969?
A. Visitors?
My husband came. I believe it was in December.
Q. And also your attorneys; is that right?
A. Oh, yes. And I had two other visitors.
Q. And during January, were you visited in the Los Angeles County Jail by any persons?
A. Excuse me?
Q. Were you also visited by people in the Los Angeles County Jail during the month of January, 1970?
A. I don’t know what dates, you know.
Q. But just during the month of January?
A. Yes. Probably.
Q. And February?
A. Yes.
Q. March?
A. Probably, yes.
Q. April?
A. Yes.
Q. May?
A. Yes.
Q. June?
A. Yes.
Q. July?
A. Yes.
MR. BUGLIOSI: We will stipulate that she wasn’t a recluse, your Honor, if that is the point that counsel is trying to get at.
THE COURT: I couldn’t hear you, Mr. Bugliosi.
MR. BUGLIOSI: We will stipulate that she wasn’t a recluse, that she did visit with people.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I thought stipulations were to be made outside of the presence of the jury.
THE COURT: There isn’t any apparently.
MR. FITZGERALD: Counsel, directing your attention to Volume 33, page 5284, line 23, et seq.
Q. Mrs. Kasabian, were you asked these questions—
MR. STOVITZ: Just a minute.
Volume 33, Counsel?
MR. FITZGERALD: Page 5284.
MR. STOVITZ: All right. Thank you, Counsel.
MR. FITZGERALD: Line 23, et seq.
Q. Were you asked these questions and did you give these answers?
“Q. Did you see Mr. Manson enter any home?
“A. No. He just disappeared halfway up. I couldn’t, you know, see very well because it was dark.
“Q. In other words, he walked out of your view?
“A. Yes.”
Q. Were you asked those questions?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you give that answer?
A. Yes.
MR. STOVITZ: So that it may be intelligible, Counsel, is this referring to the second night?
MR. FITZGERALD: This was referring to the second night.
MR. STOVITZ: Thank you.
THE WITNESS: Right.
BY MR. FITZGERALD:
Q. It is true, then, is it not, that you didn’t see Mr. Manson enter any home on the second night?
A. Right. No, I didn’t see.
Q. Now, referring to the same volume, Volume 33—
THE COURT: Just a moment, Mr. Fitzgerald.
Read the last answer.
(The answer was read by the reporter.)
THE COURT: All right.
BY MR. FITZGERALD:
Q. Referring to Volume 33, page 5286, line 15, et seq.
Were you asked these questions and did you give these answers?
“Q. How long after he left the car did he return to the car?
“A. I remember we all lit up cigarettes, and we smoked about three quarters of a Pall Mall cigarette. However long that takes.
“Q. Several minutes?
“A. Yes.”
Were you asked those questions and did you give those answers?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you later in your testimony indicate that you had smoked an entire cigarette?
A. Yes.
Q. Which is the case? Did you smoke three-quarters of a cigarette or did you smoke one cigarette, or more than one cigarette?
A. Oh, by the entire cigarette, do you mean the whole thing?
I don’t understand your question.
Q. You judged the interval during which Mr. Manson was gone by the length of time it took you to smoke a cigarette or a portion of a cigarette; is that correct?
A. Right, uh-huh.
Q. And you referred to smoking three-quarters of a cigarette.
A. Yes.
Q. Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. What did you mean when you said you smoked three-quarters of a cigarette?
A. Well, it is a Pall Mall cigarette, and you can’t smoke the whole thing or else you will burn yourself. So, I just said I smoked three quarters of it.
Q. So, you consumed, in a normal fashion, a cigarette?
A. Yes.
Q. In other words, lit it, and you smoked it down to where you normally extinguish it?
A. Right.
Q. And approximately how long did that take, if you recall?
A. Well, I am not sure how long it takes. I never timed myself.
Q. How long have you been smoking?
A. How long have I been smoking?
Q. Yes.
A. On and off since I was 14.
Q. How long have you been smoking king size cigarettes?
A. King size cigarettes?
Q. Yes.
A. I don’t understand.
Q. How long have you been smoking Pall Malls?
A. I smoked Pall Malls at the ranch.
Q. Now, you are unable to give any estimate of the length of time it would take to smoke a cigarette?
A. No.
Q. For you to smoke a cigarette?
A. No, I really don’t know how long.
Q. Would it be fair to characterize the length of time it takes you to smoke a Pall Mall cigarette as a short period of time?
A. Well, what is short?
Q. I don’t know. Can you give us any indication at all of the length of time, short, long, minutes, seconds?
A. Minutes—maybe five minutes or ten minutes, something like that.
Q. You indicated that you turned yourself in to the police, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. When you came to Los Angeles you retained the services of an attorney, did you not?
