Historic Trial Transcripts
Linda Kasabian: Day fourteen Testimony, August 13, 1970
LINDA KASABIAN,
called as a witness by and on behalf of the People, having been previously duly sworn, resumed the stand, was examined and testified further as follows:
CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. Good morning, Linda.
A. Good morning.
Q. You had a pouch full of acid when you were in Topanga Canyon?
A. Right.
Q. Was that in Topanga Lane?
A. Yes, Topanga Lane.
Q. What did that pouch look like?
A. I believe it was a Bull Durham cloth pouch.
Q. About how big was it?
A. It was small, I don’t know—you know Bull Durham’s tobacco pouch, you know what it looks like.
Q. Yes.
A. That is what it was.
Q. And about how much acid was there in there?
A. 30 tabs.
Q. 30 tablets?
A. Yes.
Q. About how large were the tablets, the size of aspirins?
A. No, they were small.
Q. The size of a saccharine tablet?
A. A little bit larger.
Q. What color were they?
A. Pink.
Q. Were they all the same color?
A. Yes.
Q. Was it your intention to use all of these 30 tablets yourself eventually?
A. No.
Q. What was your intention in regards to those 30 tabs of acid?
A. To give them to whoever wanted them.
Q. And you had bought these in Boston?
A. No, I did not buy them.
Q. You had somehow come across these tablets, somehow?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you tell us how you got them?
A. They were given to me.
Q. And where were they given to you?
A. In Boston.
Q. And by whom?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Immaterial, your Honor, irrelevant.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. Now, at one time you said that peyote was your favorite drug, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. But you have only had peyote—how many times did you say?
A. Well, I have eaten a button twice, and I had peyote the once, just a few sips.
Q. And what was your favorite drug then after peyote?
A. After?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Irrelevant, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: After peyote—
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. Yes.
A. Peyote.
Q. Did you understand the question?
A. I thought I answered it.
MR. STOVITZ: Second in command. In other words, if peyote was first, what was second best.
MR. HUGHES: Yes, thank you, Mr. Stovitz.
THE WITNESS: Acid.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. Acid?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, why did you bury this bag of acid in Topanga Canyon?
A. Well, I didn’t want to keep it in the truck, so I put it in the sand pile.
Q. Why did you not want to keep it in the truck?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Irrelevant.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: In case we got busted.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. Was it your feeling that acid was illegal?
A. Yes.
Q. Was it your feeling that you might be arrested as a dealer if you were arrested with that many tablets of acid?
A. As a dealer?
Q. As a dealer.
A. No, I was not dealing it.
Q. You were giving it away to people?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Had you done this previously? Had you given away large amounts of acid?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Irrelevant. We are going into a remote, immaterial area.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. HUGHES: When did you first start smoking grass?
A. I believe the end of the year in ’65.
Q. How old were you then?
A. 16.
Q. Had you just turned 16 then?
A. I turned 16 in the middle of the year.
Q. Did you get high the first time you smoked it?
A. Yes.
Q. How did you come to first smoke grass?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Irrelevant.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. HUGHES: Would you tell us what your first grass reaction was like?
A. Well, I did not know I was smoking grass for a long time, and my reaction? I was tired and I just sort of laid down and closed my eyes and slept a couple of days.
Q. For a couple of days?
A. Yeah.
Q. In other words, it sort of knocked you out for a couple of days?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you found this to happen other times when you smoked grass?
A. No.
Q. This was characteristic then only of the first time?
A. Yes.
Q. Other times when you have smoked grass have you walked?
A. Sure.
Q. Have you felt you were walking strange?
A. Yes.
Have you heard sounds that were not there when you were on grass?
A. Not that I can recall.
Q. Has music sounded different to you on grass?
A. Yeah.
Q. You have heard some recordings on grass and later you heard them when you were not stoned, is that correct?
A. Yeah.
Q. And you have been able to hear different things in the music when you were stoned?
A. Hear different things?
Q. Yes.
A. I don’t quite understand.
Q. Well, the music would have different meaning to you when you were stoned, is that correct?
A. The words or the music itself?
Q. Well, have you heard just instrumental things ever?
A. Yeah.
Q. Would the instrumental things, when you were stoned, have a different emotional impact on you than when you were not?
A. Yeah.
Q. Did the music sometimes sound louder than when you were not stoned?
A. Yeah.
Q. Were there patterns discernible in the music which you were not able to see when you were down?
A. See patterns? No.
Q. What do you mean by patterns in music—are you ever able to see patterns in music?
A. No, I never have.
Q. Are you able to hear patterns in music?
A. No.
Q. Or designs?
A. No.
Q. Or sequences of notes which belong to one another?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever have reason to believe that any of the drugs you were taking might have strychnine in them?
A. Yeah.
Q. Which drugs were those?
A. The acid, sometimes the acid was not good.
Q. Strychnine is actually a rat poison, is it not?
A. I’m not sure.
Q. Is strychnine a poison?
A. Yeah.
Q. Is strychnine a very powerful poison?
A. I imagine if you took a lot of it, yeah.
Q. And you have reason to believe that some of the acid had strychnine in it.
A. I never usually knew until after I took it.
Q. What told you when you took the acid that it had strychnine in it?
A. I would have an upset stomach.
Q. Was that the extent of the reaction which told you that there was strychnine in the acid?
A. My whole physical body would sort of reject it. I cannot really describe it.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, I would move to exclude or to strike that portion of her testimony with respect to the strychnine as being a conclusion.
It would be a medical conclusion, based on her testimony.
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, to any kind of a striking. The witness is well versed in the field of activity, more so than any one of us in this room.
MR. STOVITZ: I submit a chemist could not even tell unless it was analyzed, your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, she was giving an opinion, overruled.
Q. BY MR. HUGHES: Was there some reason that you believe that certain acid did have strychnine in it?
MR. BUGLIOSI: That calls for a medical conclusion, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: I don’t understand your question.
Q. BY MR. HUGHES: Besides the physical reaction that you had—
You have never taken just plain strychnine, have you?
A. No.
Q. So when you received these reactions which were not normal to the other LSD trips you had taken, you had some reason to believe that those reactions were caused by strychnine, did you not?
A. I did not know until somebody told me that it was strychnine.
Q. Someone told you that the acid had strychnine in it?
A. Yes.
Q. What did those tablets look like, or were they tablets?
A. No, a couple of them were capsules, that I remember.
Q. And what did those capsules look like?
A. They were fairly large, blue capsules.
Q. And how many times did you take these large blue capsules?
A. I don’t know, once or twice, I am not sure.
Q. And were you told after the first time you took them that they contained strychnine?
A. Excuse me?
Q. Were you told after the first time that you took these capsules that they contained strychnine?
A. Yeah.
Q. And then you took this acid again at some later time, is that correct?
A. Yeah.
Q. So you disregarded this belief that the acid contains strychnine, is that right?
A. Well, this acid did not come from the same source, from the same person, and I did not know for sure it contained strychnine until I took it.
Q. But the capsules did look alike, did they not?
A. Yes.
Q. They were blue?
A. Right.
Q. Light blue?
A. Yeah.
Q. And they contained a powder inside, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And what was the color of that powder?
A. Light blue.
Q. The powder was also light blue?
A. Oh, I guess, yeah, it was.
Q. And for all intents and purposes, then, these two capsules looked identical to you?
A. I guess so.
Q. When you took the second capsule you remembered what the first one looked like, didn’t you?
A. I guess so.
Q. Did you wonder when you took it the second time whether you would get the same reaction which you had the first time?
MR. STOVITZ: Objected to as being immaterial, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. Did you wonder when you took it the second time if it had strychnine in it?
MR. STOVITZ: Objected to, your Honor, as immaterial.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. Were you so interested in taking acid that you would take it even if it had strychnine in it?
A. Well, there usually was not that much strychnine, and it did not hurt me, so I took it, yes.
Q. Now, have you heard of any other drugs having strychnine in them, other drugs which you have taken, other hallucinogens?
A. No.
Q. Have you heard of any natural substances which you have taken—have you heard that they have strychnine in them?
A. No.
Q. Have you heard, for instance, that peyote contains strychnine?
A. I don’t see how it could.
Q. Have you ever seen a peyote button?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. Have you seen large numbers of peyote buttons?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. Have you seen hundreds of peyote buttons?
A. A gunny-sack full, yes.
Q. Would it be fair to say that the gunny-sack contained possibly thousands of peyote buttons?
A. Maybe around a thousand, I don’t know about thousands.
Q. And you are very familiar with what peyote buttons look like?
A. Yes.
Q. A peyote button is a small, green cactus, is it not?
A. Right.
Q. Is it between an inch and two inches in diameter?
A. Well, they very in sizes.
Q. Would they generally be about that size?
MR. STOVITZ: What size, Counsel?
MR. HUGHES: Between an inch and two inches.
MR. STOVITZ: Oh.
THE WITNESS: That would be really a small one.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. Two to three inches in diameter, generally?
A. Usually about like that.
Q. And about how tall?
A. With or without the root?
Q. Would you eat the root?
A. No.
Q. Without the root.
A. About like that (indicating).
Q. So, in other words, about three inches in diameter and about an inch and a half tall, is that what you have indicated?
A. I guess so.
Q. And a peyote button has fine white hairs in the middle of it, does it not?
A. Yes.
Q. And a peyote button has a bark on it which is pulled off, is that correct?
A. A bark?
Q. A slight bark at the bottom of it?
A. Yeah, around the root, if you decide to eat the root you take that off
Q. And what do you do with these white hairs that are in the middle of the peyote button?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Irrelevant.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: You take them off.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. And why do you take them off?
A. I believe it’s poison.
Q. Do you believe that it is actually strychnine?
A. I don’t know.
Q. You know what a bummer is, don’t you?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you tell the Court what a bummer is?
A. In relation to drugs?
Q. Yes.
A. A bad trip.
Q. What is a bad trip?
A. Things just don’t seem to go right, that is all I can say.
Q. What happens in your head when you are having a bad trip?
A. I am trying to think if I ever had a bad trip. I cannot really recall a bad trip.
Q. Have you ever imagined that you were cutting your fingers on acid?
A. That I was what?
Q. Cutting your fingers?
A. Cutting my fingers? No.
Q. Have you ever felt while on acid that you had to remove sharp objects from the room, put them away in drawers?
A. No.
Q. Put away knives in drawers?
A. No.
Q. Have you ever had that feeling on other drugs?
A. About sharp objects?
Q. Yes. Knives.
A. I don’t know if I was on a drug at the time, but a friend of mine was sharpening a knife above my daughter, Tanya, and the knife fell between her legs and just missed her by a few inches, and I sort of freaked out over that and told him not to play with knives around my baby.
Q. That would freak anybody out, wouldn’t it?
A. Sure.
Q. What do you mean by freak out?
A. I can’t put it into words. I guess I got angry, or something like that.
Q. You really have a lot of trouble, don’t you, describing the emotional state that—I will rephrase the question because of the problem with the microphone.
You have a lot of trouble, don’t you, describing the emotional state that you reached when on drugs?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Argumentative.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes. I have trouble describing all emotions on drugs or not.
MR. HUGHES: Q. Why do you feel that is?
A. I don’t know. I just possibly haven’t developed something within myself to express myself completely.
Q. Do you feel that drugs interfered with your ability to communicate your emotions?
A. I can’t say. I don’t know.
Q. Do you feel that drugs have interfered with your ability to communicate what you felt on the drugs?
A. I don’t know.
Q. What does the word “stoned” mean?
A. To get high.
Q. Now, isn’t it true that when you smoke marijuana one day you have a very difficult time the next day remembering what took place the day before?
A. Sometimes.
Q. Wouldn’t that generally be the rule rather than the exception?
A. Possibly. I can’t think of an instance.
Q. Have you had occasions when you were stoned one day that the next day you tried to remember something that happened the day before when you were stoned and you were not able to?
MR. STOVITZ: I object to the question, your Honor, as ambiguous as to stoned on what.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. HUGHES: Q. Have you gotten stoned on marijuana—I wonder, your Honor, could we do something with the microphone? I am not sure if I am doing something wrong.
THE COURT: You might change direction.
Is that microphone on, Mr. Bugliosi?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Yes.
THE COURT: Turn it around.
Now, that might help.
MR. HUGHES: Q. Have there been occasions when you have gotten stoned on marijuana and then the next day not been able to remember some specific thing that you did the day before, but something that you wanted to remember?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you ever watched television while smoking marijuana?
A. Yes.
Q. Has anybody ever asked you the next day or the day after what you saw on television the night before?
A. I don’t know. Possibly.
Q. Have there been times, though, like that when you were not able to remember things which would normally have been very vivid?
A. I don’t quite understand.
Q. Have there been times when people have asked you what did you eat last night and you weren’t able to tell them because you were stoned the night before?
MR. STOVITZ: Stoned on marijuana, right?
MR. HUGHES: On marijuana.
THE WITNESS: Yes, maybe at that moment I couldn’t remember, or maybe I couldn’t remember at all.
MR. HUGHES: Q. Sometimes on grass or on hashish, don’t you see things in a totally new light?
A. Yes, sort of.
Q. And as you get stoned on marijuana or hashish, isn’t it increasingly difficult to carry on conversations?
A. You don’t feel like talking. I don’t.
Q. You have had occasions, though, when you have talked with people while you were stoned?
A. Sure.
Q. And has it been your experience that it is very difficult to remember from one minute to the next what you have said before and what your thinking is?
MR. STOVITZ: Your Honor, that, of course, is ambiguous because if she can’t remember, how can she answer the question whether she remembers?
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Would you repeat that?
MR. HUGHES: Could it be read back?
THE COURT: Read the question.
(The question was read by the reporter.)
THE WITNESS: I don’t know.
MR. HUGHES: Q. Haven’t you had conversations where suddenly you will say, in the middle of the conversation, “What are we talking about?”
A. Possibly, yes.
Q. And this usually happens when you are stoned rather than when you are down?
A. It sometimes happens when I am down.
Q. But it usually happens, you will lose your train of thought when you are stoned?
A. Yes.
Q. And that is a very common experience, to lose your train of thought while you are stoned, is it not?
A. Sometimes.
Q. So, as a matter of fact, that is one of the joyous qualities of marijuana, is it not, that you are able to lose your train of thought?
MR. STOVITZ: Objection. That assumes a fact not in evidence.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. HUGHES: Q. You stated yesterday that you dug smoking grass.
A. Yes.
Q. You dug it a lot?
A. Yes.
Q. It was a joyous experience, was it not?
A. Yes.
Q. Isn’t that one of the reasons that grass is so enjoyable or so joyous, that you do lose your train of thought when you are smoking it?
A. Yes. Sometimes it takes you to a state of just total nothingness, it is just bliss, whatever.
Q. It is a lot of fun to lose your thought, isn’t it?
A. Yes.
Q. And it happens quite often on marijuana, does it not?
A. I guess so, yes.
Q. Wouldn’t you say that it happens just about every time you have ever gotten stoned on marijuana, that you have had experiences like this?
