Historic Trial Transcripts

(The following proceedings occurred in open court, all counsel, defendants and jury present:)

MR. KANAREK: May I address the Court, your Honor?

THE COURT: All parties, counsel and jurors are present.

Yes, Mr. Kanarek?

MR. KANAREK: Thank you, your Honor.

Mrs. Lust, Sergeant Lust, your Honor, at Sybil Brand Institute has been subpoenaed for this morning and I wonder if your Honor would order her back tomorrow.

We can make arrangements with the coordinator so that she is not inconvenienced. I am more than glad to give her an hour’s notice, or whatever is convenient for her, so she can come here and testify in connection with the matter she was subpoenaed for.

THE COURT: Do you want her on call?

MR. KANAREK: That is perfectly agreeable, if the Sheriff’s Department will represent that she will—that they will supply her within a reasonable time.

MR. STOVITZ: 48 hours or 24 hours, Counsel? What would you like?

MR. KANAREK: I would be willing to make it 24 hours.

THE COURT: You will be excused at this time subject to call on 24 hours notice.

MR. KANAREK: Thank you.

THE COURT: You may proceed, Mr. Bugliosi.

BY MR. BUGLIOSI:

Q. Linda, after you told Mr. Manson why you had come to live at Spahn Ranch—

MR. KANAREK: Wait a minute, your Honor. You were going to—may I approach the bench?

THE COURT: What is it?

MR. KANAREK: In connection with the last matter that was before the Court, your Honor indicated that after the recess, the record will reveal, your Honor indicated that further matters would be taken up before your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you have something further to take up?

MR. KANAREK: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. You may approach the bench.

(Whereupon all counsel approached the bench and the following proceedings occurred at the bench, outside of the hearing of the jury:)

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, in response to Mr. Bugliosi, Mr. Manson is not on trial for—

THE COURT: Enlighten us as to what you are talking about. Are you making a motion or objection, or what?

MR. KANAREK: Mr. Bugliosi made an extensive argument in connection with the last answer and objection and question of Mrs. Kasabian.

THE COURT: What do you want to say?

MR. KANAREK: What I want to say is this: That it is clear that the question and the answer is hearsay, it is a conclusion, it is immaterial, it is outside of the scope of anything that is before the Court in any way of conspiracy or anything else.

Mr. Bugliosi’s argument is just because he wants to get it in.

He has read his own press notices. Mr. Manson—

THE COURT: State your objection if you have one, Mr. Kanarek. Is that it? Is there anything further?

MR. KANAREK: He is not here on a charge of heresy.

THE COURT: Make your objection.

MR. KANAREK: I will enunciate it.

THE COURT: Do you have anything further?

MR. KANAREK: If you will let me finish?

THE COURT: I want to hear your argument, if you have one, directed specifically to the objection.

MR. KANAREK: I think it will be clear in your Honor’s mind if your Honor had the last question and answer read back.

THE COURT: I remember what it is. Let’s proceed.

MR. KANAREK: It is clearly hearsay. It has no materiality, it has no relevancy to the case.

If the District Attorney has not pleaded his case properly, that is his fault.

The only conspiracy is between the 8th and the 10th. There is no contention in here in connection with Mr. Manson—

THE COURT: That is when the overt acts were alleged, you mean?

MR. KANAREK: The conspiracy itself is alleged to have taken place between the 8th and the 10th.

THE COURT: All right.

I want to take up another matter with the People.

While it is true that a conspiracy can—and sometimes can only—be proved by circumstantial evidence, that does not mean that every hearsay statement that precedes the act is admissible.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Right.

THE COURT: Evidence of the relationship of the parties, among other things, the transactions that occurred between them, and so forth, all of these matters are admissible as being relevant on the question of whether or not a conspiracy was ever formed. However, you are also confronted with 1223 of the Evidence Code which sets forth the very limited period in which the declarations of a defendant or a party where a conspiracy is being alleged may be admissible as against that party.

Now, as I read that section, notwithstanding the fact that circumstantial evidence may be used to prove a conspiracy, this does not give you a wide-open avenue within which to get in every hearsay statement.

MR. BUGLIOSI: It is not just being offered on the conspiracy. In fact, I would say this: I would say that it is primarily being offered against Charles Manson alone on the seven counts of murder, to show his domination over that Family, not necessarily the agreement.

It is being offered for multiple purposes, but to show that he is the guy who ordered these seven murders.

Now, the People have an enormous burden to meet in this case, your Honor, because these are extremely bizarre murders and extremely unlikely to the average lay person that any man would have that much power to order seven murders; and in order to make it believable to the jury, we have to tell the jury what kind of a man Charles Manson is, and we can only do that by bringing in his statements.

Many of them are not being offered for the truth of the matter. If he told Linda Kasabian, “I am Jesus Christ,” it has nothing to do with the conspiracy, but it only is going against Charles Manson. If she believed him, this could be one reason why she followed his orders that night.

I am just giving you a hypothetical example. It is not necessarily being offered for the truth.

THE COURT: Is the reason important?

MR. BUGLIOSI: The reason for what, your Honor?

THE COURT: Is the reason that she followed him important?

MR. BUGLIOSI: It is going toward—

THE COURT: Whether he said he was Jesus Christ or the Devil. It has nothing to do with the conspiracy.

MR. BUGLIOSI: But I am saying that conspiracy is only one count of the indictment. We have seven murder counts.

THE COURT: Let me put it this way, Mr. Bugliosi: At the moment I am far from clear as to the ground upon which these preliminary conversations could be admitted.