A. Say that again.
MR. FITZGERALD: I will withdraw the question.
When you came to Los Angeles were you placed in the Los Angeles County Jail?
A. Yeah, eventually.
Q. Were you taken to court after you returned from the East Coast?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Beyond the scope of redirect examination.
THE COURT: Overruled, you may answer.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
Q. BY MR. FITZGERALD: Did you plead not guilty to the offenses with which you were charged?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you deny any implication whatsoever in these offenses?
MR. STOVITZ: I object to the question, your Honor, as argumentative.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Also implies that she had an opportunity to do so, and that she never had an opportunity, and it is also beyond the scope of redirect examination, your Honor.
This has already been gone into on cross-examination.
THE COURT: Also it is ambiguous. The objection is sustained.
Q. BY MR. FITZGERALD: You indicated this morning that—strike that.
You received written immunity to be prosecuted for these offenses, is that correct?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Ambiguous, your Honor, immunity from prosecution.
Q. BY MR. FITZGERALD: From prosecution, excuse me, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. When was that? When was it that you received immunity from prosecution for these offenses?
A. Just the other day.
Q. And were you given immunity for perjury?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. As a matter of fact you indicated to Mr. Stovitz that he had indicated to you that you were not receiving immunity for perjury, is that correct?
A. I don’t know if I stated it that way, but he told me that I could be tried for perjury.
Q. Did he tell you if you changed your testimony after—
If your testimony after you received immunity was different than your testimony before you received immunity, that you might be prosecuted for perjury?
A. No, I don’t think those were his words.
Q. You testified as to certain events that occurred on August 8th and 9th in this courtroom, did you not?
A. If those are the dates, I’m still not sure on the dates.
Q. Well, let’s say the first and the second night.
A. Yes.
Q. You testified as to certain events that took place on the first night and certain events that took place on the second night in this courtroom, is that right?
A. Right.
Q. And after you testified to those events you were granted immunity, is that correct?
A. No, I had not finished testifying, I was still being questioned.
Q. Now, is it your understanding that if you changed your testimony, and said these defendants were not with you the first and second nights, that you would be prosecuted for perjury?
A. Well, I wouldn’t do that.
Q. But were you told that if you did you would be prosecuted for perjury?
A. No.
Q. Do you know what perjury is?
A. False statements, to tell lies.
Q. Were you told it was a false statement made under oath?
A. Not that I recall.
Q. In terms of your state of mind, if you were to tell two diametrically opposed and contradictory stories under oath, is it your impression that you would be prosecuted for perjury?
A. I don’t understand your question.
Q. Let’s take a hypothetical situation:
If you testified under oath that Patricia Krenwinkel was with you the first night, and then you later testified under oath that Patricia Krenwinkel was not with you the first night, is it your understanding that that would be perjury?
A. Yes.
Q. And is it your understanding that if you so testified you would be prosecuted for perjury?
A. Yes, I guess so.
Q. Do you know who this marijuana plant called Oscar belongs to?
MR. STOVITZ: Elmer, Counsel.
MR. FITZGERALD: Emler, excuse me.
THE WITNESS: Who it belonged to?
Q. Whom it belonged to.
A. It belonged to everybody.
Q. Wasn’t it Danny DeCarlo’s marijuana plant?
A. He took care of it.
Q. Wasn’t Danny DeCarlo merely a visitor at the Spahn Ranch?
A. A visitor?
Q. A visitor.
A. He lived there.
Q. A permanent or a temporary basis?
A. As far as I know, permanent.
MR. FITZGERALD: May I have just a moment?
(Mr. Fitzgerald consults with Mr. Bugliosi and Mr. Stovitz off the record after which the following proceedings were had in open court.)
MR. FITZGERALD: I have, your Honor, approximately eight to ten questions relating to an area that is properly beyond the scope of recross-examination.
I wonder if I might for that sole purpose reopen cross-examination?
MR. BUGLIOSI: No objection, your Honor.
THE COURT: You may.
CROSS-EXAMINATION (Reopened)
BY MR. FITZGERALD:
Q. To refresh my recollection Mrs. Kasabian, would you give us the date of your child Angel’s birth again.
A. March 9th.
MR. BUGLIOSI: 1970.
BY MR. FITZGERALD:
Q. 1970?
A. 1:37 in the afternoon.
Q. 9:37 in the afternoon?
A. 1:37.
Q. And where is your child Angel now?
A. He is back East.
Q. Is he with your mother?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that Mrs. Joyce Byrd?
A. Yes.
Q. And was your child Angel released to her?
A. Temporary custody, yes.
Q. And how did that come to pass, if you know?
A. Through a legal document through the hospital.
Q. Did you have some discussions or conversations with the prosecution concerning the care and custody of your child Angel?