A. Every time?
Q. Just about every time?
A. Possibly.
Q. And you don’t consider that a bad effect of marijuana?
A. No.
Q. And isn’t that the reason that you are unable to remember with any specificity what all those trips were about?
A. Say that again?
Q. You can’t remember all of your marijuana trips?
A. Oh, no.
Q. You couldn’t even begin to remember them, could you?
A. No.
Q. And it is because of this very quality that marijuana has of putting things out of your mind that you are not able to remember those trips; isn’t that so?
A. Yes.
Q. Who was it that used to use the hyp kit on you to give you injections of methydrine.
MR. STOVITZ: Objected to as immaterial. She said it was about two years ago, three years ago, that it happened.
THE COURT: I think the question is ambiguous in its present form.
Sustained.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. You used to have some injections of methydrine; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you stated, did you not, that you did not inject yourself?
A. Right.
Q. Someone else injected this methydrine into your body?
A. Right.
Q. That person wasn’t a doctor?
Was that a man?
A. Yes.
Q. And was he a doctor?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. Who was that person?
MR. STOVITZ: Objected to, your Honor, as immaterial and remote.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may we have the answer in camera, outside of the presence of the jury?
It may be most relevant and most material, your Honor, in connection with—may we approach the bench on that, your Honor?
THE COURT: No. I have ruled, Mr. Kanarek.
Let’s proceed.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. Now, one of the reasons that you took drugs was to search for the truth; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you felt that you had found the truth on acid; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you felt that you had found Jesus on acid; is that correct?
A. No. I really wasn’t too much into Christ at that time.
Q. But you were looking for God?
A. Yes.
Q. Or God awareness?
A. Yes.
Q. And this, you felt, was similar to the truth?
A. Yes.
Q. And you recall the oath that you took as a witness to tell the truth on the witness stand?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know what the truth is?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that the same truth that you were able to find on drugs?
MR. BUGLIOSI: That is an ambiguous question.
THE COURT: What is that?
MR. BUGLIOSI: An ambiguous question.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. Were you able to find the truth on drugs?
A. What I thought was the truth, yes.
Q. You don’t feel that is the truth any more?
A. Some of the things I do.
Q. Your definition of truth has changed since you stopped taking drugs; is that true?
A. Has changed?
Q. Yes.
A. I don’t quite understand.
Q. If you were searching for the truth, you didn’t know what it was, did you?
A. Say that again?
Q. If you were searching for the truth, you didn’t know what the truth was, did you?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Truth as to what, your Honor? Ambiguous.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. HUGHES: Q. Now, you thought that Mr. Manson was Jesus Christ.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Asked and answered.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. HUGHES: Q. Did you ever feel that anybody else was Jesus Christ?
A. The Biblical Jesus Christ.
Q. Have you ever met Jesus Christ before, besides meeting Mr. Manson?
A. No.
Q. Did you think it was sort of funny that Mr. Manson walked down the beach with you and that you were holding the hand of Jesus Christ?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Assumes a fact not in evidence.
She stated that the night before she realized that he was not Jesus Christ.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, Mr. Bugliosi’s paraphrasing of the evidence, your Honor, I don’t think is proper.
I would ask that the jury be admonished, your Honor, that Mr. Bugliosi’s recollection of the evidence is not what is pertinent, it is the individual juror’s recollection, your Honor.
THE COURT: The jury is admonished to disregard the comments of all counsel.
MR. BUGLIOSI: The objection is that it assumes a fact not in evidence, your Honor, that, number one, he is Jesus Christ; and number two, that she thought on the second night that he was Jesus Christ. There is no evidence to that effect.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
Let’s proceed.
MR. HUGHES: Q. When did you stop thinking that Mr. Manson was Jesus Christ?
A. The night at the Tate residence.
Q. And a day and a night later you were walking on the beach with Mr. Manson?
A. Right.
Q. And you were holding his hand?
A. Right.
Q. And you gave him some peanuts?
A. Yes, uh-huh.
Q. And you were in love with him?
A. I don’t know whether I was then.
Q. Did you think he was Jesus Christ then?
A. No.
Q. Did you think he was a murderer?
MR. KANAREK: I object to that, your Honor, as calling for a conclusion on the part of the witness. It is immaterial.
MR. BUGLIOSI: I think it is very relevant, your Honor.
MR. STOVITZ: It goes to her state of mind.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I could ask a myriad of questions on this subject, and I object on the ground that it is calling for a conclusion. It has nothing but prejudicial value, hearsay, and a legal conclusion, if I might paraphrase the prosecution.
I asked this witness certain questions, and there were objections, and I will object on the basis of equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, because when I asked this witness about legal responsibility, Mr. Bugliosi made certain objections, and certainly it has to work both ways.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Her state of mind is relevant, your Honor.
MR. KANAREK: Well, it is calling for a conclusion.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
MR. KANAREK: Thank you, your Honor.
MR. HUGHES: You were holding his hand, weren’t you?
A. Yes.
Q. And you walked along the beach with him?
A. Uh-huh, yes.
Q. And you had good feelings about him, didn’t you?
A. Yes, he made me feel good.
Q. Made you feel real good?
A. I guess so, yes.
Q. Did you think he was Jesus then?
A. I don’t remember thinking about it.
Q. Were you in love with him then?
A. Walking on the beach?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. Did you want to know him better?
A. I don’t know.
Q. Did you want to spend the night with him?
MR. BUGLIOSI: That is ambiguous.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: I don’t know.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. Did you want to make love to him?
A. I was just happy walking hand in hand.
Q. Did you want him as your man?
A. I don’t remember thinking that.
Q. Now, hallucinogens cause you to think a lot, don’t they?
A. Yes.
Q. By hallucinogens, I mean LSD—by hallucinogens, you mean LSD, you mean peyote, mescaline, psilocybin, magic mushrooms and morning glory seeds; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Are there some others that we have left out?
MR. STOVITZ: That she used?
THE WITNESS: That I have taken?
MR. HUGHES: Yes.
THE WITNESS: Not that I can recall.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. But there might be because we are doing this pretty fast; right?
A. I think you have named them all.
Q. And besides causing you to think a lot, hallucinogens make your mind go over the same subject matter over and over; isn’t that right?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Ambiguous. Going over them at what time? At the time that you are under the influence of the hallucinogen, or later on?
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. While you are stoned?
A. I don’t quite understand.
THE COURT: We will take the recess at this time, Mr. Hughes.
Ladies and gentlemen, do not converse with anyone nor form or express any opinion in regard to the case until it is finally submitted to you.
The court will recess for 15 minutes.
(Recess.)
THE COURT: All parties, counsel and jurors are present. You may continue, Mr. Hughes.
MR. HUGHES: Thank you, your Honor.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. Did you ever close your eyes when you were on acid?
A. Sure.
Q. Did you ever fall asleep when you were on acid?
A. Yes.
Q. Was it difficult to fall asleep?
A. Sometimes.
Q. Did it tend to keep you up?
A. Sometimes.
Q. Would you sometimes drop acid late at night and stay up all night?
A. Yes.
Q. Was that a common experience?
A. In the city, yes.
Q. You would stay in an apartment and drop acid?
A. Yeah.
Q. You would listen to music?
A. Yes.
Q. Make love?
A. Sometimes.
Q. What was it like, making love on acid?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Irrelevant, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. Was it different making love on acid than making love at other times when you were not on acid?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Irrelevant.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. HUGHES: May I have a moment?
(Off the record consultation between Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Hughes.)
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. When you made love with Mr.—
MR. HUGHES: Excuse me, am I interrupting, your Honor?
THE COURT: Go right ahead.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. When you had intercourse with Mr. Manson were you ever on acid?
A. No.
Q. How about with Mr. Watson?
A. No.
Q. Mr. Davis?
A. No.
Q. Clem Tufts?
A. No.
Q. Anyone at the ranch?
A. No.
Q. Was there some reason for that?
A. The day I took acid I did not make love.
Q. How long would your acid trip generally last?
MR. STOVITZ: Counsel, are you using acid as LSD?
MR. HUGHES: Acid is LSD.
MR. STOVITZ: Just LSD acid, thank you, counsel.
THE WITNESS: Well, it would depend on the quantity and the quality.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. I am sorry, I was not able to hear.
A. It would depend on the quantity and the quality of the acid.
THE COURT: Just a moment, keep your mouth just a little further away from the microphone, please.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. How long would it normally last?
A. A full day maybe.
Q. A full day?
A. Yes.
Q. 18 hours?
A. I mean—no, maybe 12 hours.
Q. And then would there be a residual period, a period after, when you were coming down?
A. Yes.
Q. And would that last another half a day, perhaps?
A. No, I included that in the 12 hours.
Q. Would there be a period after you would come down, after the 12 hours, when you would be out of sorts; when you would be distressed or depressed or tired?
A. Yeah.
Q. And would this depression, or this tiredness last for several days sometimes?
A. Well, depending if I got any sleep.
Q. In relation to acid, do you know the word peak?
A. Oh, yeah.
Q. What does it mean to peak on acid?
A. During the trip it’s like you’re climbing, and then you reach a certain plane which you call the peak, and then it starts to come down.
Q. And does acid distort your thoughts?
A. Distort? I don’t understand your question.
Q. Does it change your thoughts in some way?
MR. STOVITZ: Ambiguous as to whether it is while on acid or after the acid.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. While on acid do your thoughts change in some way?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Ambiguous, thoughts as to what?
THE COURT: In relation to what also. Ambiguous, sir. Sustained.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. Have you ever had thoughts while on acid that you never had before?
A. Yeah.
Q. Isn’t that actually a very common occurrence, to have new thoughts on acid?
A. Yeah.
Q. Did some of these thoughts stay with you after the acid trip?
A. Yeah.
Q. Have you had new thoughts on grass, when you got stoned on grass?
A. I don’t know, I can’t really say, I don’t know.
Q. Grass sometimes makes you see events in a new light, does it not?
A. I guess so, I am not quite sure.
Q. Some of the thoughts that you have on acid stay with you later, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. When you are on acid, acid results in a mental confusion, is that right?
A. What is that again?
Q. Acid causes a mental confusion.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Ambiguous, mental confusion while under the influence of the acid, or later on?
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. While under the influence?
A. Sometimes during questions that I cannot answer, and I keep, you know, searching, sometimes it ends in confusion, yes.
Q. Does acid expand your senses?
A. I don’t understand that.
Q. Well, does acid distort your sense of time?
A. Well, I don’t really care about, you know, the dividing of time on the clock, while I am on acid or even while I am not on acid sometimes.
Q. Have you had feelings while you were stoned on acid that hours and hours had passed, but you were to tell later that it had only been minutes?
A. Yes.
Q. And you had these feelings on marijuana also, haven’t you?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you call that a distortion of your sense of time?
A. I guess so, yes.
Q. And this acid, when you are on acid, is your sense of space distorted?
A. I don’t quite understand.
Q. Have rooms seemed to get larger?
A. No.
Q. Have they appeared to get smaller?
A. Sometimes, if there are a lot of people in the room, yes.
Q. Have people who were across the room seemed to get further away?
A. Not that I can recall.
Q. Have you felt alienated from people on acid?
A. Alienated? I don’t quite understand your question.
Q. Have you felt distant from people on acid?
A. Yeah.
Q. Have you had the feeling that they drew away from you?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Physically or emotionally? Ambiguous.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. Have you had the feeling that they physically drew away from you?
A. No.
Q. Have you had the feeling that they emotionally drew away from you?
A. I don’t quite understand what you mean, drew away from me.
Q. Have you heard the expression “blow your mind”?
A. Yes.
Q. What does “blow your mind” mean?
A. The same thing as a “freak out” or a “bummer.”
Q. Do you lose some of your senses when you blow your mind or freak out?
A. I don’t understand.
Q. Do you lose the ability to think rationally?
A. Yes.
Q. And have you freaked out?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you blown your mind?
A. Well, it is the same thing. Yes.
Q. And that is not an uncommon experience on drugs, is it?
A. It has happened less than it has happened with me.
Q. Less than fifty per cent of the time?
A. Yes.
Q. But blowing your mind and freaking out, you experience some sort of panic and fear?
A. Yes.
Q. You go into some sort of confused state?
A. Yes.
Q. And that confusion is of a major proportion, is it not?
A. I don’t understand.
Q. You have gross confusions, major confusions, large confusions?
A. I guess so. I still don’t really understand.
MR. STOVITZ: What is that?
THE WITNESS: I still don’t really understand what he is saying.
MR. HUGHES: Q. Well, when you freak out or blow your mind, do you become disoriented?
A. Sometimes.
Q. Lose track of time even more than you do already?
A. Sometimes.
Q. And do you become depressed?
A. At the time, or when it is over?
Q. Either way.
A. When it is over I have, yes.
Q. And how long might that depression last?
A. I don’t know.
Q. Have you ever been treated by a psychiatrist?
A. No.
Q. You stated you visited a Paul Rosenberg, I believe, in Topanga?
A. Right.
Q. And that was when you returned from New Mexico?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall on what day you saw him?
A. I didn’t see him that day.
Q. You did see him, though?
A. Not when I returned from New Mexico.
Q. You had seen him on previous occasions?
A. Previous, yes.
Q. And is he a doctor?
A. Yes.
Q. And is he a psychiatrist?
A. Now he is, yes.
Q. He was not then?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. And were you seeing him professionally?
A. No.
Q. You were seeing him as a friend?
A. Right.
Q. Did he give you medication?
A. No.
Q. He was a doctor at the time you saw him?
A. Right.
Q. And he was becoming a psychiatrist?
A. I guess so.
Q. You are not sure?
A. No. I don’t know.
Q. When was the first time you first saw Dr. Paul Rosenberg?
A. It was the one and only time, and it was, I believe, April or May—April—of ’68.
Q. And you tried to see him when you came back?
A. Yes.
Q. Why?
A. To get an attorney.
Q. To get what?
A. An attorney.
Q. Now, you described an orgy that took place at Spahn Ranch; is that correct?
A. Right.
Q. And was that the first time that you had ever made love with a group of individuals?
MR. STOVITZ: Objected to as immaterial, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. HUGHES: Q. Did you know what to do?
A. Yes.
Q. Did anybody hold a gun at your head?
A. No.
Q. Did you feel guilty or ashamed?
A. No.
Q. Actually, what took place at this orgy primarily was a lot of hugging and kissing; isn’t that true?
A. Right.
Q. And you didn’t feel guilty and ashamed about that, did you?
A. No.
Q. And you had hugged and kissed more than one person at a time before, hadn’t you?
A. At a time? The same time? I don’t quite understand.
Q. You had hugged and kissed with a number of people at one time before, had you not?
A. Yes.
Q. So, largely, this was nothing new for you at Spahn Ranch, was it?
A. Partly, no.
Q. When did you first find that you were pregnant with your son, Angel?
A. Well, I thought I was all along, but I found out for sure, for positive, in New Mexico.
Q. When in New Mexico?
A. When?
Q. The first time in New Mexico? The second time?
A. Oh, the first time.
Q. That would be sometime in early September?
A. Yes.
MR. HUGHES: May I have a moment, your Honor?