MR. BUGLIOSI: They are coming in for many, many reasons, your Honor.

THE COURT: Then I’d like to start hearing those, your specific grounds.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Okay.

One ground is to show the interrelationship between the parties which led up to their entering into an agreement.

People normally don’t decide to rob a bank or murder someone or burglarize a place unless they know each other.

THE COURT: I understand that. But what I am asking from you now is the legal basis for the admissibility of this conversation.

MR. BUGLIOSI: It would come in probably under the res gestae of the conspiracy, not of the murders but of the conspiracy to show the background relationship between the parties.

That is one reason it is coming in.

THE COURT: You can show the background and relationship of the parties without conversation testimony.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I think it is absolutely impossible, your Honor, to show a relationship if you don’t have what the people said to each other, if all you can say is that they had a conversation.

THE COURT: You tell me how you can get around 1223 of the Evidence Code.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Could I look at 1223, your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

There are two basic requirements in that section apart from the fact that you actually have to prove a conspiracy. As a prerequisite for the declaration of a hearsay declarant against a party, the provisions in Paragraphs A and B of that section have to be met.

MR. BUGLIOSI: If a statement was made prior to or during the time that the party—subdivision B—evidence of a statement offered against a party is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement was made prior to or during the time that the party was participating in that conspiracy.

THE COURT: What about A?

MR. BUGLIOSI: If the statement was made by the declarant while participating.

I think B is in the disjunctive.

THE COURT: It is not.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I think by definition, your Honor, A is the statement made by the declarant while participating in a conspiracy to commit a crime or civil wrong, and in furtherance of the object, B, the statement was made prior to or during the time that the parties participated in the conspiracy.

THE COURT: No. They are talking about two different people, Mr. Bugliosi. One is the declarant and the other is the party.

MR. BUGLIOSI: My apologies.

Your Honor, I don’t want to narrow my offer of proof to the conspiracy.

THE COURT: All I am saying is that I want you to show me some legal basis upon which these conversations are admissible.

MR. STOVITZ: We will furnish those cases to your Honor tomorrow morning, and we will get on with the testimony of this witness now. Then we will backtrack.

MR. BUGLIOSI: No. That is not the way to do it.

MR. STOVITZ: Are we going to stay up here all day?

MR. BUGLIOSI: We are going to resolve this issue with the Judge and put it in chronological order if we can.

THE COURT: I would suggest this, gentlemen. It is obviously important to all parties concerned.

I don’t mind taking a little time to resolve it—

MR. BUGLIOSI: Right.

THE COURT: —properly.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I am primarily producing this evidence against Charles Manson himself. He is charged with seven counts of murder, and I want to show what type of a person he is.

THE COURT: What difference does it make what type of a person he is?

MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, we have got this enormous burden to prove that he ordered these seven murders. Now, it is not very believable that a person would have that power to send a person out on a mission of murder.

If that is all we could put on, we wouldn’t have a case.

Now, we are telling the jury who Charles Manson is, what his philosophies on life are. “Helter Skelter,” the Beatles. This is part of our case.

THE COURT: I know what you are saying. At the moment I do not see that these conversations, until we get into the actual conspiracy itself—

MR. BUGLIOSI: Even on the night?

THE COURT: Whenever it occurs, if it occurs, under 1223 of the Evidence Code.

I am not saying that circumstantial evidence of conspiracy is not admissible. I am talking about conversations, the hearsay declarations. They are two entirely separate things.

MR. BUGLIOSI: The question I have of the Court is why is the Court limiting this particular bit of evidence to the conspiracy? That is only one count of the indictment.

May I have just a moment, your Honor?

THE COURT: All right.

MR. KANAREK: I won’t speak while he is gone, your Honor, but—

THE COURT: You were speaking, weren’t you?

MR. KANAREK: I am saying that I am not going to make an argument out of the hearing of my voice.

THE COURT: Let’s wait until he gets back, Mr. Kanarek.

MR. KANAREK: Yes. That is what I am saying. I am voluntarily waiting.

MR. BUGLIOSI: My point, your Honor, is that he is charged separately with seven counts of murder, and these statements that he has made is circumstantial evidence of his power over the Family, and that it was he who ordered these murders, and that is why he is guilty of these murders.

Something can come in for more than one reason, your Honor. The first seven counts of the indictment don’t even mention a conspiracy. Manson is charged with all these murders. And this is basically why I am offering this evidence as circumstantial evidence to show that he was the leader of that Family, that he was the leader of the Family, and I can only do that by showing what he told the Family to do.

THE COURT: It doesn’t solve the problem to talk about a leader of a family. I have to have some legal basis for the admission of these hearsay declarations. That is what I am asking you for.

I don’t care whether he was the leader of a family or not. What I want to know is on what basis the evidence should come in. It appears to be hearsay.

You will have to show me some reason. Either it isn’t hearsay or comes within some exception.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Let’s assume it is hearsay for the sake of argument. It clearly comes under the admission exception to the hearsay rule.

For instance, a statement made by him that there is no such thing as wrong. That is an exception to the hearsay rule.

I have got to offer it. It goes toward the motives for the murders; that this man ordered the seven brutal murders and thought nothing was wrong.

THE COURT: You can’t work backwards. Because you want to get it in to prove motive doesn’t mean it is necessarily admissible.

MR. BUGLIOSI: It goes toward motive, it goes toward state of mind, your Honor, it goes toward state of mind, which is certainly in issue in this case.