A. I don’t quite understand.
Q. Did you have some conversations with Mr. Bugliosi or Mr. Stovitz about what would happen to your child after it was born?
A. I think I expressed something to Mr. Bugliosi, that if there was any way I could stay with the baby.
And he said no.
Q. The “g” before the “l” in Italian is silent. It is Bugliosi.
A. What is it?
Q. Bugliosi.
A. Bugliosi?
Q. Yes.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Thank you.
BY MR. FITZGERALD:
Q. You were pregnant during the months of January, February and early March of 1970, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And I take it you were in jail at the time?
A. Yes.
Q. And I take it you were concerned about the welfare of your child, once your child was born, inasmuch as you were an inmate of an institution, a jail?
A. Yes, very such so.
Q. And it influenced your state of mind, your thoughts and concern about your child, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you feel that your child, once born, would become a ward of the State of California?
A. No.
Q. Had you made an agreement that your child would not become a ward of the State of California with anybody?
A. Well, I spoke to my attorneys about that.
Q. And to your knowledge was there some agreement between your attorneys and the prosecution concerning your child, once it was born, concerning the care and custody of your child?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. Did you enter into any agreement with any Los Angeles police officers concerning the custody of your child, once it was born?
A. No.
Q. Did you negotiate or contact your mother in regard to her caring for your child?
A. Yes.
Q. And did she come out here during the month of March, 1970?
A. Yes, she did.
Q. And did she visit with you?
A. Yes.
Q. And she only saw you once during the month of March, isn’t that right?
A. No, twice.
Q. And on the second occasion she actually took your child, Angel, back East, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you had no conversation with any police officers about any legalities concerning your daughter’s custody or anything like that?
MR. STOVITZ: Son’s custody.
MR. FITZGERALD: Son’s custody, excuse me.
THE WITNESS: No.
Q. BY MR. FITZGERALD: Did you sign any documents in connection with your child?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know what documents you signed?
A. I signed a birth certificate, and the temporary, I think it was guidance—not guidance, I forget what you call it, but it was a temporary thing that my mother would have custody of Angel.
THE COURT: It is 12:00 o’clock, Mr. Fitzgerald, do you have something further?
Are you about to complete your examination?
MR. FITZGERALD: May I go to 2:00? It will be very brief at that time.
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, do not converse with anyone, nor form or express any opinion regarding the case until it is finally submitted to you.
The Court will recess until 2:00 p.m.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, we have a problem.
MR. STOVITZ: May we have a 30-second conference at the bench?
THE COURT: All right.
MR. KANAREK: It does not have to be at the bench, it could be outside the presence of the jury.
THE COURT: Let’s have it now at the bench.
MR. STOVITZ: I have just consulted with counsel and they represented to us that we do not have to have any additional witnesses here after noon.
Is that right, Mr. Kanarek?
MR. KANAREK: That is correct. That Marine is here, your Honor, Mr. Marsh, and I would ask that either he be allowed to testify out of order, or else that we take his deposition.
It will be very short. He is going to Okinawa.
MR. STOVITZ: If you can represent the materiality I will be glad to enter a stipulation without any written document.
MR. KANAREK: The materiality is he is going to testify that he saw Linda Kasabian taking hallucinogenic material in the presence of Sadie, Susan Atkins, during this month.
MR. STOVITZ: We will stipulate that can be done outside the presence of the jury to preserve this witness’ testimony, your Honor.
MR. KANAREK: At 2:00 o’clock. He is very brief. I have just a few questions to ask of him.
THE COURT: All right. Why don’t you discuss it between counsel during the noon hour.
MR. KANAREK: Thank you.
THE COURT: Perhaps you can arrive at some stipulation and we can take it up at 2:00 o’clock.
MR. KANAREK: Thank you, your Honor.
(Whereupon, a recess was taken at 12:00 noon to reconvene at 2:00 p.m., same day.)
[Another witness is interviewed out of order for part of the afternoon.]
2:16 P.M.
LINDA KASABIAN,
called as a witness by and on behalf of the People, having previously been duly sworn, resumed the stand and testified further as follows:
CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. FITZGERALD:
Q. Directing your attention to a photograph that has been marked Defendants’ I for identification.
Do you recognize who or what is depicted in that photograph?
A. Yes. That is myself.
Q. The person depicted in that photograph appears to have long blonde hair, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that photograph a reasonable facsimile of your appearance during the months of July and August of 1969?