(Mr. Hughes and Mr. Fitzgerald confer.)
MR. HUGHES: Now, you said that you suspected that you were pregnant earlier.
Why did you suspect that?
A. Because I felt that I was aware of the moment I conceived.
Q. You were aware of the moment you conceived? Was that your answer?
A. Yes.
Q. How did you become aware of the moment you conceived?
A. Well, to me, when you conceive it is just like when you have a baby.
It is hard to explain. I wasn’t aware when I first had Tanya, when she first entered through, but with Angel, I don’t know, I just felt that I became pregnant through this act of lovemaking.
Q. By that reasoning, then, you could determine who the father of your child is?
A. Yes.
Q. But medically, you were not certain that you were pregnant until you had gone to New Mexico?
A. Right.
Q. You stated earlier, did you not, that one of the reasons you didn’t go to the police was that you wanted to give birth to your child first?
A. Right.
Q. Has the case against you been dismissed?
A. Yes.
Q. When?
A. This morning.
Q. In chambers?
A. Yes.
Q. And what does that mean to you?
A. Everybody says that I am a free woman, but I don’t feel any different.
Q. Will you be released from custody today?
A. I guess so.
Q. Who is this everyone who says you are a free woman?
A. Who? My attorneys and a few of the officers have said it. I guess that is all.
Q. Now, the fact that you were pregnant didn’t keep you from taking hallucinogens; is that right?
A. I didn’t take them as much.
Q. Have you ever smoked grass in the same room where your child was?
A. Yes.
Q. Was that a small room?
A. Yes.
Q. And were the windows closed?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Irrelevant, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. HUGHES: Q. Do you think your child got stoned?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Calls for a conclusion.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. HUGHES: Q. Was there a lot of smoke in the room?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Irrelevant.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. HUGHES: Q. Would you have cared if Tanya got stoned?
A. I believe that she was stoned naturally. I believe all children are.
Q. You breast-fed her for about a year; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. A little longer, actually?
A. Yes. A year and three months.
Q. Do you think that through your milk she received any of the drugs or stoney substances that you were ingesting?
A. I’m not sure. I don’t know.
Q. How did you care for Tanya when you were stoned on different drugs?
A. The same way I did when I wasn’t stoned.
Q. Was it more difficult?
A. No.
Q. Have you had feelings on acid or other hallucinogens about reincarnation?
A. With and without drugs, yes.
Q. Without drugs also?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you tell us what those feelings have been on drugs.
A. I don’t quite understand your question.
Are you asking me if I believed in reincarnation?
Q. I want you to tell me what your feelings on drugs about reincarnation were.
MR. STOVITZ: Are you confining this to acid or as to marijuana as well, Counsel?
MR. HUGHES: Any drug.
MR. STOVITZ: You are including within that marijuana then?
MR. HUGHES: Yes.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. You understand the question, don’t you?
A. Not really.
Q. What feelings about reincarnation have you had while under the influence of any drug?
A. Just that I believe in reincarnation.
Q. And what do you mean when you say you believe in reincarnation?
A. That when you die your soul enters into another body, you know, you keep going through the cycle until you have reached a plane of maybe purification, perfection, and then you go straight to God, you become one with God.
Q. Have you reached that plane?
A. No.
Q. Have you gone through many cycles?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Calls for a conclusion, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled, you may answer.
THE WITNESS: Have I gone through many cycles?
MR. BUGLIOSI: I object, then, on the grounds we are getting into remote areas that are totally irrelevant to the charges of this case.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: It goes to her state of mind.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. Have you felt when you were stoned on acid that you could communicate with animals?
A. Even when I was not on drugs.
Q. You feel you can communicate with animals?
A. Yes.
Q. How do you communicate with animals?
A. Not with words. It’s more or less vibrations.
Q. You can send out vibrations that the animals can sense, can’t you?
A. Yeah.
Q. And the animals send out vibrations that you can sense, isn’t that correct?
A. Right.
Q. This does not require that the animal be within your line of vision, does it?
A. I have never done it that way.
Q. Well, do you feel that wooden walls would stop the vibrations?
A. Well, I always put out vibrations to an animal who was right there, so I don’t know.
Q. Do you feel then you have not fully developed this sense of communication?
A. I don’t know.
Q. What do you mean by the term “send out vibrations”?
A. Well, it’s like when you’re riding a horse and you put out fear vibrations.
The horse picks up on it, and sometimes he will sort of like overpower you and he becomes your master and you do what he wants you to do, something like that.
Q. Do you feel that you were controlled by Mr. Manson primarily by vibrations?
A. Possibly.
Q. Did he put off a lot of vibes?
A. Sure, he’s doing it right now.
MR. HUGHES: May the record reflect, your Honor, that Mr. Manson is merely sitting here.
MR. KANAREK: He doesn’t seem to be vibrating.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. How many times did you give Tanya acid?
A. I never gave her acid.
Q. I am talking now about small quantities also.
A. I never put anything, no drug into her mouth.
Q. How about any other organic substance which would cause some drug induced state?
A. No, I never gave her any.
Q. Did you feel you became more aware on acid?
A. Yeah.
Q. And you are able to tell when you are stoned on acid when other people are stoned on acid?
A. Say that again.
Q. You are able to tell when you are stoned on acid when other people are stoned on acid, aren’t you?
A. Sometimes.
Q. And you have experienced extrasensory perception on acid, haven’t you?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Ambiguous as to what extrasensory perception is, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. HUGHES: Do you know what extrasensory perception is?
A. Yes.
Q. What is extrasensory perception?
A. Awareness of someone else’s thoughts directed towards you.
Q. And you have experienced extrasensory perception on acid, have you not?
A. On acid? Yes.
Q. And have you experienced it on other drugs?
A. I can just recall one instance on acid.
Q. Have you experienced it when you were not stoned?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you experience it a lot?
A. No.
Q. On how many occasions would you say you were able to experience extrasensory perceptions?
A. Two occasions that I recall.
Q. Extrasensory perceptions are like reading minds, aren’t they?
A. I guess so, I am not sure.
Q. Well, what do you feel extrasensory perceptions are, then?
A. Just awareness of somebody else’s thoughts, vibrations, directed towards you.
You are just aware at that moment when they are thinking about you, and the thought enters in.
Q. So you were able to tell then what other people were thinking at that moment?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Calls for a conclusion, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. HUGHES: You felt you were able to tell what other people were thinking, didn’t you?
A. No.
Q. How do you account for being able to tell when other people were stoned on acid?
A. Say that again.
Q. You said you were sometimes able to tell when other people were stoned on acid.
A. Yeah.
Q. You could not tell that by their body trembling, could you?
A. No.
Q. You could not tell it by the condition of their hair?
A. A lot of times it was the physical—a physical thing that made me realize they were on acid.
Q. What sort of physical thing?
A. The way they walked, the way they talked. Just the look in their eyes.
Q. Do you feel that people who are on acid give out certain vibes, vibrations?
A. Maybe, yeah.
Q. Have you felt that?
A. Not that I can recall.
Q. Have you ever been around people who you thought were stoned, and got contact-high?
A. Yes.
Q. What is a contact-high?
A. Where you will yourself into a state of being stoned.
Q. And has that happened quite frequently?
A. I have done it a couple of times.
Q. And do you think that this ability to get high in this manner is easier because you have used drugs?
A. Yeah.
Q. So really your life has changed a lot since you have used drugs, hasn’t it?
A. I can’t say.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Ambiguous, your Honor, in what way?
THE COURT: She answered the question.
MR. HUGHES: Q. You are able to get high now without drugs?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you feel that that is the result of using drugs?
A. I can’t say. I don’t know.
Q. You are able, on occasion, to experience extra sensory perceptions; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you feel that that is the result of having used drugs?
A. I don’t know.
Q. You feel you are sometimes able to sense what other people are doing even though you can’t see them, don’t you?
A. Say that again?
Q. You feel that you can sometimes tell what other people are doing even though you are not able to see them at that instant; isn’t that correct?
MR. BUGLIOSI: That is ambiguous, your Honor.
She may have been told by someone what someone else was doing at a particular time, if they were at a game. It is just ambiguous the way it is phrased.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. HUGHES: Q. Have you felt that you have been able to talk to spirits on acid?
A. No.
Q. In your mind, now, have you felt that?
A. No.
MR. BUGLIOSI: That is ambiguous. What is a spirit? That is the objection, your Honor.
THE COURT: Have you answered the question?
THE WITNESS: I said no.
THE COURT: She answered the question, Mr. Bugliosi.
MR. HUGHES: Q. Have you felt that you have been able to communicate with your ancestors on acid or on any drug?
A. No.
Q. Have you felt you have been able to communicate with your prior lives, that is, the lives from which you have been reincarnated into Linda Kasabian?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Assuming a fact not in evidence.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. HUGHES: Q. Have you had a past life?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Assuming a fact not in evidence. Calls for a conclusion.
MR. KANAREK: It goes to her state of mind, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. HUGHES: Q. Do you think you had a past life?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Irrelevant. Calls for a conclusion.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. HUGHES: Q. Now, you have stated that you took methydrine?
A. Yes.
Q. And that is also known as speed?
MR. STOVITZ: Is that a question. Counsel?
MR. HUGHES: Yes, that was a question.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. HUGHES: Q. Why is methydrine called speed?
A. It sort of speeds you up.
Q. Does it do anything else?
A. Yes.
Q. What else does it do?
A. You lose your appetite. You can’t sleep. That is about it.
Q. Do you lose your depressions?
A. Lose depressions?
Q. Right.
A. No. I got more depressed.
Q. You got more depressed on speed?
A. Uh-huh, yes.
Q. When you were on speed, did you find that you withdrew from other people?
A. No.
Q. Did you find you liked to talk a lot?
A. Yes.
Q. You liked to rap?
A. Yes.
Q. What does rap mean?
A. Talk a lot.
Q. And would you just talk endlessly?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you talk with other people who you thought were on speed?
A. Who I knew were on speed, yes.
Q. It was sort of hard to talk together, wasn’t it?
A. Sometimes, yes.
Q. You were both talking at once?
A. Sometimes.
Q. You kept trying to interrupt each other?
A. Yes, sometimes.
Q. And a lot of ideas and fantasies would go through your mind on speed, wouldn’t they?
MR. STOVITZ: Ideas and fantasies are ambiguous and compound, your Honor. I object to the question.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. HUGHES: Q. Would a lot of ideas go through your mind on speed?
A. A lot of ideas go through my mind when I am not on speed.
Q. Would you say more went through your mind on speed than when you are down?
A. I don’t know. I can’t really say.
Q. Would a lot of fantasies pass through your mind?
A. I can’t really say.
Q. Would you talk about things in minute detail?
A. Yes.
Q. And express a keen interest in what you are talking about?
A. Excuse me?
Q. You would express a keen interest in what you were talking about?
A. Yes.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Objection.
THE WITNESS: Excuse me.
MR. BUGLIOSI: That is all right. You have answered it.
MR. HUGHES: May the answer be read back?
THE COURT: Read the question and the answer, please.
(The record was read by the reporter.)
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. When you first used speed in small quantities, didn’t it clear up your depression?
MR. BUGLIOSI: I object, your Honor. What relevancy would her answer have one way or the other to the charges in this case? It is so remote it is completely immaterial.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. When you used speed in large quantities, it caused a lot of confusion, didn’t it?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Same objection, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
You may answer.
THE WITNESS: I never took it in large quantities.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. You took it in large enough quantities to create depression, didn’t you?
A. After a while, from lack of sleep and lack of food, I got depressed, yes.
Q. Large enough quantities to make you unable to sleep and unable to eat; right?
A. Right.
Q. Have you ever communicated with inanimate objects?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Irrelevant, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: I don’t quite understand you.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. Have you ever communicated with the trees in the forest?
MR. BUGLIOSI: I object on the grounds that the word communication is ambiguous. There is a vast array of definitions.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. When on any drug or substance which got you high, have you felt that you became one with the universe?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you explain how this feeling came about?
A. That is a mighty hard question. I can’t explain it.
Q. Can you try?
A. I have tried many times and I don’t have the words for it.
Q. Did you feel that the universe was made of molecules and that somehow you fit into those molecules yourself in some perfect manner?
A. I don’t understand your question.
Q. While in the condition which we just mentioned, stoned on acid or some other hallucinogen, did you feel that you were perfect?
A. Perfect?
Q. Yes.
MR. BUGLIOSI: Ambiguous. What does the word “perfect” mean?
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. HUGHES: Do you know what the word “perfect” means?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you felt that you were perfect when you were stoned?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Same objection, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. HUGHES: Q. When you are first coming on on acid, and up to the time that you have peaked, which you have described as the high point—
A. Yes.
Q. —is it very difficult to perform tasks which normally would be simple?
MR. BUGLIOSI: That is too broad a question, your Honor. I object on that ground. It is also ambiguous and it is also irrelevant.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. HUGHES: May the record reflect that Mr. Bugliosi’s objection didn’t come in until after the witness had hesitated several seconds in answering the question?
THE COURT: Ask your next question.
MR. HUGHES: Q. Have you ever felt, when you were getting stoned on acid, that you wanted to go across the room and sit down but you felt that it was difficult to go across the room and get there?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Irrelevant and immaterial.
[Pages 7351-7357 are missing from the trial transcript.]
2:05 o’clock p.m
LINDA KASABIAN,
the witness on the stand at the time of the noon recess, having been previously duly sworn, resumed the stand, was examined and testified further as follows:
CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. To briefly cap your testimony, Mrs. Kasabian, you have had trips on marijuana, hashish and THC; is that right?
MR. STOVITZ: I object to the question, your Honor, as argumentative.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Did you finish your question?
MR. HUGHES: Yes.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. Morning glory seeds, psilocybin, LSD; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Mescaline, peyote, methydrine end Romilar, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And in the last year you have had the following major delusions:
You have believed that Charles Manson is Jesus Christ, is that right?
MR. STOVITZ: By “last year,” you mean exactly a year or are you using the approximate term of a year?
MR. HUGHES: Within the approximate time of the year?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. And you believed yourself to be a witch in that time, is that right?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, that is a misstatement, a characterization of her testimony.
MR. KANAREK: He is asking her a new question, your Honor, it’s not characterizing her testimony.
THE COURT: Overruled, you may answer.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q. You believed yourself to be a witch?
A. Yes.
MR. HUGHES: Your Honor, I have no further questions at this time and I ask the jury be allowed to cross-examine the witness.
MR. STOVITZ: If counsel would take the witness stand and make the same offer we’ll concede, your Honor.
MR. KANAREK: Counsel is not an alleged percipient witness, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right, gentlemen, is there any redirect examination?