One of the elements of murder is malice aforethought. One of the elements of murder is malice aforethought, which we have to prove against Charles Manson. These statements that he has made about death and killings go to his state of mind.

THE COURT: I am not saying that there are no conversations, Mr. Bugliosi, which are admissible. I am saying that the conversations that you are now talking about which precede by one month any of the alleged crimes do not appear to have any relation to the crime and do not seem to fit within any exception to the hearsay rule.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Let me make this offer of proof on this particular conversation: She tells him why she came to the Family. He feels her legs and seems pleased with her. That night he comes back and he has sexual intercourse with her. While he is having sexual intercourse with her, he tells her that she has got a father hangup, and this impresses her a lot because she did have a hangup with her stepfather.

Now, this is not being offered for proof of the matter that she does, in fact, have a father hangup. It is being offered to show what type of a bizarre, talismanic individual this man is.

In fact, she was very impressed. She said, “Gee, how do you know that I have a father hangup?”

It is part of the whole picture, your Honor. The jury is entitled to know these things.

THE COURT: I don’t see that at all.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I would almost say, your Honor, that probably our whole case against Charles Manson is to show the relationship he had with his Family.

If he were one of the murderers—

THE COURT: I am not precluding you from showing the relationship. What I am suggesting is that you have not given me any real basis for the admission of these hearsay declarations.

MR. BUGLIOSI: It is not offered for the proof of the matter asserted, your Honor. I am not offering the statement that “you have a father hangup” for the truth of the matter.

I don’t think that is hearsay.

If I were offering it to prove that she did have a father hangup, then it would be hearsay. I am not offering it for the truth of the matter asserted.

THE COURT: In order to save time, I suggest that we proceed. For the time being I am going to sustain the objection to these hearsay declarations.

I am not making a general announcement of that at this time, but I have the general feeling that unless they can clearly come within some exception, they will be inadmissible.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Can I ask the Court this? Could the Court advise the jury that these statements are not coming in for the truth of the matter asserted, that they are not to consider that fact?

THE COURT: No.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Hearsay is Section—

THE COURT: I can’t do that, Mr. Bugliosi.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Let me look at 1200, your Honor.

“Hearsay evidence is evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying at a hearing and offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.”

THE COURT: I am aware of that.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I am not offering it for the truth of the matter. I am not offering it for that.

THE COURT: Then you have failed to show what the relevance is.

MR. BUGLIOSI: The relevance is enormous.

THE COURT: I would suggest that sometime between now and tomorrow you research this matter and be able to present to me in some coherent form precisely on what theory these hearsay declarations you are now going into are admissible.

As I said before, I am not saying that there are no conversations that are admissible. I haven’t heard them all, so I don’t know. I am saying that these that precede the events by a month seem to bear no relation to anything and don’t seem to come within the hearsay exception.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Why does the Court feel that we are offering this statement for the truth of the matter? I don’t understand it.

I am not offering it for that purpose. If I were, then I would say we would not come under the exception. I am not offering it for that purpose.

The relevance is his control, his domination, his influence over the Family. We are claiming that he is the guy that ordered these murders and I’m showing it by his statements and by his conduct.

I am not offering these statements to prove the truth of the matter asserted. If I were we would be talking about exceptions to the hearsay rule.

If he tells her she’s got a father hangup, I am not offering that to prove that Linda Kasabian had a father hangup.

I am offering it to show the way he started reaching into her mind, from the very moment she joined the Family he started working on her mind to make her believe he is some type of mysterious, powerful creature. This is why I am offering it.

THE COURT: What is the relevance? What if he were a mysterious, powerful creature, then what?

MR. BUGLIOSI: This is circumstantial evidence then.

THE COURT: Of what?

MR. BUGLIOSI: That on two nights in question they did whatever he told them to do. It is powerful circumstantial evidence—it is the whole case.

He sits back and says, “Go out and murder these people.” They say, “He is Charles Manson, we’ve got to obey him.”

THE COURT: I think there is another way to get at it. I think the witnesses can testify as to what was done, I think, within certain limits they can testify to what their state of mind was.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, I never anticipated any trouble in this very basic area.

THE COURT: I am prepared to think about it a good deal more, Mr. Bugliosi.

MR. FITZGERALD: I think Mr. Bugliosi’s method of argument to the Court is highly improper.

I don’t think this Court is concerned with whether or not this constitutes all the evidence you have against Manson or whether or not this is your whole case or not. If it is inadmissible, it’s inadmissible.

MR. BUGLIOSI: But in my mind it is not being offered for the truth of the matter, none of these statements.

If he said he is Jesus Christ, it’s not offered for the truth of the matter said. I am making that representation to the Court, for me to say it is offered for the truth of the matter asserted, it would be for me to believe he is Jesus Christ, and I wanted the jury to believe it.

THE COURT: Let’s proceed, gentlemen, if you can proceed without asking questions about the conversations, if you want to do that, I suggest if you want to research further we can have argument again in the morning.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I will research it, your Honor, but I know the position I am going to come up with is that these statements have extreme relevance to show his control over his family, and I am not offering them for the truth of the matter asserted.

THE COURT: You show me how and why they are admissible and I will be happy to listen to it.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I will try to improve my way of articulating it now, but I really don’t know if I am able to.

I am ready to say if these statements by Manson show his state of mind and show what led up to these murders, that the Family believed he was a special type of individual, maybe Jesus Christ, he told them he was crucified on the cross.

I am not offering that to prove he was crucified.