A. No, my hair was short, around the middle end of July, and end of July.
Q. During sometime during 1969 was your hair long?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you cut it sometime?
A. Yes.
Q. When did you cut it?
A. I believe it was the second or third week in July.
Q. Sometime during the month of July, 1969, approximately the middle of the month were you in the vicinity of the west Topanga beach with the Defendant Susan Atkins also known as Sadie?
A. Yes.
MR. FITZGERALD: Nothing further.
THE COURT: Mr. Shinn.
MR. SHINN: Yes, your Honor. Thank you.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. SHINN:
Q. Mrs. Kasabian, you testified that this automobile that was used the first night was a ’59 Ford. You keep mentioning it as a ’59 Ford, is that correct?
A. No, I never mentioned it as a ’59 Ford.
Q. How did you describe this automobile?
A. Just by the color, and it didn’t have a back seat.
Q. Did you at any time mention that it was a ’59 Ford in your testimony?
A. Not that I recall.
Q. Do you know what year it is?
A. No, I don’t.
Q. And I believe when Mr. Stovitz asked you about getting high without drugs—
A. Yes.
Q. —do you recall that question?
MR. STOVITZ: A definition of it. I asked her what her definition of it was.
MR. SHINN: I believe she also stated that she did get high without drugs.
MR. STOVITZ: That was on Mr. Hughes’ questions.
BY MR. SHINN:
Q. I believe you then testified that getting high without the use of drugs, you said, was a form of yoga, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you explain to us what your explanation of yoga is.
A. Well, I am not an expert on the subject, I don’t really know that much about it.
I know that there are certain exercises that you can do, physical exercises with the body in preparation for the mental exercises of the mind.
Q. Did you ever practice yoga as you know yoga?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. And how did you do that?
A. Well, I have done physical exercises, different positions, and I have also sat in a lotus position and meditated.
Q. And during these sessions of yoga did you take any form of drugs?
A. No.
Q. Just without drugs?
A. Yes.
Q. And were these yoga exercises performed after you took the drugs or just before you took the drugs, if you took drugs?
A. I just told you I did not take drugs.
Q. This exercise was between drugs?
A. This exercise took place while I was in jail.
Q. That is the only time you practiced it?
A. Yes, the physical part of it.
Q. And you also stated that it was a form of meditation, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And then you also stated that a midline, the eye that is not shown?
A. The what?
Q. You call it a midline?
A. Middle eye.
Q. Middle eye?
A. Yes.
Q. And you say that it takes you into an unseen world?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you ever experienced that?
A. No. I haven’t reached that stage, no.
Q. What stage did you reach?
A. I really cannot relate it into words. I am not really sure what stage I reached. I would have to talk to an expert about it.
Q. Well, tell us in your own words the way you felt you reached a certain stage as far as you went.
A. I just told you I don’t have words for it.
Q. What do you mean which takes you into an unseen world?
A. A spiritual world, a world of intangible things.
Q. Have you ever experienced going into an unseen world?
A. I don’t quite understand your question.
Q. Well, you stated in your answer that the eye that is not known which takes you into the unseen world.
A. Yes, leads you on a journey.
Q. What kind of a journey is this?
A. Into the mind, into the spiritual realm.
Q. Give us a little more details into the journey.
A. Do you want my own experience?
Q. Yes, yes.
A. I just told you I don’t have words for it.
Q. Well, what is it, an optical illusion or a hallucination?
A. No.
Q. Well, what is it?
A. Haven’t you ever sat down and closed your eyes and meditated?
That’s what it is. I don’t have any other words than that.
Q. Well, when you meditate—
In other words, you were meditating then, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And what are you meditating about?
A. I tried to clear my mind of all thoughts and concentrate on the third eye.
Q. And do you sometimes see this third eye in your mind, visualize it?
A. No, it is not an eye like the physical eye, it is just a center behind the eyes. I cannot explain it.
Q. Are you trying to talk about the subconscious mind?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you ever get high on alcohol?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, is that the same high you get when you smoke, say, marijuana cigarettes?