MR. BUGLIOSI: Will your Honor admonish the jury to disregard that preposterous offer of Mr. Hughes?
THE COURT: The jury will disregard Mr. Hughes’ statement.
MR. HUGHES: Your Honor, I ask the jury be polled to find out if they do have any questions of this witness.
THE COURT: Mr. Hughes.
MR. STOVITZ: May I proceed, your Honor?
THE COURT: You may proceed.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Mrs. Kasabian, have you been getting up about the same time every morning for court?
A. Yes.
Q. About what time has that been?
A. About 7:30.
Q. And you had breakfast over there and are driven over to the courtroom and then you testified whenever the jury sees you, is that right?
A. Uh-huh, I don’t eat breakfast.
Q. And was there another time during your testimony when you got quite tired, say 2:00 o’clock or 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon?
A. Yes.
Q. When did that occur?
A. When Mr. Kanarek was cross-examining me.
Q. You hadn’t had any LSD that day, had you?
A. No.
Q. But you got tired, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. About 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon you felt exhausted, is that right?
A. Extremely, yes.
Q. Now, we used various terms and definitions of these terms are not the same as I learned when we were growing up.
MR. FITZGERALD: Immaterial and irrelevant.
MR. STOVITZ: Maybe there is a generation gap, but in any event we would like to go over these terms.
Q. The term “trip,” what does that term mean as you used it in your testimony?
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor, calling for a conclusion.
What the testimony is to date it is.
He can ask her what she thinks the word trip means, as she answers it this instant, but I object to her and counsel going over and trying to put some meaning as to previous questions.
THE COURT: Overruled, you may answer.
THE WITNESS: Concerning drugs.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. In other words, the word trip can be used differently according to what the question calls for?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Object, ambiguous, your Honor. That question is argumentative and ambiguous.
THE COURT: Overruled.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. All right, now, for instance one time—correct me if I am wrong—you said if a person wants to go to the beach, that is his trip. Did you ever use it that way?
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor, assuming facts not in evidence, ambiguous, argumentative and it is immaterial.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. What do you mean by the word “trip” in that context?
A. That is his thing; that is what he wants to do.
Q. All right, somebody walks along in the courtroom and falls over a chair like this and trips, that is a fall type of trip.
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor. The question is immaterial.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Then a journey is a trip, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And now a trip on the use of either marijuana or any other drug that you spoke of, what do you mean by that kind of trip?
A. Well, sort of like a journey into the mind.
Q. Now, each time you smoked marijuana, has that been a trip?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may that question be read back?
THE COURT: Didn’t you hear the question?
MR. KANAREK: No, I didn’t, Mr. Shinn was talking to me.
THE COURT: Read the question.
(Whereupon the reporter reads the pending question as follows:
“Q. Now, each time you smoked marijuana, has that been a trip?”)
THE WITNESS: Yes, in a sense.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. All right, and smoking the marijuana, Let’s say, before you got to the Spahn Ranch, when you smoked marijuana, would you smoke just one cigarette? Would that be a trip or would you say two or three cigarettes?
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, assuming facts not in evidence, argumentative, ambiguous and immaterial.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Sometimes just a few puffs on a cigarette would get me high.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. I see, and the term “high,” you know, high has a meaning being high in a building?
A. Yes.
Q. And sometimes people get high on alcohol.
What do you mean by the term “high” as you just used it now, a few puffs would get you high?
A. Get high in your mind.
Q. All right, now, counsel asked you this morning whether or not the past nine months, whether or not you have gotten high and you told us “yes,” you’ve gotten high without drugs.
What do you mean by that?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I would object to that as assuming facts not in evidence, ambiguous. The question is ambiguous.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Just by sitting and meditating and closing your eyes and concentrating, is a form of getting high.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Is it anything to do with leaving the present surroundings?
In other words, you are on the witness stand now. Do you have to leave the present surroundings and make out like you’re in the living room?
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, ambiguous, assuming facts not in evidence, irrelevant, ambiguous, calling for a conclusion, hearsay.
MR. STOVITZ: I will reframe the question.
Q. Could you tell us a little bit more about this getting high without the use of drugs?
A. Well, it’s a form of yoga.
Q. Yoga?
A. Yes.
I call it meditating. Some people meditate outwardly by a picture, a mantra. I have never done that.
A lot of people close their eyes and focus their attention on what they call the midline, the eye that is not shown, which takes you into the unseen world. Eventually it takes you to God.
Q. And this is without drugs?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, in December, or the first or second day of December, you surrendered to the police; is that right?
A. Yes. Right.
Q. Was it you or your mother that called the police?
A. My mother did.
MR. FITZGERALD: Objection, your Honor.
I move to strike the conclusion that her mother called the police unless there is an adequate foundation to demonstrate personal knowledge.
MR. STOVITZ: May I then ask?
Q. Did you see your mother call the police?
MR. KANAREK: I object. That is impossible. Calling for a conclusion and hearsay.
MR. STOVITZ: Were you there when your mother called the police?
A. Well, what she did was to get in a car and drive to the police station.
Q. Were you there at that time?
A. No.
Q. You were in an apartment somewhere?
A. Oh, I thought you meant was I there when she spoke to the policeman.
No, I was there in the house when she left to talk to the policeman.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may that be stricken as a conclusion, “to talk to the policeman,” and also on the grounds of hearsay.
THE COURT: The answer is stricken and the jury is admonished to disregard it.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Now, did you talk to your mother concerning her going to the police?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Objection, your Honor, on the grounds of hearsay and a conclusion.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. When you talked to your mother, were you in custody at that time?
MR. KANAREK: Object. Calling for a conclusion.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Were you in an apartment of some type?
A. Yes. I had just moved into one.
Q. And at that time you felt you were pregnant; is that right?
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, calling for a conclusion.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: I was very much pregnant, yes.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Had you been to a doctor and had tests taken or did you just feel you were pregnant because you missed your menstrual period?
A. I was showing. I was actually aware of the baby kicking inside of me.
Q. All right.
Then after your mother went somewhere and she came back, did she come back with a policeman?
A. No.
Q. What happened next?
A. She told me that she—excuse me.
MR. KANAREK: I hate to interrupt the witness but I believe this is hearsay.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: She came back and she told me that she spoke to the Chief of Police.
MR. KANAREK: May that be stricken on the grounds of hearsay, your Honor?
THE COURT: The motion is granted. The answer will be stricken.
The jury is admonished to disregard it.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Now, you had a conversation with your mother?
A. Yes.
Q. And you were still not in custody at that time?
A. No.
Q. What was your state of mind then at that time?
A. I was very frightened. I knew that—I don’t know, I can’t really explain it. I was just frightened.
Q. According to the knowledge that you had, from whatever source it was, did you know whether or not the police were looking for you in the State that you were in at that time?
A. No.
MR. KANAREK: I object. Calls for a conclusion and hearsay, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Where did you believe the police were looking for you?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, your Honor, hearsay and a conclusion.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: In New Mexico.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. And thereafter, having the conversation with your mother, what happened next?
Try not to give us conversation.
A. A car pulled up in front of my house, I put on my coat, walked out the front door, said goodbye to my dog, and got into the car.
Q. Where was Tanya at that time?
A. She was upstairs with my mother.
Q. You were then taken before a judge; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And an attorney was appointed for you in that state?
MR. KANAREK: Calling for a conclusion and hearsay, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. At some time or other you were informed about extradition proceedings; is that correct?
MR. KANAREK: I object on the grounds of hearsay, conclusion and immaterial, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Do you know what extradition proceedings mean?
A. I don’t know if I did at that time.
I just wanted to come back here.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may that be stricken, “I just wanted to come back here”?
THE COURT: That portion will be stricken.
The jury is admonished to disregard it.
MR. KANAREK: Thank you.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Were you asked to sign certain papers concerning a hearing about your extradition?
MR. KANAREK: Conclusion, hearsay and immaterial, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Not that I can recall.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Without telling us what was said, did you have a conversation with Mr. Fleischman while you were in custody back East?
A. Yes.
Q. Following that conversation, did you voluntarily return to California with the police officers?
MR. KANAREK: I object. Calling for a conclusion, your Honor, hearsay and immaterial.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. And you did not in any way that you know of fight extradition; is that right?
MR. KANAREK: Object. Calling for a conclusion, hearsay and immaterial.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
MR. STOVITZ: All right.
Q. Now, the first night that you landed here in Los Angeles with that police lady and policeman, you met me; is that right?
A. That’s right.
Q. Prior to that time you had never seen me before; is that correct?
A. No.
Q. I showed you what? Some pictures of whom?
A. Of the defendants and some of the people out at the ranch.
Q. And did I ask you any of the details of the crime whatsoever?
MR. KANAREK: I object as calling for a conclusion and hearsay, and immaterial.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Did I ask you to discuss your observations or anything at that time?
MR. KANAREK: Object, calling for a conclusion, hearsay and immaterial.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Did we have any conversation concerning your knowledge of the events of August the 8th or August the 9th, 1969?
MR. KANAREK: Calling for a conclusion, hearsay and immaterial.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. You were put into custody at Sybil Brand institute; is that correct?
A. Right.
Q. And from time to time you saw your attorney; is that correct?
A. Right.
Q. At one time you were introduced to Mr. Bugliosi and myself again; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you pregnant at that time?
A. Yes.
Q. When was Angel born again?
A. March 9th.
Q. With reference to that date, do you know whether it was a week before or a month before that we met for the first time? At Sybil Brand Institute, that is.
A. It was just a little bit before, when I met Mr. Bugliosi.
Q. Was I there at that time?
A. No.
Q. All right.
Then subsequently, Mr. Bugliosi and myself both came up to Sybil Brand; is that correct?
A. Subsequently?
Q. Subsequently means afterwards.
A. Yes.
Q. Were you still pregnant at that time?
A. No.
Q. Now, you used the term “creepy crawly.”
Before going to the Spahn Ranch, did you know what a creepy crawling mission was?
A. No.
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, calling for a conclusion and hearsay.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. FITZGERALD: We have the gerund form of the verb, “ing,” and also the adjectival form, or rather, the adverbial form of the verb, “ly.”
MR. STOVITZ: I will ask it both ways.
Q. Had you ever heard of a creepy crawl mission?
MR. KANAREK: That is immaterial and calling for a conclusion.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. STOVITZ: Before going to the Spahn Ranch.
A. No.
Q. In other words, in all of your trips to all the different places you have lived and everything, “creepy crawl” is not a term used by people who use LSD?
A. No.
MR. KANAREK: Calling for a conclusion and hearsay.
THE COURT: Sustained.
The answer is stricken.
The jury is admonished to disregard it.
MR. STOVITZ: Prior to going to the Spahn Ranch in July of 1969, you had never used that term?
MR. KANAREK: I object. The question is ambiguous.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Now, after you got to the Spahn Ranch, from whom, from what person, did you learn what a creepy crawl mission was?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, your Honor, calling for a conclusion, hearsay: and it must be limited to the two days that the conspiracy is alleged.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Exactly who did I learn it from the first time?
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Yes. The very first time you had ever heard it?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, unless it is one of these defendants, it is immaterial. It couldn’t possibly be material in any event.
MR. STOVITZ: We will show the materiality after.
THE COURT: You may answer.
THE WITNESS: I am not really sure who I first heard it from.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Was it a girl or a boy?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: I am not sure if it was the first time I heard it, but Leslie told me of the time where they went creepy-crawling.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. With reference to the dates of July the 5th and August the 8th, could you tell us whether it was closest to July the 5th or closest to August the 8th?
MR. KANAREK: Irrelevant, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Closest to July 5th.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Now, then, you told us about the time that you saw Mr. Manson with this black cape on?
A. Yes.
Q. Was this conversation that you had with Leslie Van Houten before seeing Charlie Manson with the black cape on or after seeing Charlie Manson?
MR. KANAREK: Irrelevant, calls for a conclusion and hearsay.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: It was before.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. So, then, when you heard Mr. Manson use the term, “Now when I go creepy-crawling,” et cetera, you knew what he meant?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, you have told us that you brought a packet containing 30 capsules of what you believed to be LSD; is that right?
A. They were tablets.
Q. Tablets?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know what happened to those after you got to the Spahn Ranch?
A. I gave them to somebody, I am not sure who. At one point, I know Brenda had them.
Q. Brenda McCann?
A. Yes.
She told me they just sort of melted; they got wet and were destroyed.
MR. KANAREK: May that be stricken as a conclusion, the latter portion that they were melted and destroyed, that Brenda told her that?
THE COURT: That portion is stricken.
The jury is admonished to disregard it.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Did you ever see those 30 capsules again?
A. Tablets.
Q. Tablets?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, your Honor, and irrelevant.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Did you ever take any of those 30 tablets after once arriving at the Spahn Ranch?
A. No.
MR. KANAREK: Calling for a conclusion.
THE COURT: Overruled.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Now, while you were back at the ranch there, you told us that at some interval of time before the first night you did take something that you don’t know was LSD or mescaline, or one time you even said it might have been psilocybin? Is that right?
A. Yes. Something that was weak.
Q. Did you bring that particular object to the ranch?
A. No.
MR. KANAREK: Calling for a conclusion and immaterial.
THE COURT: Overruled.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Who was present besides yourself at the time you took them?
MR. KANAREK: Assuming facts not in evidence.
THE COURT: If anyone?
MR. STOVITZ: If anyone.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Sadie was there.
Q. By Sadie, you mean Susan Atkins?
A. Yes.
And a girl named Barbara, she took some also.
There were a few more people. I can’t quite say who they were.
Q. And this was at least several days before the August the 8th or 9th night, the first night?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Leading and suggestive, your Honor, and irrelevant.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. STOVITZ: Aside from that, did you ever take any peyote at the Spahn Ranch?
A. No.
Q. Mescaline? If that particular tab was not mescaline, did you ever take any mescaline?
MR. KANAREK: Irrelevant, your Honor. It has to be limited to the two days alleged in the indictment.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Did you take any other hallucinogenic drug? And I am separating marijuana now. Aside from this one item that you told us about.
A. No.
MR. KANAREK: That is ambiguous, your Honor.
Is he including marijuana or isn’t he?
MR. STOVITZ: I said aside from marijuana.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Then you left the Spahn Ranch on the day that you believe was the day after Mary Brunner was brought to court; is that correct?
A. Say that again?
Q. I will try to break it down.
You went to come down to see Mary Brunner at the jail, at Sybil Brand institute?
A. Right.
Q. You were told that she was in court?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Leading and suggestive, your Honor.
I object to his questioning wherein the question is really answered by Mr. Stovitz in his question.
MR. STOVITZ: It is just foundational.
THE COURT: Read the last question.
(The question was read by the reporter.)
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Is that correct?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Then you left the following day?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may that be stricken on the grounds of hearsay, that she was told that she was in court?
THE COURT: I don’t follow.