THE COURT: I am not referring to any specific statement.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I am giving you an example of all these crazy, bizarre things he told the members of his Family.

I am not offering it for the truth, merely to show the relationship between him and the Family.

He worked on them. He transplanted his mind into theirs so they did not have a mind any more.

When he told them to go out and commit these murders, they did not have a choice. The only way I can do that is to put on evidence as to what he told them, not for the truth of the matter.

I don’t know what basic I can come up with, except Section 1200 of the Evidence Code, it says hearsay is evidence offered for the truth of the matter, and I am not offering it for that purpose.

THE COURT: All right, let’s proceed.

MR. KANAREK: Since it is our position that this is hearsay, prejudicial hearsay, it is prejudicial immaterial matter that has been uttered by this witness, we ask your Honor to admonish the jury not to consider the last question and answer for any purpose.

First of all we would have the Court to advise the jury in that regard.

THE COURT: That is denied, let’s proceed.

MR. BUGLIOSI: For a short period now I will be going into his philosophy of mind, what he told her about “Helter Skelter” and things like that.

It is our case.

MR. KANAREK: If he has no case, he has no case.

He may wish to accuse me of killing John Kennedy. Because the District Attorney wishes to prove a case does not mean our entire law has to go down the drain.

Therefore this is inadmissible hearsay.

MR. BUGLIOSI: It is the philosophy of what the People were. It is not for the truth of the matter.

THE COURT: What you are talking about is motive. And as you have said motive is not an essential element to the crime. You are not entitled to prove motive by any means available, only by lawful means available.

MR. BUGLIOSI: The Court is not suggesting that we cannot put on Manson’s statement about Helter Skelter, when Helter Skelter was put in blood at the LaBianca residence.

THE COURT: Certainly not, that would be highly relevant.

MR. BUGLIOSI: That is what this is all about.

THE COURT: This is not what you are asking for.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I said I am about to go into his statements about his philosophy of life, which are related to these murders, which are definitely related to these murders, his philosophies about death, his philosophies about killing.

THE COURT: We are just going to have to proceed question by question. I cannot anticipate everything you are going to ask her.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Okay, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. KANAREK: I would like to also make the point, your Honor, that during this interim, your Honor—

THE COURT: Mr. Bugliosi is not here now.

(Mr. Bugliosi returns to the bench.)

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, first of all we ask your Honor—

THE COURT: Get to the point.

MR. KANAREK: We ask your Honor to sustain the objection and instruct the jury.

THE COURT: I already overruled that.

MR. KANAREK: Because of the offense of sex in connection with this last question, it is prejudicial.

THE COURT: Denied.

MR. KANAREK: Also your Honor, may the record reveal that during this long interlude at the bench, Mr. Fleischman, Mr. Goldman and the witness Kasabian have spoken at great length with the Deputy Sheriff in the presence of the jury, that is a fact I am sure your Honor will agree to.

THE COURT: I wouldn’t agree to it; I have not seen it.

MR. KANAREK: I represent to the Court and offer to be sworn in that regard.

THE COURT: What difference does it make?

MR. KANAREK: This is the difference:

During the recess when the recess started I came over to Mrs. Kasabian. I wanted to talk to her. She was about to talk to me.

Mr. Bugliosi was standing right next to her; Mr. Goldman was standing—

THE COURT: I don’t want to get this all on the record. Now, if you have a motion or a petition to make, you support it with a declaration and we will take it up out of the presence of the jury tomorrow morning or any morning before the trial starts.

MR. KANAREK: I make a motion we be allowed to interview her.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Is the Court’s ruling his telling her about the father hangup, is that admissible?

THE COURT: I wouldn’t think so. I don’t see under what theory.

MR. BUGLIOSI: The following question is, “Did this impress you?”

She would say, “Yes, I did not know how he could possibly know that I had a father hangup.”

In the end that goes again, this goes towards why she found herself—

THE COURT: I don’t see it, Mr. Bugliosi. Now, if you want to bring it up again tomorrow after you had a chance to reflect on it further I will be happy to listen to you.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Okay, thank you.

(The following proceedings were had in open court in the presence and hearing of the jury:)

Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: After you told Mr. Manson why you had come to Spahn Ranch, did he do anything—

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, that assumes facts which are not in evidence.

THE COURT: Overruled, you may answer.

THE WITNESS: Yes, he felt my legs and seemed to think they were okay or whatever.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, that is most prejudicial.

It has no materiality.

THE COURT: Are you making a motion or an objection?

MR. KANAREK: Yes, I make a motion, your Honor, that the jury be asked not to consider that for any purpose, it has nothing but prejudicial value. It does not tend to prove any issue.

THE COURT: I don’t want to hear the argument.

MR. KANAREK: I will ask to approach the bench if I might in that regard.

THE COURT: That won’t be necessary. The motion will be denied.

Let’s proceed.

Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: Where did you stay that night?

A. In a cave up in back of the ranch.

Q. When was the next time that you saw Mr. Manson?

A. The next night or maybe the night after, I am not sure.

MR. KANAREK: May I ask it be stricken as not material, your Honor, the dates in question here are August 8th—

THE COURT: I don’t want the argument, just state your motion or objection.

MR. KANAREK: Immaterial.

THE COURT: The motion to strike is denied.

Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: Where did you meet Mr. Manson on this following occasion?

A. Inside the cave.

Q. What took place at that time?

MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, your Honor.

THE COURT: What date are we talking about, Mr. Bugliosi?