A. Yes, yeah, maybe.
Q. What is the difference between getting high on marijuana cigarettes and getting high on alcohol?
A. Alcohol makes me sick to my stomach.
Q. Do you get hallucinations when you drink alcohol?
A. Do I get what?
Q. Do you get any hallucinations when you drink alcohol?
A. Oh, things are blurry.
Q. You say things are blurry, what do you mean things are blurry?
A. Sort of like a haze over things.
Q. And does it affect your memory?
A. I don’t know, it has been so long since I took alcohol, I could not really say.
Q. Well, marijuana now, you get high on marijuana, you stated.
A. Yes.
Q. Now, what kind of feelings do you have getting high on marijuana?
A. What kind of feelings?
Q. Yes.
A. Well, it’s a relaxer. It relaxes me. It makes me hungry; it makes me laugh.
MR. SHINN: Your Honor, Mr. Kanarek wants to ask some questions, so could I defer my cross-examination until Mr. Kanarek examines, because he informs me he wants to ask her questions regarding the other witness who was here this afternoon?
THE COURT: Very well.
MR. SHINN: Thank you.
MR. KANAREK: Thank you, your Honor.
May I bring Mr. Marsh forward?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Mr. Marsh, will you come forward.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Mrs. Kasabian, may I ask you, do you recognize this gentleman that is standing here?
A. No, I don’t.
Q. Have you ever seen him before?
A. Not that I recall.
Q. Now, directing your attention to the middle of July, 1969, were you at West Topanga Beach?
A. West Topanga Beach?
Q. Were you at Topanga Beach where Topanga Canyon hits the pacific Coast Highway?
A. Yes, I was in that area.
Q. Were you is the area—do you know a person named Piccolo?
A. Me?
Q. A person named Piccolo.
A. No.
Q. Did you, while—were you at the beach with Sadie?
A. I wasn’t on the beach itself, no.
Q. Well, were you near the beach?
A. Yes.
A. With Sadie?
A. Yes.
Q. With some dogs?
A. No.
Q. Did you have any dogs near you and Sadie?
A. No.
Q. Directing your attention to that time did you, while you were at the beach with Sadie, get some psilocybin from a person at the beach that—
MR. STOVITZ: Your Honor, I object to the question, assumes facts not in evidence, number one, she was at the beach; number two, she was at the beach with Sadie.
She said she was near the beach.
MR. BUGLIOSI: It is beyond the scope of the redirect examination, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, on redirect examination Mr. Stovitz went into her activities in the month or so that she was at the Spahn Ranch.
Clearly he went into those activities. He asked her about what drugs she had taken.
THE COURT: Ask your next question, Mr. Kanarek.
MR. KANAREK: Yes.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Mrs. Kasabian, did you in the middle of July get some psilocybin from somebody?
A. No.
Q. You never—
In the middle of July did you use any psilocybin?
A. Just that one trip. I don’t know if it was psilocybin or mescaline or acid or whatever it was.
Q. Where were you when you took that one trip?
A. At the ranch.
Q. And when you were in the beach area with Sadie—
A. Uh-huh.
Q. —did you get any psilocybin from anyone?
A. No, it was the same day that I took the psilocybin or whatever it was that we went down to the beach area at night.
Q. The same day that you took the psilocybin, or whatever it was, you mean you may have taken psilocybin on this day, this one time you say you took it?
A. Whatever it was, it was some sort of a trip.
Q. Well, was it psilocybin?
A. I don’t know what it was, Mr. Kanarek, it was something weak.
Q. Well, comparing the effect that it gave to you—
A. Uh-huh.
Q. —with other trips that you had taken, would you describe that trip?
MR. STOVITZ: This has been asked and answered, your Honor, on cross-examination, and it was not gone into on redirect examination.
THE COURT: Overruled, you may answer.
THE WITNESS: Well, there were no hallucinations. There wasn’t really that much of a trip. There is nothing outstanding about it. I cannot tell you.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: I see, but that day you went to the beach area with Sadie.
A. That night, yes.
Q. That night you went to the beach area with Sadie?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, directing your attention over to the middle or sometime in July, did you go to Topanga Center with Sadie?
A. Topanga Shopping Plaza?
Q. Yes.
A. No.
Q. During the time you were at the Spahn Ranch did you go to the Topanga Shopping center?
A. No.
Q. Now, Mrs. Kasabian, on how many occasions have you taken psilocybin?
A. At the ranch?
Q. Anywhere?
A. Oh, anywhere? I believe two times that I definitely knew it was psilocybin.
Q. And what made you know for sure it was psilocybin?
A. The person that gave it to me told me it was.
Q. Comparing the effects of that material with material that you took that you thought to be LSD, did you compare those—would you compare those two effects for us?
A. Say that again, I wasn’t listening to your question.
Q. Comparing the effects on the two occasions that you say you took something that someone told you was psilocybin—
A. Uh-huh.
Q. —with LSD when you thought you were taking LSD, would you compare those effects for us?
MR. STOVITZ: That is not covered in the redirect examination, your Honor. I object to the question as improper recross-examination.