MR. KANAREK: Well, the question, your Honor, and the answer—it’s hearsay. She was told that she was in court; this is clearly hearsay.
THE COURT: Read the last question.
THE REPORTER: “Then you left the following day.”
“A. Yes.”
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. STOVITZ: All right. Counsel—
MR. FITZGERALD: We are prepared to stipulate.
MR. STOVITZ: After consulting with all counsel, your Honor, it is stipulated that Mary Brunner was in the Municipal Court in the city of San Fernando on August 12. 1969.
MR. FITZGERALD: So stipulated.
MR. KANAREK: So stipulated.
MR. SHINN: So stipulated.
MR. HUGHES: So stipulated.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: All right, now, then, if that was a day when Mrs. Brunner was in court, you believe, then you left the following day for the Spahn Ranch, is that correct?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, your Honor, also improper foundation.
She may have been in court on other days; therefore, there is no foundation for that conclusion.
THE COURT: Overruled.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Now, then, do you recall what time of the day on this particular day in August that you left Los Angeles, picked up these two boys you met the day before and drove towards New Mexico?
A. It was early morning.
Q. Before the rush time traffic or after the rush time traffic?
A. Once I was on the freeway, it was rush.
Q. And did you drive until it got dark?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you drive until after it was dark?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you recall whether or not you slept over that night on the road or not?
A. Yes, we did.
Q. And then you say the following day you met a tall, blonde man that you now believe is named Breckenridge; is that right?
A. Right.
Q. And thinking back, how many hours or how many days did you spend in Mr. Breckenridge’s presence?
A. One whole day and a half day.
Q. Now, after that was it a week, two weeks or a month that you returned—before you returned to Los Angeles?
A. I think about a weak; I am not sure how many days.
Q. Before you returned to Los Angeles?
A. Right.
Q. And did you fly or take a train or drive or hitchhike or what?
A. I flew.
Q. When you returned to Los Angeles did you discover at that time that Tanya Kasabian was in custody?
MR. KANAREK: Calling for a conclusion, your Honor, and immaterial.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: At that time?
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Yes.
A. No, I found out before.
Q. Well, when you came back you knew she was in custody.
A. Yes.
Q. Did you have a chance to see her?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes, I did.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Did you at that time talk to any social worker or any referee in juvenile court or anything?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: That is ambiguous as to what time we are talking about, your Honor.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Do you know what time I am talking about, Mrs. Kasabian?
A. Yes.
Q. What time am I talking about?
MR. KANAREK: That is immaterial, if she knows what time he is talking about.
THE COURT: Follow the questions a little more closely, Mr. Kanarek.
Overruled.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: At that time did you talk to a social worker or some other person concerning your daughter’s welfare?
A. Yes, I spoke to people.
Q. Without telling us what was said, who were those two people?
A. One was the social worker handling the case, and the other person was, I guess he was a social worker that took me out to the residence where Tanya was.
Q. Do you recall whether or not in either one of these conversations you told the people when you had left Los Angeles?
MR. KANAREK: A conclusion and hearsay, your Honor, and also—
THE COURT: That calls for a yes or no answer.
Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Now, at some time you returned again to Los Angeles, or did you continue to stay here in Los Angeles before regaining custody?
A. No, I returned back to New Mexico and came back, again.
Q. Then you came back again, and now it was September before you came back, is that right?
A. I guess so.
Q. All right, and then you did take physical custody of Tanya, is that it?
A. Right.
Q. At that time did you feel yourself pregnant?
A. Yes.
Q. Either the first time that you came back, which was sometime in the middle of August, or the other time when you actually took physical custody of Tanya, did you see Mr. Manson?
A. No.
Q. Did you see Susan Atkins?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Which visit, the first or second?
A. The second visit.
Q. And where was Susan Atkins when you saw her?
A. She was in the hallway at the courtroom.
Q. And did you see another person that you recognized there?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, your Honor, irrelevant.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: The defendants, or just—
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Anybody?
A. Yes.
Q. Who was it?
A. Danny DeCarlo and Brenda McCann and Squeaky.
Q. And then did you see Patricia Krenwinkel at that time?
A. No.
Q. Did you see Leslie Van Houten at that time?
A. No.
Q. Now, was this the time that you actually took custody of Tanya or is this the first visit?
A. No, this is when I got custody of Tanya.
Q. Then where did you go with Tanya after that?
A. To New Mexico.
Q. How long did you stay there, a week, a month or what?
A. In New Mexico?
Q. Yes.
A. Probably about a month.
Q. Then it was you went to Miami?
A. Right.
Q. When you met June Emmer in Miami did you have a conversation with her concerning your experiences here in Los Angeles?
MR. KANAREK: Conclusion and hearsay, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Not that I recall now.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Do you ever recall telling June Emmer that you were in a house with beautiful chandeliers?
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, calling for a conclusion, hearsay on the part of this witness.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, in order that we get the context, then I would move that we at this time read June Emmer’s testimony, because this witness is now testifying before the jury.
June Emmer testified outside the presence of the jury.
He is asking questions, your Honor, that are presupposing June Emmer’s testimony.
MR. STOVITZ: I am not presupposing anything, your Honor, I am just asking this one simple inquiry so we can save some time later on.
THE COURT: I think Mr. Kanarek has a good point, Mr. Stovitz.
MR. STOVITZ: Then I will ask that the previous question be stricken and the jury admonished to disregard it.
THE COURT: The testimony regarding June Emmer will be stricken. The jury is admonished to disregard it.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Now, Mrs. Kasabian, going back to what we have now commonly called the first night, were you keeping a diary at that time as to what day of the week it was?
A. No.
Q. Were you keeping a diary as to what day of the month it was?
A. No.
Q. Were you keeping a diary as to how many days after July 4th that occurred?
A. Not really.
Q. This particular car that you went out in, this particular Ford you identified in the photographs, do you know whose Ford automobile it was?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Calling for a conclusion, your Honor, and hearsay.
THE COURT: Overruled.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Did any particular person use that particular Ford automobile at the Spahn Ranch?
MR. KANAREK: Calling for a conclusion, your Honor, hearsay and ambiguous.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Did you see anyone use this particular Ford automobile with the back seat removed from it at the Spahn Ranch?
MR. KANAREK: Irrelevant, your Honor, and immaterial
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Who if anyone did you observe drive that car?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, irrelevant and immaterial. We are talking about a time of two days.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: I have seen Johnny Swartz drive it.
I have seen myself drive it; I have seen Mary Brunner drive it.
I believe that is all.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Now, at all times did this Ford automobile have the back seat missing, or at times it had the back seat in it and other times it did not?
MR. KANAREK: Conclusion, immaterial.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: I don’t think it ever had a back seat while I was there.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Do you now know what the license plate of that car was when you first used it or when you rode in it on the first night or second night?
A. No.
MR. KANAREK: Irrelevant, immaterial, a conclusion, hearsay whether she now knows it.
MR. STOVITZ: Did counsel hear the answer?
MR. KANAREK: I don’t care what the answer is, your Honor, I—
THE COURT: How is it hearsay?
MR. KANAREK: Because she is alleging it.
THE COURT: The question is whether she knows it.
MR. KANAREK: That’s right, she is alleging she knows it, so the jury will believe the actual license number that counsel is advocating is correct, so it’s clear hearsay.
It is offered for the truth of the fact asserted that she is alleging.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No, I don’t know the license plate number.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. While you were driving that particular car were you ever stopped by a policeman whereby the license number was recorded?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, irrelevant.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. And you had no particular reason—strike that. Did you ever use that car when you went into a service station and bought gas on a credit card?
MR. KANAREK: Irrelevant and immaterial, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes, I think I did.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Do you know what happened to that charge slip on that particular—
MR. KANAREK: Irrelevant, immaterial, your Honor, conclusion and hearsay.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: I believe I put it in the glove compartment.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Do you know what name, if any, was on the credit card that you used?
MR. KANAREK: Conclusion, hearsay, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No, I don’t remember.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Now, this particular Ford automobile that we are talking about, are you certain that that was the car that was used on the first and second nights?
MR. KANAREK: Conclusion, your Honor, hearsay, irrelevant and immaterial.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. KANAREK: She is judging her own testimony, your Honor.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Now, going to the first night, I would like to show you again Exhibit 16 for identification which depicts a white automobile in front of some type of a building.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I will object to all of this procedure on People vs. Carter.
It is an improper bifurcation of the People’s case.
They cannot, your Honor, under ostensible redirect bring up the matters that they already have gone into.
People vs. Carter sets that out very explicitly. This is an improper attempt, your Honor, to go into matters they have already gone into.
THE COURT: The question is whether or not this was covered on the cross-examination.
MR. KANAREK: But your Honor, counsel has in his question, he has admitted that this witness has already gone through this process, of this picture and all of that.
It’s nothing new as far as the cross goes.
He is not going into anything. He is doing his case, his thing all over again, if I may put it that way.
THE COURT: Overruled.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Do you remember the question, and look at the picture.
Now, I direct your attention in this photograph to what appears to be a wire, and then on top of the porch there appears to be a light.
I would ask you whether or not you know whether or not that light was shining on the first night you were at the Tate residence.
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor, outside the scope of cross-examination, immaterial, irrelevant, calling for a conclusion of the witness under People vs. Carter.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes, it was shining.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: On the way toward what you later learned to be the Tate residence did Sadie during that entire trip towards this house that you later learned to be the Tate residence, did Sadie, that is Susan Atkins, ever say that she had been to the house before?
MR. KANAREK: Leading and suggestive, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Did you ever hear Sadie, Susan Atkins, say anything that you now remember concerning the trip—
MR. KANAREK: Outside the scope of cross-examination, your Honor, irrelevant, immaterial, calling for a conclusion, leading and suggestive, in view of counsel’s last question, the one that he asked just a half minute ago.
MR. BUGLIOSI: May we approach the bench on this?
THE COURT:
Very well.
(The following proceedings were had at the bench out of the hearing of the jury:)
MR. BUGLIOSI: I don’t know if the defense is interested, but we expect the answer to be no to all of these questions.
That Sadie had said she never had been there.
Now, the reason we are going into it, of course, is because they brought up on cross the fact that Tex said he had been there before.
This came out on cross for the first time. It did not come out on direct.
Now we are simply asking if Sadie or Katie said they had been there.
The representation I will make is Linda told me they told her they had not been there before.
I don’t know how it will harm you. In any event, I think it is admissible, it is part of the res gestae.
They are on the way to the commission of the murders. I think it’s relevant if these co-conspirators either mentioned or did not mention they had been to the scene of the murder.
I think it is extremely relevant, it is certainly part of the res gestae.
I think it is clear, your Honor, that we have the right to not only offer statements, but sometimes we have the right to offer a lack of a statement, the absence of a statement, and I think it is relevant here.
Tex apparently is the only one who had ever been to that residence, or if Sadie and Katie had been they certainly never told Linda that.
THE COURT: I see nothing objectionable about bringing out whatever the conversation was as long as it is not done in a leading and suggestive manner.
MR. BUGLIOSI: We also intend to ask, and again I anticipate the answer will be no, we intend to ask whether Katie or Sadie said that they had stolen anything at the Tate residence.
I expect the answer to be no, that they did not steal anything.
But again it was brought out on cross-examination that Tex said he had taken 70 dollars.
MR. SHINN: Anyway, your Honor, that question would be limited to those two defendants anyway.
MR. FITZGERALD: Mr. Shinn and I would join with Mr. Bugliosi, if the evidence will be limited to Patricia Krenwinkel and Susan Atkins; if Mr. Kanarek wants to object on behalf of Manson, we have no objection to your Honor admonishing the jury that the evidence is to be considered only against Patricia Krenwinkel and Susan Atkins.
It is helpful to our clients.
THE COURT: As to whether or not they made any such statement.
MR. FITZGERALD: Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I might say this:
First of all, if we depart from our rules of evidence—
THE COURT: What rule of evidence?
MR. KANAREK: The rule of evidence this is outside the scope of cross-examination.
It only refers to Tex. There are all kinds of things—
THE COURT: It is within the scope. Now, if you have anything else, let’s hear it now. I want to proceed.
MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor, the fact of the matter is that your Honor has made a previous order wherein your Honor stated that what was said, that what is being said is all being offered subject to a motion to strike.
Now, this is a clever attempt by the prosecution to pinpoint something which is supposedly, quote, favorable, unquote, to Patricia Krenwinkel and Susan Atkins, all this does is, by pinpointing it as to them, it somehow or other makes Mr. Manson a person who has to suffer because of this evidence.
THE COURT: In effect the question will simply be whether there was any conversation.
MR. BUGLIOSI: That’s right.
MR. KANAREK: That is the way to do it, but not to ask leading questions.
THE COURT: I already said that they cannot do it by asking leading questions leading to it.
You can refer to a particular subject matter.
MR. BUGLIOSI: I think the questions by definition have to be somewhat leading.
THE COURT: Only to orient the witness as to the subject matter.
MR. BUGLIOSI: “Did Sadie say she took anything,” that suggests a yes answer. I am representing to the Court that Linda Kasabian told me that neither Sadie nor Katie said they had taken anything.
So as an officer of the Court I am making that representation.
I don’t think that question is leading. It is necessary that Mr. Stovitz direct her attention to the precise issue, “Did Sadie ever tell you that she had ever been there,” and, “Did Sadie ever say she had taken anything?”
I represent to the Court the answer will be no.
I don’t know how we can get a no answer from her without directing her attention to the taking.
MR. KANAREK: It is inadmissible hearsay, no exception to the hearsay rule, it is offered for the fact asserted.
MR. FITZGERALD: We agree it is hearsay to Mr. Manson.
MR. KANAREK: It is prejudicial to Mr. Manson because later on they are going to attempt to show that Mr. Manson is present in that home. I know Mr. Bugliosi’s purpose and representation.
THE COURT: Present in what home?
MR. KANAREK: They are going to show that Mr. Manson was present in that home previously.
MR. BUGLIOSI: No, we are not.
MR. KANAREK: The fact of the matter is, your Honor, not on this occasion, but at some time earlier—furthermore, they are trying to identify very cleverly Mr. Watson with Mr. Manson.
In other words, what they do—
THE COURT: All the question calls for is the remainder, if any, of a conversation.
MR. KANAREK: I know, but your Honor, the fact of the matter is—
THE COURT: All right, I have heard enough, Mr. Kanarek, you made your objection.
MR. KANAREK: It prejudices Mr. Manson.
THE COURT: All right, the objection is overruled.
(The following proceedings were had in open court in the presence and hearing of the jury:)
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Now, Mrs. Kasabian, on the first night, on the house on the hill that you later learned to be the Tate residence, did you ever hear this young lady Susan Atkins say anything about ever being to that house before that night?
MR. KANAREK: Objection on the grounds of hearsay, your Honor.
THE COURT: You already made your objection, Mr. Kanarek. Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. On the way back from that house—
THE COURT: Are you objecting to the hearsay aspect?
MR. KANAREK: Yes, improper bifurcation.