MR. BUGLIOSI: I imagine somewhere around the 7th or 8th of July, your Honor, one month before the murders took place.

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, may we approach the bench?

THE COURT: You may not, sir, the objection will be sustained.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I am not asking for any conversations now between Mr.—

MR. KANAREK: Would your Honor ask the jury not to consider Mr. Bugliosi’s statements? It is for the jury to determine whether there are any murders or not.

THE COURT: That is true. I am sure the jury will understand that Mr. Bugliosi’s statement is referring to the murders alleged in the indictment.

There has been no proof of anything so far.

Let’s proceed.

Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: You mentioned earlier, Linda, about a family, is that what the people were called out at the Spahn Ranch?

A. Yes.

MR. KANAREK: Objection on the grounds it is assuming facts not in evidence. There is no evidence of any family. What they are called is hearsay, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Kanarek, I told you before I just want the motion or the objection and grounds without the argument.

MR. KANAREK: And I respectfully ask the Court to ask the witness—

THE COURT: Sit down, sir.

MR. KANAREK: —not to respond—

THE COURT: Sit down, sir.

Delay your answer, Mrs. Kasabian, to permit counsel to object.

Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: So the group is called the Family, it that correct?

MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, leading and suggestive, hearsay and a conclusion.

MR. BUGLIOSI: She already testified to it, your Honor.

THE COURT: Overruled.

Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: The group was called the Family, Linda?

MR. KANAREK: I object, leading and suggestive, calling for hearsay.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: Did you become a member of the Family?

A. Yes.

MR. KANAREK: I object, conclusion, hearsay.

MR. BUGLIOSI: She can testify whether she joined an organization, anyone can.

MR. KANAREK: No foundation for that, your Honor.

THE COURT: Overruled.

Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: Did you become a member of the Family, Linda?

A. Yes.

MR. KANAREK: Objection on the ground of assuming facts not in evidence.

THE COURT: I already ruled on that, Mr. Kanarek.

THE WITNESS: Yes, I do.

Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: Who was the head of the family, Linda?

MR. KANAREK: I object, it calls for conclusion, hearsay, no foundation.

MR. BUGLIOSI: If a person is a member of a group of organization, certainly they are in a position to testify who was the head of that group.

THE COURT: I don’t want the argument, Mr. Bugliosi, from either you or Mr. Kanarek state the motion or objection and I will rule on it.

The objection will be sustained.

The question is ambiguous.

BY MR. BUGLIOSI:

Q. How many people were in the Family, Linda?

MR. KANAREK: Object, assuming facts not in evidence, conclusion, hearsay, that there ever was a Family.

MR. FITZGERALD: Join in Mr. Kanarek’s objection.

THE COURT: Sustained.

BY MR. BUGLIOSI:

Q. What was the Family that you were a member of, Linda? You said you were a member of a Family. What do you mean by that?

MR. KANAREK: Object, your Honor, calling for a conclusion, hearsay, assuming facts not in evidence, immaterial and ambiguous.

THE COURT: Overruled, you may answer.

THE WITNESS: I don’t understand your question.

BY MR. BUGLIOSI:

Q. You said you were a member of the Family, what did you mean by that?

MR. KANAREK: I must object, your Honor, because the witness—

THE COURT: Overruled.

MR. KANAREK: May I make the objection at the bench, then, your Honor?

THE COURT: No, you may not, sir.

MR. KANAREK: May I make the objection?

THE COURT: I have already ruled on the objection.

MR. KANAREK: I have not finished making it. I have not stated the legal grounds for it.

THE COURT: All right, state the legal grounds.

MR. KANAREK: I object on the grounds of hearsay, conclusion, no foundation, assuming facts not in evidence.

And it is ambiguous.

THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer.

THE WITNESS: Well, we lived together as one Family, as a Family who lives together, a mother and a father and children, but we were just all one, and Charlie was the head.

MR. KANAREK: I move that be stricken as not responsive to the question, your Honor.

THE COURT: Overruled.

BY MR. BUGLIOSI:

Q. You say Charlie was the head?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, how many people were in this group that you called the Family?

MR. KANAREK: I object, your Honor, calling for a conclusion, no foundation.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: Let’s see, maybe 20 that stayed there all the time, and there were a few coming in and out.

BY MR. BUGLIOSI:

Q. Were these mostly girls or boys?

A. Yes, mostly girls.

Q. Were they mostly young people?

A. Yes.

MR. KANAREK: Calling for a conclusion, ambiguous, your Honor.

THE COURT: Overruled.

BY MR. BUGLIOSI:

Q. Where did the Family sleep at Spahn Ranch?

MR. KANAREK: Assuming facts not in evidence, your Honor.

THE WITNESS: Some slept in the saloon, some in the shed behind the saloon. There were two shacks actually and some slept in the trailer, and I believe one or two of the girls slept in George Spahn’s house.

BY MR. BUGLIOSI:

Q. Did you ever camp out away from the ranch?

A. Yes.

MR. KANAREK: I object, immaterial.

THE COURT: Overruled.

BY MR. BUGLIOSI:

Q. Can you describe where you camped, how long you camped, what took place at the camping site?

MR. KANAREK: I object, compound, your Honor.

MR. FITZGERALD: Join as to the compound.

THE COURT: Sustained.

BY MR. BUGLIOSI:

Q. Can you describe where you camped out?

MR. KANAREK: It’s immaterial, your Honor, without connection of date.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: The first place we camped out was called “The Waterfall.”