THE COURT: Overruled, you may answer.
THE WITNESS: They are similar in a lot of ways, yet acid is more intense, more vivid.
That is all I can say.
Q. Well, now, Mrs. Kasabian, you say that you get high, you can get high without taking anything, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And on these occasions when you get high without taking anything do you get high on purpose?
A. On purpose?
Q. Yes.
A. I guess you could call it that, yes.
Q. I mean you sit down and you determine that right now you are going to be high, is that the way you do it?
A. Yes, I sit down and meditate, yes.
Q. And do you ever get high when you are not taking any kind of hallucinogenic material or any kind of a drug?
Do you ever get high without taking those materials at a time when you don’t get high on purpose?
A. No.
Q. And, so, are you telling us that you can sit down and at will decide you are going to be high, and then you will have an exhilirated feeling in your mind, and you will have these visions, and these—these things that you have spoken of go through your mind.
MR. STOVITZ: Your Honor, that is not her testimony that she had visions when she got high without drugs at all.
She said it made her feel good.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Directing your attention, Mrs. Kasabian, when you get high all by yourself, would you describe that sensation.
A. I thought I described it to the best of my ability to Mr. Shinn.
I will try again.
I sit down, I close my eyes, and I sit in the full lotus position and I concentrate, I put all of my energies to a center behind my eyes which is called the third eye.
And I concentrate on just this one area and try to eliminate all thoughts, and then I don’t know what goes on from there. I don’t have words for it.
Q. You have no words for it?
A. No, I don’t.
Q. But is it a feeling of exhiliration?
A. I don’t understand what you mean.
Q. You do not know what I mean by exhiliration?
A. No, not really.
Q. Did it make you feel good?
A. Yes.
Q. In your mind what do you see while you are feeling good?
A. I haven’t seen anything really.
Q. Well, do you see cubes and patterns and colors?
A. Oh, no, I am still at a stage where it is still darkness.
Q. What do you mean by darkness?
A. It’s just dark. I mean, it’s darkness when you close your eyes, it’s just darkness.
Q. Now, Mrs. Kasabian, you told us this morning that in connection with the matter that Mr. Stovitz spoke to you about in the court in Boston—
A. Uh-huh.
Q. That you pled guilty, is it true, to the unlawful possession of drugs, dangerous drugs, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, is it true that you were put on two years probation?
A. No.
Q. It is not true?
A. No.
Q. You are telling us you were put on one year probation?
A. Yes.
Q. And was that case No. 1962?
A. I have no idea.
Q. You have no idea?
A. I don’t know what the case number was.
Q. Did you ever report back to your probation officer?
MR. STOVITZ: Objected to as immaterial, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: He brought up the subject, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Now, Mrs. Kasabian, is it a fair statement that every time that you have gotten involved with the law you have managed to sweet talk your way out of it?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Argumentative. It is also ridiculous.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Now, Mrs. Kasabian, when you were in the court in Boston, as far as doing any time is concerned, you did no time, right?
A. No, I did not.
Q. You just walked out of the courtroom on probation, right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you got what you wanted which was to walk out of the courtroom, is that correct?
MR. STOVITZ: Objected to, your Honor.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Argumentative.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: When you came to California, Mrs. Kasabian, to get your baby, Mr. Stovitz spoke, to you on redirect concerning, you know, the hearing before the Superior Court here in Los Angeles in connection with your baby.
A. Yes.
Q. Now, would you tell us, Mrs. Kasabian, what did you tell the judge at the hearing when you got your baby?
MR. STOVITZ: That is objected to, your Honor, it was not gone into on redirect examination. It was covered thoroughly on cross-examination. He established she spoke to a referee on cross-examination.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Mrs. Kasabian, is it a fair statement you got what you wanted from the court, as far as your state of mind is concerned, you got the baby and you left?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Argumentative, compound, beyond the scope of the redirect examination.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. KANAREK: Now, Mrs. Kasabian, in connection with this case, this very case, you have seven counts of murder, one count of conspiracy, and it is a fair statement, Mrs. Kasabian, that you—your state of mind is such that you are now at the stage or near the stage of the proceedings where you are going to leave us; you are going to leave us behind and you are going to Milford, New Hampshire.
MR. STOVITZ: I object to the question, your Honor. The form is ambiguous and compound.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. But your state of mind is such that you recognize that now you are a free woman; is that correct?
A. I don’t feel like a free woman; but technically I am, yes.
Q. Practically you are?
A. Practically, whatever the word is; but I don’t feel like a free woman.
Q. You don’t feel free?
A. No.
Q. But as a matter of fact, you can come and go as you please? When this court is over today, you can leave and you can go out and you can get yourself a chocolate malt or whatever you wish, when you leave this court; is that correct?