THE COURT: Do you want it limited?
MR. KANAREK: Pardon?
THE COURT: Do you want the answer limited as against Mr. Manson?
MR. KANAREK: I don’t wish the answer to go in at all, your Honor.
THE COURT: I understand that. I told you it is going in.
MR. FITZGERALD: May it be limited to the declarant anyway?
MR. KANAREK: There is no declarant. It is a non-declarant, your Honor. Somebody does not say something. How could it be limited? It is limited to the whole wide world because she is saying something that did not happen.
THE COURT: Let’s proceed.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. On the way back from the house on the top of the hill that you later learned to be the Tate residence did Susan Atkins ever say to you that she had been to that house before?
A. No.
MR. KANAREK: Leading and suggestive, hearsay, immaterial, outside the scope of the cross-examination.
THE COURT: Overruled.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. On the following day, the day you watched the television, you found out that people were killed in that house and who those people were.
Susan Atkins ever say to you that she knew who those people were?
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, on the ground it is solicitation of a conclusion, hearsay; it is immaterial, it is irrelevant and it also is outside the scope of cross-examination.
It has nothing but prejudicial value, no probative value.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. All right, Patricia Krenwinkel, on the way to the house on the hill that you later learned to be the Tate residence, did Patricia Krenwinkel ever tell you that she had been to that house before?
MR. KANAREK: Objection, leading and suggestive, calling for a conclusion; it is hearsay; it is irrelevant and it is immaterial and outside the scope of cross-examination.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. On the way back from that house on the hill, all the way until you get back to the Spahn Ranch did Patricia Krenwinkel ever tell you she had been to that house?
MR. KANAREK: Leading and suggestive, immaterial, solicitation of hearsay, irrelevant, solicitation of a conclusion.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. KANAREK: Outside the scope of cross-examination.
THE WITNESS: No.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Now, do you remember as you sit here now which light if any was on outside the Tate residence the night that you were there?
A. Yes.
Q. Which light was it?
A. I guess it was the garage, or something, like a spotlight, a bright light.
Q. Do you see the light pictured in either one of these two pictures, Exhibit No. 6 or 16 in front of you?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may I see those exhibits. I don’t have them memorized.
MR. STOVITZ: I will show it to you, they are both the same ones, Counsel.
Q. Do you see that light pictured in those pictures?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may we have a foundation as to time when those pictures were taken? That light may have been put on afterwards, your Honor.
MR. STOVITZ: That will be done before they are offered in evidence, Counsel.
MR. KANAREK: Nevertheless—
THE COURT: She testified to what she saw, Mr. Kanarek, overruled.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Would you kindly take the blue Crayon and mark on Exhibit 16 a circle around that light?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may I approach the witness?
THE COURT: For what purpose?
MR. KANAREK: To see what is going on.
THE COURT: Very well.
MR. KANAREK: Thank you, your Honor.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. I show you now Exhibit No. 8 for identification.
THE CLERK: What exhibit?
MR. STOVITZ: I am sorry, it is Exhibit 4 in evidence, it was admitted in evidence, Exhibit 4.
MR. KANAREK: Counsel has put a 4 on the face of that picture, your Honor.
MR. STOVITZ: Yes, a blue 4.
MR. KANAREK: All right.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. I direct your attention to what appears to be a front door with what may be one or two lights, I cannot see too well at this time of day.
Do you know whether or not those two lights were on at the front of the house the night that you were there?
MR. KANAREK: May I have a moment, your Honor, to look at that picture? I cannot see it.
THE COURT: You may answer.
THE WITNESS: No, I don’t recall this light as being on.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. All right, now, I notice that at that point where the circle has been drawn and a VF written next to it, there appears to be some sort of wooden post that you kept calling a pole, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And on Exhibit 8 for identification, that diagram is the same post that you called the pole on Exhibit 8 that you circled?
A. Yes.
Q. And this M that you have written on Exhibit 8 here, did you intend for that M to be at the post or where the M is now?
A. At the post.
Q. You say that you saw Tex cut a screen?
A. Yes.
Q. I show you Exhibit No. 26 in evidence and ask you were you ever shown this particular photograph before you testified?
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor, on the grounds it is outside the scope of cross-examination.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. You now remember Tex actually cutting the screen?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Objection, your Honor, calls for a conclusion, it is leading and suggestive and immaterial.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. That screen that is depicted in that particular photograph, Exhibit No, 26, is that the screen that you saw Tex cut or is that a screen similar to the one you saw Tex cut?
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor, leading and suggestive.
I would like to inquire on voir dire and also it calls for a conclusion.
There is no foundation.
THE COURT: It calls for her own knowledge.
Overruled.
THE WITNESS: What was your question?
MR. STOVITZ: May it be read, your Honor?
THE COURT: Read the question.
(The question was read by the reporter.)
THE WITNESS: It looks like the screen, yes.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Now, you understand the difference in terminology, “the same” and “looks like”?
MR. KANAREK: That is calling for a conclusion on the part of the witness, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes, I do.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. For instance, the fan over there looks like the fan over there; is that correct?
A. Right.
Q. But it is not the same one?
A. No.
Q. Now, with relation to the automobile that you were shown, the photograph of the automobile. You were shown that, a picture of the Ford automobile, before you took the witness stand; is that right? John Swartz’s car?
MR. KANAREK: May that question be read back? I think there are two questions run together.
THE COURT: Read the question.
(The question was read by the reporter.)
THE COURT: It is a little confusing, Mr. Stovitz. Reframe the question.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. The particular car that you were in, which you have said you have seen John Swartz drive, the one with the back seat missing—
A. Yes.
Q. —is that the exact car as shown to you in the photograph, or is it a car similar to that car?
MR. KANAREK: That is calling for a conclusion on the part of this witness. There is no foundation for that.
THE COURT: Sustained.
We will take a recess at this time, Mr. Stovitz. Ladies and gentlemen, do not converse with anyone nor form or express any opinion regarding the case until it is finally submitted to you.
The court will recess for 15 minutes.
(Recess.)
Let’s proceed.
MR. STOVITZ: May I proceed, Mr. Fitzgerald?
MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, you may.
MR. STOVITZ: Was the record ever made to show that the jury is present and all defendants?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. STOVITZ: Your Honor, I have a photograph that depicts a post, which I believe is the post depicted in Exhibit No. 4, and also shown on People’s Exhibit 8. Also some greenery.
May this post and the greenery be marked as people’s next for identification in order?
THE COURT: It will be so marked.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. I show you again Exhibit 4 for identification. It is actually in evidence, I am sorry.
I direct your attention to the post that you have circled there.
Now, I would like to show you this People’s Exhibit 94. And bearing in mind that I am covering over the brownish spot on the cement there, I will ask you if you have ever seen that scene depicted in Exhibit 94 before today?
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, on the grounds of improper foundation, outside the scope of cross-examination, and I would like to inquire on voir dire in connection with this picture, this second picture, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
You may answer.
THE WITNESS: Have I ever seen that before?
MR. STOVITZ: Yes.
Q. The scene depicted in Exhibit 94 as I am covering over the brownish red area there?
A. No.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, the record does not reflect. So that the record will reflect what Mr. Stovitz is talking about, we would have to put a line of demarcation on that underneath the picture; otherwise it is lost forever.
MR. STOVITZ: We will do that one step at a time, Mr. Kanarek.
Q. Do you understand the question that I have asked you?
A. Yes.
Q. All right.
Now, bearing in mind that I am now covering over the cemented area with the Exhibit 4, does the scene depicted in Exhibit 94 appear to be something that you have seen before?
A. No.
Q. Now, with respect to this man that you saw come out of the house that you later learned to be the Tate residence, you said that you spoke some words at that time; is that correct?
A. Not words from my mouth, no.
Q. So, then, these were words that you did not speak out loud; is that correct?
A. Right.
Q. On this first night, did you, yourself, carry with you a change of clothing?
A. Yes.
Q. What clothing were you wearing? Not the clothes that you took with you.
A. I had on—
MR. KANAREK: Asked and answered.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: A pair of dark Levi pants and a dark T-shirt.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. And what clothing did you carry with you?
A. A Levi cut off skirt and a lavender knit sweater top.
Q. What clothing were you wearing when Manson spoke to you and told you to get a change of clothing?
A. The dark clothing.
Q. Now, did you ever change into the other clothing, the lavender top to the skirt?
A. No.
Q. Did you, yourself, ever wash your hands off at that house with the hose?
A. No.
Q. Now, who, if anyone, carried the change of clothing for the three people that you were with that first night?
A. I guess they carried their own. I don’t know.
Q. Did you observe that?
A. No. I don’t recall.
Q. Did you see how the clothing got from wherever it was into the car?
A. Before we left the ranch?
Q. Yes.
A. No.
Q. Then the first time, I take it, that you saw the clothing was after you were in the car; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know what part of the car the clothing was carried in?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, if counsel wishes to put his case on over again, your Honor, this is—
THE COURT: Make your objection, Mr. Kanarek.
MR. KANAREK: The objection is, your Honor, that it and has been asked and answered.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. KANAREK: And it is improper redirect.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Do you know what part of the car the clothing was carried in?
A. I think they just held their own in the back seat.
Q. When the girls—when I say “the girls,” I mean Sadie and Patricia Krenwinkel—got back to the Spahn Ranch, on their trip all the way back, or back at the Ranch, did either one of them say that they had taken any money from the residence at the top of the hill?
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, on the grounds that it is leading and suggestive, hearsay and irrelevant.
MR. FITZGERALD: No objection on behalf of Patricia Krenwinkel.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. You told us something about giving a knife to Patricia Krenwinkel when you were outside the residence; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. I again show you Exhibit No. 39, this knife, in a closed condition.
I open it now.
I will ask you, is this the knife that you gave to Patricia Krenwinkel outside of the Tate residence?
A. No.
Q. Is it similar to the knife that you gave to Patricia Krenwinkel outside the Tate residence?
A. No.
Q. Is it smaller or larger, or is it bigger or fatter?
A. Smaller.
Q. This is smaller than the one you gave to Patricia Krenwinkel?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, you told us on cross-examination that you climbed around the fence, and you told us that you climbed over the fence.
What was it? When you first came over the fence for the very first time on that first night? Did you climb around it or over it?
A. Well, it was over it, but it was not the front part. We had to go around and then over.
Q. Well, actually—do you know what the word “hurdle” means?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you actually have to hurdle the fence?
A. I believe we went through some wires, barbed wires.
Q. So, then, you didn’t go over the top of it?
A. No.
Q. All right.
Now, when you left the house on top of the hill that very first night, you also told us that you climbed around the fence, and you told us you climbed over the fence.
What was it?
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor, on the grounds that it is assuming facts not in evidence. It is ambiguous as to time. The form of the question is improper. It is argumentative.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Both. I had to climb around and then over.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Did you have to go up an embankment of some type to climb around the fence?
A. Yes.
Q. When you say over, did you actually go over the very top, or was it again through?
A. Through.
Q. Was there any lighting there?
A. None.
Q. Now, do you recall where it was that you overheard this statement that Tex made that he took something from the house on top of the hill?
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor.
Just so I can be a hundred percent clear, may that be read back?
THE COURT: Read the question.
(The question was read by the reporter.)
THE WITNESS: Yes. He said—
MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor, that is where I will object, to the use of the word “overheard,” on the ground that it is assuming facts not in evidence. It is also leading and suggestive.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. KANAREK: It is hearsay and a conclusion.
THE WITNESS: Yes. He told me at the gas station.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Did he say that he took anything in addition to the money?
A. No.
Q. Do you recall now the specific amount of money?
A. Yes.
Q. What did he say?
A. $70.
Q. Did you ever find out what, if anything, Tex did with that money?
A. I don’t know.
Q. Did you ever get any of it?
A. He gave me $2 to pay for the gas.
Q. Did you see Tex give any of it to Susan Atkins?
A. No.
Q. Did you see Tex give any of it to Patricia Krenwinkel?
A. No.
MR. STOVITZ: Your Honor, I have what appears to be a leather or lace that counsel has from time to time called a leather thong.
May this envelope containing the leather thong be marked as Exhibit 95 for identification?
MR. KANAREK: Isn’t it already marked?
MR. STOVITZ: There is a 75, Counsel. Now this is 95.
THE COURT: It will be so marked.
MR. KANAREK: May I see that?
(Mr. Stovitz shows the item to Mr. Kanarek.)
MR. KANAREK: May we approach the bench, your Honor?
I would like to approach the bench, if I may, your Honor.
THE COURT: Very well.
(Whereupon, counsel approach the bench and the following proceedings occur at the bench outside of the hearing of the jury:)
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, counsel is proposing to use a leather thong that was taken from Mr. Manson when he was arrested in Inyo County.
It has nothing but prejudicial value in that there are literally millions of pieces of leather like this, I suppose, in California.
The fact that Mr. Manson was wearing this at the time that he was arrested, months later, has no materiality, it is not relevant, it is remote, and has only prejudicial value.
Unless there is some showing that it has something to do with these events, I object to it. It prejudices the case of Mr. Manson and denies him a fair trial.
MR. STOVITZ: First of all,—
MR. KANAREK: Furthermore, it is bifurcating their case.
THE COURT: Are you sure you know what is going to happen?
MR. KANAREK: Well, your Honor—
THE COURT: So far, all that has happened is that something has been marked as an exhibit.
MR. KANAREK: But he is going to waive it in front of the jurors.
MR. STOVITZ: I am not going to waive it in front of the jurors. I am going to show it to the witness.
MR. KANAREK: He will show it to the witness in the presence of the jury.
This is something that counsel represents was taken from Mr. Manson when he was arrested.
THE COURT: Let’s hear from Mr. Stovitz.
MR. STOVITZ: Your Honor, I don’t think that there are millions of leather laces like this, but there are probably 224,000 leather laces in Southern California.
I intend to show this to the witness and ask her if this is similar to the lace that she was given by Mr. Manson on the second night.
I then can show her Exhibit 75, which she identified two or three times on direct and cross-examination, and ask her whether or not this is similar to the lace that was given by Mr. Manson to her, and ask her if she now looks at both laces can she tell which one it was that was given by Mr. Manson.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, this is absolutely incredible, because this is something that was taken from Mr. Manson when he was arrested months later.
THE COURT: Apparently he doesn’t intend to ask her that.
MR. STOVITZ: She won’t say that it was taken from Mr. Manson months later.
MR. KANAREK: It has no materiality or relevancy, your Honor.
THE COURT: He can ask her to compare one lace with another.
MR. KANAREK: He could go to Olvera Street and pick out a lace and—
MR. STOVITZ: But I didn’t.
THE COURT: The fact that Mr. Manson had it on him when he was arrested has no probative value.
MR. STOVITZ: I think counsel’s objection goes to the weight and not the admissibility.
THE COURT: Apparently you are anticipating something far in advance.
MR. KANAREK: I am trying to avoid error.