BY MR. BUGLIOSI:

Q. Where is the waterfall?

A. Near Devil’s Canyon or in Devil’s Canyon.

Q. How close to Spahn’s Ranch is that?

A. Maybe a mile and a half or two miles, I am not sure of the distance.

Q. When did this first camping take place?

A. Maybe about a week, a week and a half after I had been there.

Q. How long did you camp there?

MR. KANAREK: I ask that be stricken, all of this testimony be stricken as immaterial.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: About five days to a week.

BY MR. BUGLIOSI:

Q. Do you know who selected the camping site?

MR. KANAREK: I object, calling for a conclusion and hearsay, your Honor.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I am asking if she has any personal knowledge of it, your Honor.

THE COURT: I think it is a conclusion. Sustained.

THE WITNESS: I don’t know if it had been—

BY MR. BUGLIOSI:

Q. What was taken if anything to the camping site?

MR. KANAREK: Immaterial.

THE COURT: Overruled.

BY MR. BUGLIOSI:

Q. You may answer that, Linda.

A. Excuse me, let’s see, we had a tent and we had sleeping bags, a few cooking utensils, a bag of rice, a few baby clothes for Bear and Tanya.

Q. Who is Bear?

A. Mary Brunner’s little boy.

Q. Tanya is your daughter?

A. Right.

Q. You may continue.

MR. KANAREK: I object to her just continuing, your Honor.

THE COURT: I don’t know whether she completed her answer or not.

THE WITNESS: That is basically what we took.

BY MR. BUGLIOSI:

Q. Was anything camouflaged while you were out there?

A. Not at the waterfalls.

MR. KANAREK: I object, conclusion as to what camouflage means.

THE COURT: Overruled.

Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: Did you set up any type of walkie talkie system?

A. Not at the waterfalls.

MR. KANAREK: Immaterial.

THE COURT: The objection is overruled.

MR. KANAREK: May I approach the bench?

THE COURT: No, you may not, sir, the objection is overruled, sit down, Mr. Kanarek.

Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: Did Mr. Manson tell you girls to do anything at this first camping site?

MR. KANAREK: Immaterial solicitation of hearsay, conclusion.

MR. FITZGERALD: Hearsay as to Patricia Krenwinkel.

MR. HUGHES: Hearsay as to Leslie Van Houten.

THE COURT: Objection sustained.

Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: Now, you indicated a second camp site.

When did you go to that camp site?

MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, your Honor, and it is assuming facts not in evidence.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: Possibly a week later, actually when I was there I had no concept of time so I cannot really relate it to you here now.

Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: When you say you had no concept of time did you have calendars out there?

A. No.

Q. You were not concerned with days or dates, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. One day just followed another, is that right?

A. Right.

Q. You did not know Tuesday from Saturday?

A. No.

Q. Well, about how long after the first camping site did you go to the second camping site, approximately?

MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, your Honor.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: I would say about a week, week and a half.

Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: Where was the second comping site located?

A. It was further up from the waterfall, maybe two or three miles or something like that. It was way into the woods.

Q. Who told you to go there?

MR. KANAREK: Calling for hearsay, your Honor, and also, if I may approach the bench, I did not want to make argument in the presence of the jury.

MR. FITZGERALD: Hearsay as to Patricia Krenwinkel.

MR. HUGHES: Hearsay as to Leslie Van Houten.

THE COURT: Overruled, you may answer.

THE WITNESS: Charlie found it.

Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: Charlie found the second camping site?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you take to the second camping site?

MR. KANAREK: Immaterial.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: Everything, all kinds of—

MR. KANAREK: Your Honor, if I may have a continuing objection.

THE COURT: No, you may not, sir. Your objection has been overruled.

You may answer the question.

THE WITNESS: We took dune buggy parts, a dune buggy frame, all kinds of tools, sleeping bags, a great big tent that possibly fit ten people, cooking utensils, a little bit of food, clothing, things like that.

MR. KANAREK: I ask all that be stricken as immaterial to any charge.

THE COURT: Motion denied.

Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: Was a walkie-talkie system set up?

A. Yes, there was.

Q. Who directed a walkie-talkie system be set up?

MR. KANAREK: Immaterial.

MR. FITZGERALD: We object to any extrajudicial statements on the grounds no corpus delicti, hearsay as to Patricia Krenwinkel.

MR. BUGLIOSI: We offer it subject to a motion to strike if the corpus is not proven, your Honor.

THE COURT: Read the last question, please.

(Whereupon, the reporter read the last question as follows:

“Q. Who directed a walkie-talkie system be set up?”)

THE COURT: The objection is sustained.

Q. BY MR. BUGLIOSI: Did Charlie direct you girls to do anything at the second camping site?

MR. KANAREK: Immaterial, your Honor, also hearsay and calls for a conclusion.

THE COURT: Sustained.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, may we approach the bench?

THE COURT: Very well.

(The following proceedings were had at the bench out of the hearing of the jury:)

MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, with all—

MR. HUGHES: I find it highly prejudicial, that we go to the bench whenever Mr. Bugliosi wishes and not when Mr. Kanarek asks.

THE COURT: Don’t interrupt. Mr. Bugliosi was talking.

MR. BUGLIOSI: With all deference to the Court I don’t understand why I cannot put in Manson directing—

MR. HUGHES: I cannot hear him.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I cannot understand—with all deference to the Court I cannot understand how the Court is not permitting me to put on evidence that Manson was in charge of this Family.

I have the highest regard for the Court. I want the court to know that.