MR. STOVITZ: Are you not considering the subpoena that you have on her, Counsel? Aside from the subpoena?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor—
MR. STOVITZ: I object to the question, your Honor.
It is not a fair question of the witness when counsel knows that she is under subpoena.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, either we make legal objections, we have due process, or we don’t.
This kind of colloquy, your Honor—
MR. STOVITZ: I object to the question as an improper question.
THE COURT: All right, gentlemen.
Overruled.
You may answer.
THE WITNESS: What was your question?
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. The question, Mrs. Kasabian, is this: Your state of mind is such that as far as this court, as far as Judge Older’s court is concerned, you are now free, except when you are coming to court, you are now free to go and come as you please, as you, Linda Kasabian, dictate; right?
A. I am under protective custody. So I am still not free to do as I please.
Q. But this protective custody that you are under, Mrs. Kasabian, is at your whim and caprice; if you decide that you no longer want “protective custody,” there is no force that can force that protective custody upon you; is that your state of mind?
A. I guess so.
Q. Correct? Right?
A. Yes.
Q. And so you are free to come and go as you please?
A. I guess so. I don’t know. I haven’t tried.
Q. You guess so? You mean you know so?
A. Yes, but I haven’t done it, so—
Q. Without telling us where you are staying, last night you didn’t stay at Sybil Brand, did you?
A. Right.
Q. You stayed somewhere else?
A. Yes.
Q. Correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So, then, there is no restraint upon you except that which you dictate?
MR. STOVITZ: Asked and answered.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Now, Mrs. Kasabian, in connection with your getting high by yourself, have you been able to get high by yourself since you have been in custody?
A. I don’t understand your question.
Q. Well, since December 1 of last year, or thereabouts, since last December, you have been in custody; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Since that time until, let us say, yesterday have you been able to get high by yourself?
A. Yes.
Q. And you have been able to get high at will; that is, you can make yourself exhilarated?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, directing your attention to times before you came to this courtroom, Mrs. Kasabian, and testified. While you were in Sybil Brand, did you get high?
A. Sometimes I would sit and meditate and try to still my mind.
Q. You tried to stone your mind?
A. Still my mind.
Q. Still your mind?
A. Yes.
Q. What is the reason for that?
A. So that I’d be together, I wouldn’t be nervous.
Q. Was there some reason that you were nervous?
A. Yes. Because I had never sat up on a witness stand and voiced myself to lots of people.
Q. I see.
So, you were trying to steel yourself for that?
A. I don’t understand.
Q. You were trying to prepares yourself for coming to court here?
A. Yes.
Q. Then, on how many occasions before you came to court—or is it a fair statement that each night before you came to court here that you would make yourself high? Is that a fair statement? To get ready for court for the next day?
A. No, not every night.
Q. But about every night?
A. No. Mostly in the beginning. The beginning of my testimony.
Q. You mean, after you got used to it, you didn’t—
A. Yes, I was able to be calm.
Q. Without going through this process of getting high?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, is there some reason, Mrs. Kasabian—
Mrs. Kasabian, have you ever taken a powder from a cellophane wrapper?
MR. STOVITZ: I object to the question, your Honor, as outside the scope of redirect.
THE COURT: Overruled.
You may answer.
THE WITNESS: Would you repeat that again?
MR. KANAREK: Q. Have you ever taken a powder from a cellophane wrapper?
A. Powder front a cellophane wrapper?
Q. Yes.
A. Is that plastic? Yes.
Q. Have you taken a powder from a cellophane wrapper on more than one occasion?
A. Yes.
Q. And have you taken psilocybin from a cellophane wrapper?
A. No. It was Owsley Acid that I took.
Q. It was what?
A. Owsley Acid.
THE COURT: Keep your voice up, please.
THE WITNESS: Owsley Acid. Pure pharmaceutical acid.
MR. KANAREK: That you took from a cellophane bag?
A. A bag, a baggie. You know, a sandwich baggie.
Q. Did you ever open up a capsule and open up the capsule and put the contents of the capsule on your tongue?
A. Not that I recall.
Q. While you were in the Topanga Canyon area, Mrs. Kasabian, did you, on occasion, get drugs from someone? You know, someone that either sold drugs or gave drugs to you?
MR. STOVITZ: I object to the question as outside of the scope of redirect examination.
MR. HUGHES: May I inquire?
Does counsel mean the Topanga Beach area?
MR. KANAREK: The general Topanga, area.
THE COURT: Read the question.