THE COURT: Let’s wait until it happens.
MR. KANAREK: Then it is too late.
THE COURT: I am talking about waiting until the question is asked.
MR. STOVITZ: By the way, both were introduced at the Grand Jury hearing. 95 was introduced as 57, and 75 was introduced as 56. So counsel is well aware of the foundation.
MR. KANAREK: At a Grand Jury hearing no one has their own lawyer. The only lawyer there is the District Attorney.
THE COURT: Overruled.
Make your objections as we go along.
(Whereupon counsel return to their respective places at counsel table and the following proceedings occur in open court within the presence and hearing of the jury:)
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may I approach the witness with Mr. Stovitz?
THE COURT: Yes, you may.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. I show you Exhibit 95 for identification, this leather thong, and ask you:
Does this look similar to the leather thong that Mr. Manson gave to you the night of the second night?
A. Yes, that is what it looks like.
Q. I show you Exhibit 75 for identification, which you have previously identified as being similar to the one that Mr. Manson gave to you, and ask you now to look at both of them.
Can you tell us which one he gave to you the night of the second night?
MR. KANAREK: That is assuming facts not in evidence.
MR. STOVITZ: If either one of these two.
MR. KANAREK: Wait a minute.
Are we going to have law and order here?
May we have our objection?
THE COURT: Just a moment, Mr. Kanarek.
MR. KANAREK: May I have a ruling on my objection, your Honor?
THE COURT: Let’s not start interrupting again. We have gone through this before.
MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor, but—
THE COURT: All right.
You may both speak, but not at the same time.
MR. STOVITZ: May I withdraw my question, Counsel?
THE COURT: Reframe the question, Mr. Stovitz.
MR. STOVITZ: Thank you.
Q. Looking at both of these two leather thongs now, Exhibit 75 and Exhibit 95, can you tell us whether or not either one of those are similar or the same as the one that Mr. Manson gave to you the night of the second night?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, if I may?
That question is compound, it is ambiguous, it is irrelevant and immaterial, and it calls for a conclusion of this witness.
There are, I suppose, millions of leather thongs.
And if I can incorporate by reference what I have told the Court previously, I would like to, and I do, because of the fact that counsel is asking for conjecture at this point.
There is no foundation as to that, that item that he just brought to the witness stand.
THE COURT: Read the last question.
(The question was read by the reporter.)
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Can you tell us whether or not either one of these two items is similar to the leather thong that Mr. Manson gave to you on the second night?
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, on the grounds that it is calling for a conclusion, hearsay, immaterial, irrelevant and improper foundation.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes, they are similar.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Both of them or one is more similar than the other or—
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may the last answer be stricken on the grounds of counsel’s present question?
It is obvious that even the answer is ambiguous in his mind.
THE COURT: The motion is denied.
Let’s proceed.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Are they both similar?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, on cross-examination you were asked concerning Exhibit 75, whether this was the same leather thong that Mr. Manson gave to you on the second night. That question appears on Line 25 of Page 6789.
MR. SHINN: What volume?
MR. STOVITZ: 47.
MR. SHINN: Thank you.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. And your answer was, “Yes.”
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may he give her the transcript?
THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek, go back to your seat, sir.
MR. KANAREK: May I—
THE COURT: No, you may not.
MR. KANAREK: May I look over his shoulder, your Honor?
THE COURT: No, you may not.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. When you said on Page 6789 that you had this leather thong with you, Exhibit 75, did you mean it was the exact one, or one similar?
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor. It is assuming facts not in evidence.
THE COURT: What facts?
MR. KANAREK: That she knows either one of those alternatives.
The question is ambiguous, it is improper, it calls for a conclusion.
THE COURT: Overruled.
You may answer.
THE WITNESS: I don’t know positively if it was that leather thong. It was one like it.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Now, at one time in the cross-examination you were asked concerning when you first saw this wallet, Exhibit 65 for identification.
You said it was near Harold True’s house, and then another time you said it at Harold True’s house.
The word “at.” Did you mean near Harold True house?
A. Yes.
Q. Or in Harold True’s house?
A. No.
MR. KANAREK: I object. These questions are leading and suggestive to this witness.
THE COURT: I think the form of the question is improper.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. With respect to Exhibit 65, the wallet. Do you recall on cross-examination you were asked when the first time was you saw that wallet?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you now recall where it was?
A. Yes.
Q. Where was it?
A. In the car in front of Harold True’s house.
Q. Did you ever see this particular wallet, Exhibit 65, in Harold True’s house?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever see this particular wallet, 65, at Harold True’s house; “at” meaning inside Harold True’s house?
A. No.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, if I may?
I will object to counsel leading the witness and telling her what the words mean.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Now, during your direct examination, you said that it took you a cigarette length’s time before Mr. Manson returned to the car on the second night.
Do you recall that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Now, have you had an opportunity to reflect as to how many minutes it was that it took to smoke that cigarette?
MR. KANAREK: I object on the grounds it is improper redirect, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Well, it was a Pall Mall cigarette.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. With or without a filter?
A. Without.
Q. And was it the extra long, or was it the regular?
A. The regular.
Q. And do you know how long it took you to smoke it?
A. No, I don’t, really.
Q. Were you passing that cigarette around to the other people in the car?
A. No. I think we all had our own.
Q. Do you know whether or not the windows of the car were open?
A. Yes, they were.
Q. Have you ever timed yourself as to how long it takes you to smoke a Pall Mall?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, your Honor. It is what happened at this particular time. It is irrelevant, and calling for a conclusion.
MR. FITZGERALD: It may have some bearing, your Honor, on the length of time that elapsed.
MR. STOVITZ: I didn’t finish my question.
If my voice is failing, your Honor, it is because of the time of day.
I wish counsel wouldn’t interrupt me. It is difficult enough to ask it the first time.
THE COURT: Reframe the question, Mr. Stovitz.
MR. STOVITZ: Have you ever estimated the time it takes you to smoke a similar Pall Mall cigarette?
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor, on the grounds that it is calling for a conclusion, it is immaterial, it is irrelevant, and has nothing but prejudicial value.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Do you know whether it was ten minutes?
A. I really can’t say. I don’t know.
Q. All right.
Now, bearing in mind—have you ever watched a boxing match?
A. No.
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial and irrelevant, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
MR. STOVITZ: All right. Let’s see now.
Q. You know there are 60 seconds in a minute?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, have you ever seen how long it takes a person to run a mile?
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor. Immaterial, irrelevant, calling for a conclusion.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Do you know how long it takes a person to run a mile?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, irrelevant, and calling for a conclusion.
Glenn Cunningham does it in a different time than—
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Now, when you were driving around on the second night in this particular Ford automobile, did you know of your own knowledge how to go from the Spahn Ranch to Harold True’s house if you wanted to go there?
MR. KANAREK: Asked and answered, your Honor, on direct examination. This is improper, your Honor, redirect examination.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. The time that you had been there the previous year, who, if anyone, drove there?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, your Honor. Irrelevant.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Charlie Melton.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Charlie.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Did you pay any particular attention to the streets or routes he went on?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial and irrelevant.
THE COURT: Overruled.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Did Mr. Melton start from the Spahn Ranch when he went to Harold True’s house?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, irrelevant, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Now, you used the expression, “I flashed” on your cross-examination.
I believe you used it once on direct.
What do you mean by the word “flashed”?
A. Taken back, I was surprised. That is about it.
Q. Astonished?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that the same type of flash that you have when you are using LSD?
A. No, not really.
Q. And so then this term that you use, flash, was just like you said, taken aback or—
A. —surprised.
Q. —surprised?
A. Yes.
Q. When Charlie told you that he was not going in to Harold True’s house, did you know what he was going to do?
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor, calling for a conclusion and it is assuming facts not in evidence.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: How soon after Charlie told you that he was not going into Harold True’s house did he leave the car?
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor, calling for a conclusion, assuming facts not in evidence.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: He said it and then he left the car.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: And was he driving at that time?
A. No.
Q. Was he sitting in the front seat at that time?
A. Yes.
Q. When Mr. Manson left the car at that time do you recall any particular conversation that you had with Susan Atkins, Mr. Steve Grogan, that you call Clem, or yourself at that time?
MR. KANAREK: Improper redirect, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. KANAREK: It has been asked on direct.
THE WITNESS: No.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Did you overhear Miss Patsy Krenwinkel say anything?
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, same grounds.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Did any of those people in that car say at that time that they had been to that house before that particular night?
MR. KANAREK: Leading and suggestive, your Honor, irrelevant, immaterial, and also improper redirect examination.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Did you ever hear Charles Manson say that he had been to the house before that night?
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor, leading and suggestive, improper redirect examination, immaterial, irrelevant.
MR. FITZGERALD: Too general and it calls for a narrative answer. It has been asked and answered.
THE COURT: A narrative answer; I don’t understand that.
MR. FITZGERALD: Strike that. I’m sorry.
THE COURT: I think the question should be focused more, Mr. Stovitz, the objection will be sustained.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Now, before you stopped the car in front of what you now say is Harold True’s house, had you ever discussed going to Harold True’s house with Mr. Manson?
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, on the grounds that it is improper redirect examination.
It is certainly outside the scope of any cross-examination that was entered into by any of counsel.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: That particular night, after you had said, “Oh, no, not Harold True’s house,” did Mr. Manson indicate to you that he had been to that house before?
MR. KANAREK: I object, calls for a conclusion, your Honor, immaterial, irrelevant, hearsay.
THE COURT: The question is ambiguous. Sustained.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Did Mr. Manson say to you that he had been to that house before?
MR. KANAREK: Leading and suggestive, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Not that I can recall.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Now, on cross-examination you stated to us that you did not quarrel with Mr. Manson when he said he was going to the house next door.
What do you mean by that?
MR. KANAREK: Assuming facts not in evidence, your Honor, leading and suggestive.
THE COURT: What facts?
MR. KANAREK: Pardon?
THE COURT: What facts?
MR. KANAREK: The facts that—there is nothing in the evidence that says that Charlie Manson and this “quarreling”—
MR. STOVITZ: I did not use your proper words, Counsel, may I check the record for the proper words.
MR. KANAREK: Yes.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: The words were, I believe, that you did not quarrel with the fact that he was going—
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may I have that question read, please?
THE COURT: Wait until he finishes.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: You did not quarrel with the fact that he was going next door to kill?
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, that is argumentative.
That question is leading and suggestive; it is improper redirect examination. It is immaterial. It is irrelevant.
Counsel is trying to testify, your Honor. Counsel wants certain answers from this witness.
He should take the witness stand if he wants the jury to hear it—
THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek, I told you before if you want to make an objection, state the grounds.
MR. KANAREK: Yes, Your Honor, I have enunciated the grounds.
THE COURT: If you think the argument is sufficiently important, you can ask to approach the bench.
MR. KANAREK: May I approach, the bench, may I?
THE COURT: No, you may not.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Do you remember the question?
THE COURT: Read the question or reframe it, Mr. Stovitz.
Do you wish it read?
MR. STOVITZ: I will reframe it.
THE COURT: All right.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Did you quarrel with. Mr. Charles Manson when you thought that he was going next door to kill the people next door?
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, on the grounds that it is assuming facts not in evidence.
It is immaterial, irrelevant and it is leading and suggestive, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: I did not quarrel with him.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Do you recall being asked that question, a question similar to that on cross-examination?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial and irrelevant, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. What do you mean you did not quarrel with him? Did you want those people next door killed?
A. Of course not.
MR. KANAREK: Objection, your Honor. May we approach the bench?
THE COURT: The question is objectionable. Objection is sustained.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Did you intend in any way, shape or form to give approval to Mr. Charles Manson’s going next door to kill those people?
A. No.
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor. Your Honor, I must object to that question.
THE COURT: You are objecting.
MR. KANAREK: I am.
May we approach the bench?
THE COURT: It is not necessary. Overruled.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. What do you mean that you did not quarrel with Charlie Manson?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I object on the grounds that the question is assuming facts not in evidence.
There is nothing in—may I approach the bench your Honor, in connection with that?
THE COURT: That question is objectionable. The objection is sustained.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. On cross-examination you made a statement in substance that you did not quarrel with the people next door to Harold True’s being killed.
Now, what did you mean by that?
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor. Assuming facts not in evidence.
THE COURT: Just a moment, gentlemen.
MR. STOVITZ: I will try to find the exact language.
THE COURT: Don’t characterize the evidence. Either read it from the transcript or ask her if she said it.
Put the question directly to her or read it from the transcript.
Do not characterize it.
MR. STOVITZ: I will cover this tomorrow, your Honor, I will find the exact words.
I merely have a summary of them in my notes.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Now, Mrs. Kasabian, were you in any way jealous of Mr. Manson showing attention to the newer girls as they came to the ranch?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, your Honor, irrelevant, calling for a conclusion and outside the scope of cross-examination.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Now, this morning you told us that you love everybody.
Now, is this some type of love that we don’t know of.
How do you explain that love that you love everybody?
A. I mean on a universal level, on a spiritual level I love all of mankind as myself.
Q. Even that part of mankind that does evil things?
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, in the context of these proceedings, that is leading and suggestive.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: I don’t love the principle that moves mankind to do evil things, but mankind himself, yes, I do love.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. All right, now, with particular emphasis on the love that you had for Charles Manson when you first met him at the Spahn Ranch, and the type of love that you had for him when you left the Spahn Ranch in the middle of August, did that love change in any way?
MR. KANAREK: That is ambiguous, your Honor. That question is ambiguous. It is immaterial and it is irrelevant.
THE COURT: Overruled.
Do you understand the question?
THE WITNESS: Not really.
THE COURT: Perhaps it is ambiguous. Reframe it.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Does love have a different type of intensity, say, in the middle of July than it does in the middle of August, is that correct?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Leading and suggestive and ambiguous.
THE COURT: Overruled.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. In what way did it change from the middle of July to the middle of August?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, irrelevant, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: The principle of Charlie Manson is what I did not like.
But the spirit of Charlie Manson is the spirit of myself, as of all mankind, I love.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Now, you started to tell us about all of the conversations that you had with Charles Manson when other persons were present and when you were alone with him, and you got to about two or three conversations yesterday.
Did you write these conversations down as they occurred?
MR. KANAREK: That question, your Honor, is incomprehensible. It is ambiguous. It is immaterial and it is irrelevant.
THE COURT: Do you understand the question?
THE WITNESS: Are you asking me if I wrote them down?
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Yes.
A. When?
Q. When they occurred.
A. No.
Q. Did you write them down the next night as you went back to your sleeping bag and went to sleep?
A. No.
Q. Did you keep any type of a diary?
A. No.
Q. When was the first time ever that you started to think about these conversations that you had with Charles Manson?
A. I thought a little bit about what he told me right after I left.
Q. What do you mean by that?
A. When I left the ranch.
Q. When you were driving away or when you were already in New Mexico?
A. When I was already in New Mexico. I was trying to figure out what it was all about and—
Q. Did you ever figure out what it was all about?
MR. KANAREK: That is calling for a conclusion, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Now, with respect to this particular group living that you experienced at the Spahn Ranch, were there some people that stayed at the Spahn Ranch that did not live within this group?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, irrelevant, calling for a conclusion, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: The ranch hands?