MR. HUGHES: I cannot hear anything Mr. Bugliosi is saying.

THE COURT: Then get a little closer.

MR. BUGLIOSI: At this particular point, your Honor, I am shocked at the Court’s position.

This is our case against Manson.

THE COURT: That is not a legal argument, Mr. Bugliosi, as you well know.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I agree with the Court on that.

THE COURT: The question called for hearsay. I find no exception under which it might come in. That is the reason I sustained the objection.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Well, your Honor, I want to put on evidence he was the leader of this Family.

Is the Court saying I cannot?

THE COURT: I am not making any such statement at all. I am simply passing on the motions and objections as they come in.

MR. BUGLIOSI: The only way I can prove he was the leader of the Family is that he directed everyone to do things.

I am just at a loss for words.

THE COURT: I think perhaps a good deal of it can be solved by phrasing your questions in some other manner.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I used the word “direct.”

“Who directed you to do this?” And I think the Court, that the Court sustained an objection on that.

All of these statements, as far as I am concerned, your Honor, are admissible.

THE COURT: I have seen very little so far, Mr. Bugliosi, that you could not have gotten in by some other means, by some other form of question that would not call for a hearsay response.

I think the same is true of this, if you give it some thought. I am not going to tell you how to try your lawsuit. All I can do is rule on the matters presented to me.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I agree with the Court. I know of no other way to properly show domination over the Family other than by words between the Family and the leader.

MR. HUGHES: I cannot hear you.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Excuse me, I am sorry.

As the Court knows, the Court has been with me now as the Court has been with all of the attorneys in the case, for six weeks, and I don’t make a habit, as the Court knows, of arguing to the Court on objections.

THE COURT: I know you consider it extremely important, Mr. Bugliosi.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Our position is, Charlie Manson was the leader of this Family.

MR. FITZGERALD: Those are conclusionary statements and this argument is improper.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I want to offer evidence to the Court and jury that he was the leader and the only way I can do that is by their saying, “Charlie told us to do this and Charlie told us to do that.”

MR. FITZGERALD: That is improper argument to the Court.

THE COURT: He can argue that way but it is not going to be persuasive, I can assure you.

MR. BUGLIOSI: There is no other way to show his control over the Family other than by the direction and orders he gave.

I can’t pop out of nowhere and say he told them to commit a murder. I have got to show the orders and directions that he gave which led up to this night.

THE COURT: You can certainly put on evidence as to what was done, what the parties did, what their relationship was to each other, the transactions that they engaged in together.

MR. BUGLIOSI: That is what I am doing.

THE COURT: Any conversations that go to the question of conspiracy.

MR. BUGLIOSI: This is exactly what I am doing.

THE COURT: To show an agreement or some concert of action.

MR. BUGLIOSI: This is exactly what I am talking about, your Honor. It is exactly what I am doing.

I am showing the interrelationship between these parties, that he made the decisions, “We are going to the campsite,” “We are going to do this,” “We are going to do that.”

MR. KANAREK: If I may make a homely simile?

Let’s say that someone from the Mafia—

THE COURT: I don’t need any homely simile from you, Mr. Kanarek.

MR. BUGLIOSI: If he directed the murders—

THE COURT: I think it is possible to show the same thing by other means, Mr. Bugliosi.

For example—I don’t mean to suggest that the example I am about to give you may not have infirmities in it too, but it is something to think about—

MR. BUGLIOSI: I appreciate that.

THE COURT: For example, if a witness testifies to having done something and the reason for having done it has been asked, I think it would be proper to state, for example, that she acted because Charlie told her to or commanded her to.

MR. BUGLIOSI: That is another way of having her testify—

THE COURT: I realize that. I am not saying that that is free from the same type of infirmities that I am suggesting to you, but I think it may very well possibly be hearsay.

I suggest that you give this some thought overnight, Mr. Bugliosi. We are going to have some pretrial motions tomorrow morning before the trial resumes.

MR. HUGHES: Your Honor, I don’t know how to get any closer but I can’t hear your Honor.

THE COURT: We are going to have some pretrial motions tomorrow morning before the trial resumes, and I think we can take this matter up again then.

It is almost time to recess.

MR. BUGLIOSI: The only problem is that I have to skip over all these things and then have to come back.

THE COURT: You are not going to have much more time today. You only have five minutes or so.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I had anticipated many legal problems in this case, and I have done research on them, because I kind of play the devil’s advocate, and this is one problem I guess I should have anticipated, but I never anticipated that I would have any problem with the Court showing Manson’s directions to members of the Family leading up to the night in question.

The Court can appreciate my position, that if I started out on August the 8th and he said, “Go out and kill someone,” that wouldn’t be too believable.

THE COURT: I am not suggesting that you do that, or that you have to.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I understand that.

I am saying that I never anticipated any legal problems with putting on evidence of his domination over the Family.

As I told the jury in my opening statement, everybody was slavishly obedient to him. They did his bidding. Eventually, at his command, they committed the murders.

This is what I am doing now, putting on evidence that he was the leader, he told them what to do.

Incidentally, if this was a family out there, and she has already testified to this, but who is in a better position to say who was the leader, the leader of the Family, than a member of the Family.

It would be like my asking who is the President of the United States? President Nixon. Or if I am a member of the Kiwanis Club. Who is the president of the Kiwanis Club?

I am asking who was the head of that group out there.

Who else could you ask other than a member of the group to say that he was the leader of the group? That is not conclusionary.

THE COURT: Well, I suggest that we take it up again tomorrow morning.