(The question was read by the reporter.)
THE WITNESS: Are you talking about before or after I came to the ranch?
MR. KANAREK: I will ask it completely. Both before and after.
THE WITNESS: Before, yes. After, no.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Now, then, are you telling us, Mrs. Kasabian, that in the whole month that you thought that Mr. Manson was Jesus Christ, you actually thought he was Jesus Christ in that whole period of time; right?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And you thought he was Jesus Christ without the benefit of anything except weak something or other once?
MR. BUGLIOSI: That assumes a fact not in evidence, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. Mrs. Kasabian, in this whole period of time that you were staying at the Spahn Ranch, in that whole period of time, you are telling us you only took something that put you on a trip—and that was a weak trip—once?
A. That’s right.
Q. And in that whole period of time, you thought that Mr. Manson was Jesus Christ?
A. That’s right.
Q. Did you worship him?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. I see.
Did you carry the New Testament with you?
A. No. It had nothing to do with the Bible.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Argumentative.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Excuse me.
It had nothing to do with the Bible. There were no Bibles around.
BY MR. KANAREK:
Q. There were no Bibles around?
A. That I saw, no.
Q. Did you seek out a Bible?
A. No.
Q. I see.
Then you, for this whole month, had the delusion that Mr. Manson—or whatever time it was—until you left and started going to New Mexico with Mr. Hannon’s car—in that whole month you thought that Mr. Manson was Jesus Christ?
A. Yes.
Q. Pardon?
A. Yes.
Q. Well, how was it that you told us this morning that when you saw Mr. Frykowski, when you saw the man at the pole, I thought that was when the transition occurred, Mrs. Kasabian?
A. It was.
Q. At that point you found out that Mr. Manson wasn’t Jesus Christ, at the time when you saw this person come to the pole with all of the blood.
Now, which is it?
A. That’s right. That is when I realized who he was.
Q. Well, a minute ago, Mrs. Kasabian, just a few seconds ago, you told me it was when you took Mr. Hannon’s car and went to New Mexico.
A. That is what you said. I didn’t understand your question. I am sorry.
Q. You didn’t understand that question?
A. That’s right.
Q. Or are you not telling us the truth?
A. I am telling you the truth.
Q. Which way is it, Mrs. Kasabian?
A. I realized who he was the moment I saw Mr. Frykowski.
Q. That moment you realized that Mr. Manson was not Jesus Christ?
A. That’s right.
Q. That went through your mind?
A. Yes.
Q. Then will you tell me, Mrs. Kasabian, what did you mean just a few minutes ago when you said that it was when you were in the car going to New Mexico in Mr. Hannon’s automobile?
MR. BUGLIOSI: That is a misstatement of her testimony. He was the one that said it.
MR. KANAREK: She answered yes to the question.
MR. STOVITZ: The witness said yes to the whole month of July.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Mrs. Kasabian, when was it, Mrs. Kasabian, that you no longer thought Mr. Manson was Jesus Christ?
A. I just told you. That night.
Q. That night?
A. Yes.
Q. I see.
Then, directing your attention, Mrs. Kasabian, to the questions that Mr. Stovitz addressed to you.
Do you remember the questions that he addressed to you while he was examining you this morning?
A. No, I don’t recall at the moment what he was asking me about.
Q. You don’t?
A. At the moment, no.
Q. Well, directing your attention to this morning.
Do you remember that Mr. Stovitz showed you two thongs; right?
A. This morning?
Q. Did he show you two thongs this morning?
A. Not that I recall, no.
MR. STOVITZ: Yesterday afternoon, counsel.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, this is cross-examination.
May Mr. Stovitz’s comment—
MR. STOVITZ: I don’t think counsel has a right to mislead the witness.
THE COURT: That is enough.
MR. STOVITZ: It was yesterday afternoon that I referred to them. They were shown yesterday afternoon.
THE COURT: Mr. Stovitz, I admonish you, sir.
MR. STOVITZ: All right.
THE COURT: Let Mr. Kanarek conduct his examination.
MR. KANAREK: Q. Mrs. Kasabian, is it your statement that when you looked into Mr.—into that man’s eyes at the pole, at that instant in time, at that precise instance, you realized that Mr. Manson was not Jesus Christ?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Repetitious, your Honor. Asked and answered.
THE COURT: Sustained.
It is after 4:15, Mr. Kanarek. We will adjourn now.
Ladies and gentlemen, do not converse with anyone nor form or express any opinion regarding the case until it is finally submitted to you.
The Court will adjourn until 9:45 on Monday morning.
(Whereupon, at 4:17 p.m. the Court was in recess.)