Q. Well, if that is what they were.
A. Yes.
Q. And do you remember any of these ranch hands’ names?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, irrelevant.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Johnnie Schwartz and there was a guy named Vern, who was fairly new.
Q. Vern Thompson or Vern Plumlee?
A. I don’t know the last name.
Q. A younger man or older man?
A. Young, tall.
Q. Did he say what his occupation was?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, irrelevant, your Honor, outside the scope of cross-examination, clearly.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: And anyone else that you can recall?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, irrelevant.
THE WITNESS: Larry.
THE COURT: Overruled.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Was there a man there—
THE COURT: What was the name?
THE WITNESS: Larry.
THE COURT: Larry.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Was there a man there with one arm?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, irrelevant, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Do you remember what his name was?
A. Randy Starr.
Q. Do you remember what his function at the ranch was?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, irrelevant.
May we approach the bench?
THE COURT: Overruled.
You may not.
THE WITNESS: He used to be a movie star.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: How did you know he was a movie star?
A. He told me.
MR. KANAREK: I ask all that be stricken on the basis it’s hearsay.
MR. FITZGERALD: He was a movie star.
THE COURT: Read the last question and answer, Mr. Reporter.
(Whereupon, the reporter read the last question and answer as follows:
(“Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: How did you know he was a movie star?
“A. He told me.”)
MR. HUGHES: Mr. Fitzgerald and myself and Mr. Shinn will stipulate that Randy Starr was a movie star.
MR. KANAREK: I think stipulations should be made by checking with all counsel before they are offered to the Court.
THE COURT: That is correct. The answer is stricken. The jury is ordered to disregard it.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Did you see any movies being filmed at the Spahn Ranch during the month you were there?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, irrelevant.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: So the activity that took place on Saturday and Sunday, was that any different at the ranch than during the week?
A. On the weekends? Yeah.
Q. What activity did you notice?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, and irrelevant, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. KANAREK: Outside the scope of cross-examination.
THE WITNESS: People outside of the ranch would come in and ride the horses, and we were more or less told to stay out of sight.
MR. KANAREK: May that statement, “we were told to stay out of sight,” your Honor, be stricken on the grounds of hearsay?
THE COURT: The motion is denied.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: And when you say, “stay out of sight,” was it more than just the bunk house and the saloon and buildings like that to the ranch?
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, on the grounds it’s not material, it’s irrelevant, it’s ambiguous.
THE COURT: I don’t understand the question, Mr. Stovitz.
MR. STOVITZ: All right, I will show the witness the photographs.
Q. You saw those photographs, D, C, E and F, this morning?
A. Yes.
Q. Were there more to the ranch than just what is shown in those photographs?
A. Yes.
Q. What else was there on the ranch?
A. There was a trailer and George Spahn’s house, and some bathrooms and a shack and a parachute room, a whole bunch of barns in the back and a corral.
Q. A corral?
A. Yes.
Q. Did the corral hold horses?
A. Yes.
Q. Who took care of the horses?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, irrelevant, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: The ranch hands, and there was one girl, Cheri, who was a member of the family, but she really dug being with the horses.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. And who if anyone told you to stay out of sight when the people came on weekends?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, before that question is answered I would ask that the previous record to Cheri be stricken, your Honor, on the grounds it is a statement of hearsay and also it is not responsive to the question.
MR. STOVITZ: And that she took care of the horses?
MR. KANAREK: She stated something about Cheri and the Family and all of that. That is hearsay, your Honor.
THE COURT: The motion is denied.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Who if anyone told you to stay out of sight on weekends?
A. Charlie did.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may I enunciate my objection?
THE COURT: You may.
MR. KANAREK: On the grounds that it is outside the scope of the cross-examination; it is immaterial, irrelevant and it is a solicitation of hearsay.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. STOVITZ: Your Honor, I submit that it is in the scope of cross because he asked for conversations in cross-examination.
This is one of them which she could not remember, so I submit it is proper.
THE COURT: It appears to be hearsay.
MR. STOVITZ: What is that?
THE COURT: It appears to be hearsay.
MR. STOVITZ: It merely goes up to clear the point that she could not remember the conversations because they were so minor.
MR. KANAREK: May we approach the bench if counsel is going to make argument?
MR. BUGLIOSI: May we approach the bench?
MR. STOVITZ: We will go into it another way.
Q. Who was present at the time Mr. Manson made a statement concerning what you should do on weekends?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, that is assuming facts not in evidence.
Your Honor just sustained the objection.
MR. STOVITZ: I will reframe the question.
Q. Did Mr. Manson make a statement to you concerning what you should do on weekends when there were visitors at the Ranch?
MR. KANAREK: Leading and suggestive, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. KANAREK: May we approach the bench?
THE COURT: No.
THE WITNESS: Yes, he did.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Who else was present at the time?
A. I am not sure. He might have said it when we were eating. I am not sure.
Q. And did you follow his instructions at that time?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, calling for a conclusion.
THE WITNESS: Sometimes.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. You said “when we were eating.” When you speak of you and your friends, like Patti Krenwinkel, Leslie Van Houten and the other girls, did you generally eat together?
A. Yes.
Q. And when you ate together would you girls take turns serving?
A. Yes.
Q. Take turns cooking?
A. Yes.
Q. And did they take turns equally on these garbage runs or were there some better garbage runners than others?
A. Well, when I was there I went on most of the garbage runs because I had a driver’s license.
Q. And was there a dinner bell which sounded for chow?
A. No.
Q. How were the people called together to eat?
MR. KANAREK: All of this is immaterial and irrelevant.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Those who were living in the back house, we had a walkie-talkie system set up and we would ring the bell. Somebody would answer, you know, time to eat, whoever was at the ranch would go to the back house.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Did Mr. Manson sometimes appear for dinner?
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor, it calls for conjecture.
It is immaterial, irrelevant. It calls for a conclusion.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: We all came together at dinner.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. And to your knowledge now, thinking back, was Mr. Manson there more than 50 percent of the time or less than 50 percent of the time to dinner?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, your Honor, irrelevant, outside the scope of cross-examination.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: He was almost always there.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Did you say grace before you ate?
A. No.
Q. What about breakfast and lunch, did you also get together in the same group for breakfast and lunch, or did you mostly do your own thing for breakfast and lunch?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: I object to that question as being ambiguous, irrelevant, immaterial, outside the scope of the cross-examination.
THE COURT: It is ambiguous, Mr. Stovitz, sustained.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Breakfast and lunch, would you mostly eat by yourself, or wherever you were?
A. It was not organized.
Q. But the dinners usually were?
A. Yes.
Q. Were the dinners usually before nightfall or after nightfall?
A. We usually ate when it was dark.
Q. When it was dark?
A. Yes.
Q. Did someone conduct any type of discussion or anything like that during dinnertime?
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, calls for a conclusion, hearsay, immaterial, irrelevant, outside the scope of the cross-examination.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Would you repeat that?
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Do you know what discussion is?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you usually have a discussion during dinnertime?
A. Yes.
Q. Was this individual discussions with the person next to you or a main discussion?
A. A main discussion.
MR. KANAREK: I object on the grounds it is leading and suggestive, immaterial, irrelevant.
THE COURT: Overruled.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: A main discussion, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Did there appear to be a chairman of the board or was there just whoever started to speak first carried on the conversation?
MR. KANAREK: I will object to that, your Honor, on the grounds the question is obviously facetious; the use of the word “chairman of the board.”
MR. STOVITZ: I will withdraw the question, Counsel.
Q. All right, now, could you give us the number of people that were at these dinners, between 10 and 20, between 20 and 30—
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I will object to this broad brushing.
On top of everything else it is immaterial, it is irrelevant, it calls for a conclusion on the part of this witness; it is hearsay and it is outside of the scope of cross-examination.
THE COURT: You should sharpen the question up, Mr. Stovitz. Sustained.
MR. STOVITZ: Shorten it?
THE COURT: Sharpen it.
MR. STOVITZ: Oh, sharpen it.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: During these discussions did Charles Manson speak to the group?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: Object, leading and suggestive, your Honor. It is outside the scope of cross-examination. It is immaterial and irrelevant.
THE COURT: Read the question.
(Whereupon, the reporter reads the pending question as follows:
“Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: During these discussions did Charles Manson speak to the group?”)
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: And some of these discussions, do you recall them now? Don’t tell us what they were but do you recall these discussions now?
MR. KANAREK: I object on the ground it is immaterial, irrelevant, calls for a conclusion, hearsay, outside the scope of the cross-examination.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes, I can remember some of them.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Did you ever hear anyone during any of these discussions ever disagree with Charles Manson?
MR. KANAREK: I object, calling for a conclusion clearly, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. BY MR. STOVITZ: Okay, now, you told us the other day, I cannot remember right now whether it was Monday, Tuesday, or Wednesday, that you had searched your mind for an occasion when you had heard Charles Manson tell Tex Watson what to do.
Do you recall that inquiry being brought up, I believe the subject matter was, “Was there ever a time when you heard Charles Manson tell Tex Watson what to do?”
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, assuming facts not in evidence.
Also the question is incomprehensible. It is ambiguous. It is irrelevant; it is immaterial, the form of the question, when she answers you won’t even know what she meant.
She could not respond to that question.
THE COURT: Do you understand the question?
THE WITNESS: I have forgotten it now. Too much confusion.
THE COURT: Reframe the question.
MR. STOVITZ: All right.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Do you remember being shown the notes of yours by Mr. Kanarek the other day?
A. Yes.
Q. And you recognized your handwriting?
A. Yes.
Q. And in your own handwriting there was something said about you could not recall a time when Mr. Manson ordered Tex Watson to do anything.
Do you remember that?
A. I thought I wrote it the other way around.
Q. All right. Tell us—
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, and I would ask that that statement be stricken, where she says “I thought I wrote it the other way around.” It is not responsive to this question.
THE COURT: The question hasn’t been put yet.
MR. KANAREK: That’s right. Therefore, it is not responsive to anything.
I would ask that it be stricken and request that the jury be instructed not to consider it for any purpose.
THE COURT: Reframe the question, Mr. Stovitz.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Aside from the first night, before that first night, when you tell us what you told us about on your direct and cross-examination as to what Mr. Manson told Mr. Watson to do and everything like that—
A. Yes?
Q. —do you ever recall any other instance in which Mr. Manson told Mr. Watson what to do?
MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor, on the ground that it assumes facts not in evidence.
I object to the form of the question. It solicits a conclusion.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Now, with respect to some of the girls at the Ranch there. Did they all stay at the buildings?
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, I will object to the question. The question is patently impossible to answer.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: I don’t really quite understand your question.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Did all of the girls stay at the main buildings at the front of the ranch?
MR. KANAREK: That is calling for a conclusion, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Where did some of them stay?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, your Honor. Irrelevant.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Well, they were scattered. Some were in the parachute room, some were in the trailer, some were in George Spahn’s house; maybe some were up in the woods.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Do you ever recall an occasion when Gypsy had to sit on some sort of a rock or a mountain for a period of time?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, irrelevant, leading and suggestive.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. KANAREK: Outside the scope of cross.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Do you recall when that occurred?
A. Right about the same time.
Q. What time?
A. That these two nights occurred.
Q. About the same night of the Tate and the second night?
A. Well, let me think.
She went to the Waterfall or this rock maybe a few days before the two nights.
Q. Do you recall the occasion why she went there?
A. Yes.
MR. KANAREK: I object.
Calling for a conclusion, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. Did you know of your own knowledge as to why Gypsy went to the Waterfall?
MR. KANAREK: Calling for a conclusion, hearsay, immaterial.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. STOVITZ:
Q. With respect to Gypsy going to the Waterfall, could you tell us whether it was a day, two days, a week, two weeks before the first night that we are talking about, August the 8th, 1969?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, irrelevant, your Honor, and calling for a conclusion on the part of the witness.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. KANAREK: And ambiguous.
THE WITNESS: A couple of days.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. And when you left the ranch on this date that you drove away on the second day with Mr. Hannon’s car, did you notice where Gypsy was on that occasion?
MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor. Immaterial, irrelevant, calling for a conclusion, and outside the scope of cross-examination.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Well, the night before she was at the waterfall.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. How did you know that?
A. Because I was there.
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial and irrelevant, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may I have what her answer was to that question?
THE WITNESS: Because I was there.
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor?
THE COURT: Read the answer.
(The answer was read by the reporter.)
MR. KANAREK: Thank you.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Mrs. Kasabian, you used the expression “shock” and “I was in a state of shock,” concerning the events that took place after you heard the gun fired on the first night.
Do you recall using those expressions?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, when you used the terms “state of shock” and “shock,” were you using the definition that we know that doctors use?
MR. KANAREK: I object. That is calling for a conclusion.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Did you ever take physiology in high school?
MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, irrelevant; unless he is going to establish her as some kind of an expert, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KANAREK: And it is irrelevant.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Were you using the term “shock” in a scientific way?
MR. KANAREK: That is calling for a conclusion, your Honor. Irrelevant and immaterial.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. What did you mean? What words—synonyms, I think it is, would you use for the word “shock”?
A. Just—
MR. KANAREK: Your Honor—wait—I will object. That is ambiguous.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. KANAREK: May I make the point, your Honor?
The point is that when he says “synonym”—
THE COURT: He is asking her what she meant when she used the word.
MR. KANAREK: That I agree would be a proper question. But he is asking a different question.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. KANAREK: Perhaps she may be answering, your Honor—
THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek.
MR. KANAREK: Yes. I am sorry.
MR. STOVITZ: Do you remember the question?
THE WITNESS: No.
MR. STOVITZ: Q. Your definition of the word “shock.” Could you give us other words, instead of “shock,” or a simple definition for the word “shock.”
MR. KANAREK: That is the ambiguity, your Honor.
Does it mean what she thinks in her mind? Or does it mean a synonym of shock that she may think applies in general, perhaps, to some other people or some other situation.
I would have no objection if—
THE COURT: Overruled.
You may answer.
THE WITNESS: What do I think shock is?
MR. STOVITZ: Q. In what context did you use the word “shock”?
A. The word “shock”?
Q. Yes.
A. Just as seeing something totally unbelievable. I was put in a state of shock.
I can’t—shock is the only word I can say. I can’t give you the emotional description of it.
Q. Did you feel your blood pressure fall down to 110, or something like that?
MR. KANAREK: Calling for a conclusion, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
We will adjourn at this time, Mr. Stovitz.
Ladies and gentlemen, do not converse with anyone nor form or express any opinion regarding the case until it is finally submitted to you.
The Court will adjourn until 9:45.
(Whereupon, at 4:15 the court was in adjournment.)