Can you finish out this afternoon with something else?

MR. BUGLIOSI: Again, I was going into something else here now.

“Did male visitors ever come to the Ranch? Did Manson ever tell you to do anything with them?

“Yes. He told us to make love to them if they were going to join the Family.”

Again, this is just the People’s case here that I am putting on.

He wanted them to join the Family. He told the girls to make love to them so they would join the Family.

I pride myself, your Honor—

THE COURT: What was the last question that you asked that I sustained an objection to? Do you recall that?

MR. BUGLIOSI: Did Charlie tell you girls to do anything at the campsite?

And the answer is: He wanted us to make magical witchy things to hang in the trees.

We are talking about extremely bizarre murders. This type of stuff is circumstantial evidence of what led up to the two murders. That they were leading a weird, far-out, unconventional type of existence. That he was the leader. Whatever he said, they did.

I pride myself in being a rather experienced trial Deputy, and if I knew how to prove that he had control without introducing evidence of the statements he made to them directing them to do things, “Dress this way,” “I don’t want you to get haircuts any more,” there is just no other way that I can do it. I am just confounded.

If I were a first year law student, I would say, “Well, there has got to be another way,” but I have got quite a bit of trial experience, your Honor, and I don’t know of any other way to do it but than by what he told them.

MR. FITZGERALD: The point is, whether Mr. Bugliosi knows another way of bringing in hearsay that is not relevant to Patricia Krenwinkel, he hasn’t established a corpus delicti, he hasn’t even begun to establish a corpus delicti—

THE COURT: That is not the problem.

MR. FITZGERALD: He starts out with a bald-faced conclusion: that there is a Family in existence. He starts out with another conclusion: that he is a member of some sort of a family, when that obviously is a conclusion.

He purports to represent to the Court just exactly what this witness is going to testify to, but he has represented to counsel through the Court that there is no verbatim transcript of any questions and answers that she is likely to give, and it is obvious from what happened earlier in the courtroom when she mentioned Mr. Manson’s past jail experience.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I was unaware of that.

MR. FITZGERALD: He Isn’t in control of what she is going to say.

MR. BUGLIOSI: That is true of any witness.

MR. KANAREK: He is now going into matters which are not part of the things that he stated to us, even accepting his synopsis for the sake of argument.

MR. BUGLIOSI: This is foundational, your Honor, and it leads up to the two nights of murder.

I have got to tell the jury of the interrelationship that Manson had with his co-conspirators, I have got to do that.

What is the People’s case? The relationship between, these people.

If I were to—

THE COURT: I think you can go into the relationship. I said that a number of times.

MR. BUGLIOSI: Right. But if I ask Linda, “Why did you cut off your hair,” just hypothetically, and she is not permitted to say, “Manson told me,” if she were to say, “Well, Manson wanted me to do it,” or “I thought he wanted me to do it,” it would be a conclusion.

The objection would be, “How do you know he wanted you to do it?” it would be a conclusion on her part.

I am trying to avoid conclusions.

THE COURT: That is highly questionable whether that response would be hearsay at all.

MR. BUGLIOSI: No, it wouldn’t be hearsay, that response, but it would be a conclusion on her part, and the defense would object, your Honor, that that is a conclusion on her part.

THE COURT: That question hasn’t been asked.

MR. BUGLIOSI: No. But I am giving the Court an example.

If I ask her why they did certain things, and she said, “Because Charlie wanted us to do it,” that would he a conclusion and they would object on the grounds that it is a conclusion.

The evidence of it is that he told them to do it. That is the direct evidence of it.

I don’t want to start—

THE COURT: If their state of mind was important on that subject, then it would be admissible. It wouldn’t be hearsay at all.

If their state of mind was unimportant, it would be either hearsay or inadmissible.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I am sorry that we are taking up all the Court’s time here, but it goes to the very heart of our case.

THE COURT: I understand that it is important, and I suggest that you think it over and get your thoughts organized tonight.

I will certainly give it further consideration.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I appreciate that.

THE COURT: And we will take it up in the morning.

MR. BUGLIOSI: All right. What time?

THE COURT: 9:00 o’clock.

We have a motion here that can be resolved rather quickly, or put over to another day probably.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I think it should be taken up back in chambers.

MR. KANAREK: No. We want it in open court, your Honor.

MR. BUGLIOSI: I will gladly have it in open court.

THE COURT: Of course, I can confer with counsel whenever I want to, Mr. Kanarek. Any time, anywhere, assuming you are all present.

MR. KANAREK: Yes. I am saying that I want the proceedings in open court.

MR. BUGLIOSI: The reason why I would want it back in chambers is for the defense’s benefit. I will be making statements here in open court about all the things that Manson had these people do, and they are going to pick it up in the press.

If you want that, be my guest.

THE COURT: It would be out of the presence of the jury.

MR. BUGLIOSI: But the press would pick it up.

MR. HUGHES: I would make a further discovery motion that we have the purported questions and answers.

THE COURT: You can take it up tomorrow morning, Mr. Hughes. We are not going to do it now.

We are going to adjourn now.

(Whereupon, all counsel return to their respective places at counsel table and the following proceedings occurred in open court within the presence and hearing of the jury:)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, do not converse with anyone and do not form or express any opinion regarding this case until it is finally submitted to you.

The Court will adjourn until 9:45 tomorrow morning.

MR. STOVITZ: Does your Honor want any cases on that?

(Whereupon, at 4:16 p.m. the Court was in recess.)